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Introduction 
 
The objective of this work is to provide experimental evidence in relation to the topic of 
bounded rationality in economic decision making. I report three experimental studies, 
one on integrative negotiation, one on committees’ decision making with logrolling, and 
one on the perception of risk, that I carried out with the aim to analyse the implications 
of categorization processes in human decision making. The purpose of the experiments 
is to test the hypothesis that people do not behave according to the perfect rationality 
and maximization assumptions of Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEUT), which 
underlie many economic models, but rather as satisficers who try to simplify complex 
decision problems through the process of categorization.  
Particular importance throughout this work has been given to the adoption of an 
interdisciplinary approach by integrating psychological and economic perspectives, and 
by transferring the concept of categorization from the psychological research to the 
study of economic decision making. 
 
For a long time decision making has been the object of study almost exclusively of 
economists and mathematicians. As a consequence it is originally of a normative nature, 
concerned with prescribing the course of action that most fully conforms to a decision 
maker’s own goals, expectations and values.  
Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEUT) represents the most actual and widely 
accepted normative theory of decision making, and bases its architecture on the 
fundamental principles of perfect rationality and of utility maximization.  
Much debate and empirical research has centred around the question of whether this 
theory can actually describe both the goals that motivate real decision makers and the 
process they employ when making their decisions.  
The moment one moves beyond simple constrained settings, as those treated by SEUT, 
to real-world situations, the time, knowledge, and computational capabilities that SEUT 
demands in order to make decisions grow unfeasibly large.  
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Many experimental studies, indeed, have rigorously tested the foundations of SEUT, 
and have given a solid proof  that several axioms and principles underlying it are 
systematically violated by individuals.  
 
As an alternative to SEUT, in the 1950’s Herbert Simon introduced the theory of 
bounded rationality which provides a new key for understanding how actual people 
make decisions. This theory postulates that decision-makers avoid the problem of 
evaluating utilities and comparing incommensurable features. Fundamental is the idea 
that humans are constrained by limitations of time, knowledge, perception and 
computational abilities, and that these limitations force individuals to construct 
simplified and partial models of the world in order to deal with complexity. 
In opposition to the concept of optimization, the key principle of bounded rationality is 
that of “satisficing”, whereby individuals strive to attain some satisfactory, though not 
necessarily maximal, level of achievement. 
The exponents of the bounded rationality framework sustain that much of human 
decision making cab be understood by examining the cognitive limitations that 
constrain our ability to cope with complexity, and thus by taking into consideration the 
evidence coming from the psychological research. The attempt to incorporate 
psychological aspects into economic models of decision making has given birth to a 
new discipline, Experimental Economics, which has the purpose to test the actual 
correspondence between economic theories of human behavior and empirical data, and 
to generate new theoretical models or corrections to the original ones.  
One of the most consistent conclusions drawn from economic-psychological 
experiments is that human decision making is guided by heuristics which are 
simplifying strategies, or rules of action, that allow to take decisions with limited time 
and knowledge and do not require to compute probabilities and utilities.  
 
An example of simplifying strategy is represented by the process of categorization.  
Economics, with the exception of the research on consumer behavior, has paid very 
little attention to this topic. The reasons for that probably have to do, among other 
things, with the particular nature of the research. It is rare to derive in this vein simple 
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formal theories which make sharp predictions and which can be readily translated into a 
set of coherent axioms.  
Studies on memory and cognition have shown that information about the world is 
usually stored and retrieved according to hierarchical or cluster-type structures of 
categories. The functional role of categorization is to contribute to “cognitive economy” 
by parsing environmental variation into units that can be processed and manipulated 
more efficiently than continuous variation. 
A fundamental principle of categorization pertains to the structure of the perceived 
world. Combinations of attributes in the perceived world do not appear uniformly, but 
according to a highly correlational structure that forms natural discontinuities (so, for 
example, the pair of attributes wings and feathers has a higher probability of co-
occurring compared to wings and fur). Categories can be thought of as concepts or 
images reflecting such discontinuities in a cognitive system.  
The key role of categories is to provide expectations about a class of objects, which are 
than translated to novel instances, whenever encountered. The role of categories, in 
short, is both providing an interpretation of stimuli and guiding inference, e.g. providing 
pre-stored expectations in substitution for missing information. 
The issue of categorization has been tackled by two main lines of research, the cognitive 
and the psychophysical one, that have been proceeding more or less independently from 
one another. 
The first line of research is concerned with “generic knowledge” (GK) categories, and 
the other with “sensory perception” (SP) categories. So far it hasn’t been possible to 
define SP and GK categories rigorously, and perhaps the best way to define these two 
category types is operationally.  
GK categories are those studied by investigators interested in semantic analysis, 
memory organization, and abstract thought. Work on GK categories is often closely tied 
to cognitive science issues concerning knowledge representation and processing. 
Examples of GK categories include natural kinds (e.g., birds), artifacts (e.g., cars), and 
events (e.g., going to restaurants);  
SP categories are those categories studied by investigators interested in sensory 
processes and perception. Work on SP categories is often closely tied to psychophysical 
issues concerning the relationship between physical stimulation and sensation, for 
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example, that between the physical intensity of a stimulus and the psychological 
intensity of the sensation it causes. 
Examples of SP categories include categories of visual (e.g., colors), auditory (speech 
and non-speech sounds), tactile, gustatory, olfactory, and proprioceptive information.   
The psychophysical research on SP categories has demonstrated the existence of 
categorical perception (CP), a phenomenon which continues to engage the interest of 
investigators, even though there has been little agreement about what processes might 
underlie this way of perceiving. CP was first observed with the perception of speech 
sounds, but it has since been found in a variety of domains.  It refers to a phenomenon 
in which a range of stimuli from a physical continuum gives rise to a limited set of 
discrete perceptual responses. The stimuli, in other words, are perceived as if they 
belonged to one or another perceptual category in an all-or-none fashion, rather than 
appearing to vary continuously as a function of their physical values.  
A consequence of this all-or-none categorization process is that the distance between 
stimuli within the same perceptual category is perceived as being smaller than the 
distance between stimuli belonging to two different categories, even though the actual 
distance is the same.  
In the hypothetical case of absolute or perfect CP people would not be able to 
discriminate members of the same category at all (i.e., they would be unable to tell two 
different exemplars of the same category apart). In such a case one would expect to find 
both chance performance in discriminating among the perceptually equivalent stimuli 
drawn from a single perceptual category and a higher degree of discriminability 
between stimuli drawn from separate perceptual categories. Experimental evidence 
however has shown that CP is usually less than absolute.  
This notion of a discrete perceptual recoding of a physical continuum has represented a 
challenge to classical psychophysical functions that crudely approximate the continuous 
monotonic recoding implied by Fechner’s Law and Steven’s Power Law. 
 
The idea at the basis of my research is to analyse if a phenomenon similar to the CP 
observed in the psychophysical research, takes place even in the evaluation of the 
options available to choice in economic decision making. 
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In the first experimental study, on bilateral integrative negotiation, I pose the question 
of how a continuum of monetary outcomes is actually perceived by individuals; is it 
really perceived as a continuum, as standard economic theory assumes, or is it rather 
perceived in a discrete way? And if this second hypothesis were true, how would this 
categorization process influence the outcomes of negotiation? 
Integrative negotiation is usually defined in opposition to distributive negotiation and 
refers to those situations in which the parties have the possibility to maximise their 
outcomes without competing with one another in a direct win-lose fashion. When the 
negotiation involves many issues, indeed, there exists often the possibility (through 
logrolling) to create tradeoffs in which the parties concede on low-priority interests in 
order to receive satisfaction of high-priority interests, and therefore reach win-win 
agreements. 
The purpose of the experiment on bilateral integrative negotiation is to show that people 
do not behave as optimizers but rather like satisficers who simplify the negotiation 
problem by categorizing a continuum of outcomes into a discrete set containing only 
two categories (as will be shown, satisficing always implies a categorization process), 
and that the adoption of this simplifying procedure can lead to suboptimal outcomes and 
to what I call the “Zone of Agreement Bias” (ZAB).  
In the second experimental study I extend the investigation of categorization processes 
to commitees’ decision making with logrolling. I analyse the topic of coalition 
formation in multi-issue commitees’ decisions under different voting rules when there is 
the opportunity of logrolling (or vote trading). In particular I’ve carried out three 
experiments with the aim to analyse how categorization, satisficing, and the ZAB 
observed in bilateral integrative negotiations influence the process of coalition 
formation and the optimality of the outcomes.  
The topic I deal with in these three experiments lies in the intersect of the disciplinary 
areas of negotiation research and public choice theory. Logrolling, indeed, and the 
negotiation processes it involves, has been treated in both areas, but with different 
approaches and methodologies, which in my opinion can be integrated. Negotiation 
research, on the one hand, is more empirically based, in that it makes a wider use of 
direct observation and of experimentation, and stresses the importance of taking into 
account negotiators’ cognitive processes. Most of the work which has been done so far, 
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however, exclusively deals with bilateral negotiation. How coalition formation in 
committees’ multilateral negotiations under different voting rules works has been left 
open to question. Public choice research, on the other hand, treats the topic of 
committees’ multilateral negotiation, coalition formation, and voting rules, but is mainly 
of a purely theoretical nature and is built on the assumption of negotiators’ perfect 
rationality. My objective is to simultaneously draw from and to integrate both 
perspectives. 
In the first experiment on committees’ decision making with logrolling, I consider a 
situation of 3-issues and 3-parties negotiations with majority rule, and test the 
hypothesis that categorization, satisficing, and the ZAB  might lead the subjects to form 
suboptimal coalitions and to choose Pareto-dominated agreements. I compare then my 
experimental findings with the predictions of the standard public choice theory.  
In the second experiment I test the hypothesis that, in a situation like the one analysed in 
the first experiment, the adoption of the unanimity, instead of the majority, rule could 
reduce the suboptimizing effect of the ZAB, and produce a much higher rate of optimal 
agreements.  
The third experiment, finally, has the purpose to test if the results obtained in  
experiments 1 and 2 hold even when the level of complexity of the negotiation problem 
increases. To this aim I consider a situation of four-issues and four-parties negotiations 
under both the majority and the unanimity rule. 
 
As to the third experimental study, on decision making under risk, I take as starting 
point the results of previous empirical research indicating that people systematically 
violate the principles of rational decision-making when judging probabilities, making 
predictions or otherwise attempting to cope with probabilistic tasks. Instead of applying 
the correct rules for estimating probabilities, individuals adopt intuitive heuristics, 
which allow to reduce difficult mental tasks to simpler ones.  
On the basis of this evidence, I advance the hypothesis that in the field of decision 
making under risk one simplifying strategy that people might use is that of 
categorization. I suppose that in a choice task involving many alternatives people do not 
adopt a rational optimizing algorithm to come to a decision, but rather simplify the 
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decision problem through a process of categorization of the alternatives available to 
choice. 
I give the example of a person driving a car and making the decision of how fast to 
drive; if she exceeds the speed limit there’s a certain probability to be caught by the 
police and to be given a ticket proportional, by a certain factor, to the violation of the 
speed limit. 
My hypothesis is that, in such a situation, most of the people do not compute the 
expected utility associated to every option (i.e. to every possible speed), and than 
choose the option with the highest expected utility; rather they simplify the decision 
problem by recoding the set of options available into a set containing only two 
categories: risk (exceed the speed limit) or no risk (observe the speed limit), and the 
choice is then made only between these two alternatives. This would mean that the 
relevant choice for the individual would be either to observe the speed limit or not to 
observe it, and, in the case that she opts for this second option, all the speeds above the 
speed limit would be perceived as almost equivalent, or at least as more close to one 
another than they actually are, so that the choice of the exact speed would be made 
(almost) randomly. As in the psychophysical research on CP, I based my experiments 
on the analysis of a discrimination performance of the subjects. Nevertheless, because 
of the different nature of the stimuli my research is concerned with, it has been 
necessary to develop a new method in order to infer the ability of the subjects to 
discriminate among options.  
 
The thesis is structured in the following way: 
The first section presents an overview of the leading normative and descriptive theories 
of decision-making.  
In the first chapter I describe the Theory of Subjective Expected Utility (SEUT) and the 
normative theories that have preceded it, and then introduce the theory of Bounded 
Rationality.  
In chapter 2 I review economic research that has attempted to modify and render more 
realistic the standard theories of decision making by incorporating psychological 
aspects in the study of economic behavior. 
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Chapter 3 is concerned with the use of experimentation in economic research. I discuss 
the experimental method with its pros and cons, and review the main experimental 
studies that have put into question the concept of perfect rationality. 
 
In section 2 I review the psychological literature on categorization. 
Chapter one introduces the concepts of category and categorization.  
In chapter 2 I describe the cognitive and psychophysical approaches to categorization, 
which are concerned respectively with the study of GK and SP categories. 
Chapter 3 is concerned with the phenomenon of Categorical perception (CP) which has 
been observed in SP categories. 
 
In section 3 I describe my experimental study on categorization processes in bilateral 
integrative negotiation. 
Chapter one is concerned with the concepts of integrative negotiation and of logrolling, 
and discusses previous research on the topic.  
In the second chapter I describe the experiment on categorization processes in bilateral 
integrative negotiation, where I test the hypothesis that categorization might lead to the 
ZAB and to suboptimal outcomes. 
 
Section 4 presents the experimental study on committees’ decision making with 
logrolling. 
In chapter 1 I review the standard public choice approach to logrolling in committees’ 
decision making. 
In chapters 2-4 I report 3 experiments on multilateral integrative negotiation, where I 
analyse the topics of coalition formation and voting rules, and the relationship between 
categorization and the optimality of the outcomes.  
 
Section 5 is dedicated to the experimental study on categorization processes in decision 
making under risk. 
The first chapter provides a review of the empirical findings relative to probabilistic 
decision making. 
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In chapter 2 I report my experiment on the perception of risk, in which I test the 
hypothesis that a phenomenon similar to the CP demonstrated for physical stimuli, 
might take place also in the field of decision making under risk. 
 
In the conclusions are summarized the main findings of this research. 
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Section 1 
Normative and descriptive approaches  
to decision making 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The first chapter of this section presents a brief overview of the leading normative and 
descriptive theories of decision-making. I first describe the Theory of Subjective 
Expected Utility (SEUT) and the normative theories that have preceded it, and then 
introduce the theory of Bounded Rationality. Particular emphasis is given to a 
comparison between the SEUT, that assumes maximization of subjective expected 
utility as a normative guideline, and a conceptualization of bounded rationality which is 
descriptive in intent, and which takes the distance from the ideal of maximization.  
 
In chapter 2 I review economic research that has attempted to modify and render more 
realistic the standard theories of decision making by incorporating psychological 
aspects in the study of economic behavior. 
 
Chapter 3 is concerned with the use of experimentation in economic research. I discuss 
the experimental method with its pros and cons,  and review the main experimental 
studies that have put into question the concept of perfect rationality. It has to be 
remarked that the experiments described in this section concern only decision making 
under certainty. Experimental studies on decision making under risk and uncertainty, 
indeed are reviewed in chapter 5.1. 
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1.1  From Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEUT) to 
bounded rationality 
 
The objective of decision theory is to provide a rationale for making wise decisions 
mainly under conditions of risk and uncertainty. For a long time decision making has 
been the object of study almost exclusively of economists and mathematicians. As a 
consequence it is originally of a normative nature, concerned with prescribing the 
course of action that conforms most fully to the decision maker’s own goals, 
expectations and values.  
Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEUT) represents the most widely accepted 
normative approach to the study of decision making, and it bases its architecture on the 
fundamental principle that a choice is rational to the extent that it maximizes the 
subjective expected utility associated to the outcome of a choice.  
 
SEUT belongs to a group of normative decision-making theories, common to all of 
which is the probabilistic concept of expected value as a rule to compute the value of an 
option.  
The notion of expected value was proposed by Bernoulli (1738) in order to solve a 
problem raised by a group of aristocrats. The latter asked him if there was a rational 
method to evaluate a bet. He suggested to execute a simple calculation, i.e. to multiply 
the amount to be gained and the amount to be lost respectively times the probability to 
win and the probability to lose. Then the two products had to be summed up and if the 
sum was negative they had to refuse the bet. Moreover he recommended that, if they 
had to chose among more bets, they had to chose the one with the highest sum, i.e. with 
the highest expected value. 
Formally, a simple bet can be represented in terms of a prospect ),;...;,( 11 nn pxpx  
where an individual can obtain the outcome ix  with probability 
 and 
he expected value  of a prospect, is calculated this way: 
ip , and where 
1...21 =+++ nppp ni ...1=   
 
 )(VT
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 ∑
=
ss in terms of expected value soon ran into problems: the 
plication of the expected value principle indeed could comport absurd implications. 
es up at the 
ird toss, $4, at the fourth toss, $8, and so on. What is the fair price player 2 should pay 
to play this game? The fair price is defined by the expected value of the bet. By 
applying the formula for the computation of the expected value we obtain: 
=
ni
ii xpV
...1
  
 
The definition of reasonablene
ap
An example of it is given by the so-called St. Petersburg Paradox, based on the 
following monetary gamble:   
  
Player 1 offers player 2 a gamble in which a fair coin is repeatedly tossed as long as 
heads doesn’t come up. If the coin comes up heads on the first toss, player 1 pays player 
2 1$; if heads comes up at the second toss, player 2 receives $2; if it com
th
 
∞=+++=+++= ...2/12/12/1...)4)(8/1()2)(4/1()1)(2/1(V  
 
In other words player 2 should be ready to pay an infinitely large amount of money to 
play this game.  
Reasonable people, nevertheless, offer only some $5 to $10. This discrepancy was 
labelled a paradox, the St. Petersburg paradox, not because it is a logical paradox, but 
 of finding a different principle which 
possessors. In other words, decisions are determined more by the interest or utility that 
because the mathematical theory was so at odds with the dictates of good sense. The 
theory of rationality was thought of as a description of human behavior as well as a 
prescription for it.  
The problem for Bernoulli became then the one
could be employed to guide decision making under risk. To resolve the discrepancy 
between theory and good sense, he proposed to modify the theory: from maximizing 
expected value to maximizing expected utility.  
The great intuition of Bernoulli was to show that there isn’t a simple equivalence 
between the monetary value of goods and the value that the latter have for their 
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the outcomes have for the decider, what Bernoulli calls the “moral value”, than their 
simple monetary value. He proposed a logarithmic function (see Fig. 1.1) between 
monetary value and utility, which is similar to the function proposed one century later 
by Fechner to measure the relationship between sensations and the intensity of stimuli 
or a description of Fechner’s Law, see footnote at p.), and which incorporates the fact 
at money has diminishing returns . 
 
 
Fig. 1.1 The utility function 
he utility function is monotonically increasing and negatively accelerated, thus implying risk aversion. 
(f
th
 
 
Monetary  
value 
Utility 
 
T
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Formally, the expected utility (EU) of a prospect 1x ),;...;,( 1 nn pxp  is calculated as 
llows: fo
 
∑
=
e p perty of risk aversion, which is 
efined as the tendency to prefer any sure outcome 
=
ni
ii xupEU
...1
)(  
 
where )( ixu  represents the utility associated to outcome ix . 
 
The concavity of the utility function embodies th ro
x , over any gamble with an d
expected value of x . So, for example, a risk averse person would prefer a sure gain of 
50$ rather than accepting a gamble offering a 50:50 chance to win 100$ or win 0$. 
Alternatively, a risk averse person would prefer to pay any amount y , rather than 
playing a gamble with an expected value equal to y− . 
 
The notion of utility formulated by Bernoulli received many criticisms and was 
neglected for several years. It was retrieved only recently as integrating part of the 
“Theory of Games and Economic Behavior” by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), 
(EU) Theory.  
lised the EU theory to allow  (the probability 
 the 
EUT therefore represents the youngest of a group of normative decision making 
theories, which differ from one another only on the basis of the determination of two 
a work in which the authors provided the axiomatic foundations of Expected Utility 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) developed a formal justification for the 
expected utility criterion. They showed that if an individual’s preferences satisfy certain 
basic axioms of rational behavior, than his decisions can be described as the 
maximization of expected utility.  
Subsequently Savage (1954) genera i
associated to outcome ix ) to represent subjective or personal probabilities. With the term 
“subjective” he referred to the “degree of belief” with which the occurrence of events is 
considered. Subjective evaluations or personal interpretations of the probabilities 
associated to the occurrence of an outcome can differ consistently with respect to
p
objective probability of occurrence . 
S
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parameters: instead of the objective values (monetary quantities), the subjective values 
(utilitie  the objective probabilities (in 
eneral statistical measures) the subjective probabilities are assigned to outcomes.  
e theories making, are summarized in Tab 1.1.. 
 
 
Tab. 1.1 Normative theories of decision making 
 
Values of outcomes/ 
Probabilities 
Objective Subjective 
s) are associated to outcomes, and/or instead of
g
The four types of normativ  of decision 
Objective 
 
Expected Value Expected Utility 
Subjective Subjective Expected Value Subjective 
 
Expected Utility 
 
 
 
Here follows an example of how SEUT is applied to decision making. 
Decisions under uncertainty are typically represented by a payoff matrix, in which the 
d a state of 
ince it is impossible to make a decision that will turn out best in any eventuality, 
ecision theorists view choice alternatives as gambles  where the decision-maker 
choose est subjective expected utility. 
The SEU value of an option is given by the sum of the utilities of the single possible 
consequences, weighted by the subjec babilities of occurren
 
 
rows correspond to alternative acts that the decision-maker can select and the columns 
correspond to possible states of nature.. The cells of the payoff matrix correspond to the 
possible consequences contingent upon the joint occurrence of a decision an
nature. A simple illustration for a traveller who has to decide whether to carry an 
umbrella or not is given in Table 1.2. 
S
d
s the course of action yielding the high
tive pro ce.  
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Tab. 1.2 Example of a payoff m  
 
State of nature / 
Alternatives 
Su  Rain 2  
atrix
n ( 1e ) )(e
1a  (+1) 
Stay dry carrying umbrella 
(+1) 
Stay dry carrying umbrella 
2
Dry and unburdened Wet and unburd
a  (+2) (0) 
ened 
 
 
 
Formally, the subjective expected utility of a course of action )(a  is given by: 
 
SEU ∑
=
f outcome . If we assume that the parenthesised s cells of Tab. 1.2 
sent the traveler’s utilities or the various consequences, and if the subjective 
robability of sun and rain are taken to be .6 and .4 respectively, we can compute the 
=
ni
ii xuepa
...1
)()()(  
 
where nxxx ,..., 21   are the possible consequences of the course of action )(a , which are 
contingent respectively on the occurrence events neee ,..., 21 ; )( iep  represents the 
subjective probability of occurrence of the ith event, and )( ixu  represents the subjective 
utility o  ix  value  in the 
repre  f
p
subjective expected utility for each action as follows: 
 
SEU 1)1(4,0)1(6,0)( 1 =+++=a  
SEU 2,1)0(4,0)2(6,0)( 2 =++=a   
 
In this situation, leaving the umbrella has greater expected utility than taking it along.  
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SEUT, taken as prediction or as explanation of decisions, is deduced from axiomatic 
principles that presumably would be accepted by any rational man and thus requires in 
construct 
c  that humans choose the options 
c c  
ic e. Four axioms are 
re h teries, p a 
robability, ∼ the indifference relationship, and  the preference relationship: 
any case that some prerequisites are fulfilled. 
In other words, only when certain axioms, i.e. fundamental assumptions over 
preferential behavior, are fulfilled, it is possible and right to interpret and to re
the observed choices as expressions of the prin iple
with the highest subje tive expe ted value.
There are various variants of the axiomat  foundation of this principl
nowadays central. They a  t e following ones, where X, Y, Z are lot
p ≥
1) Comparability: for all X, Y either X≤Y or Y≥X; 
2) Transitivity: if X Y and Y Z then X Z 
4) Z,1-p) 
For or simplicity the indifference relation is neglected): 
1) 
2) nd Y to Z, then he also 
3) 
) Continuity: if a decision maker is offered a choice between a lottery X, where, 
≥ ≥ ≥
3) Independence: if X≥Y then (X,p;Z) ≥  (Y,p;Z) for every p and Z 
Continuity: for every X≥Y≥Z there exists a p such that Y∼ (X,p; 
 
mulated in a simpler way (f
 
Comparability: A decision maker can compare the options with one another, and 
between two lotteries X and Y he prefers either X to Y or Y to X. 
Transitivity: If a decision maker prefers the lottery X to Y a
prefers the lottery X to Z. 
Independence: If two lotteries X and Y contain some outcomes which are identical 
and equally likely, then these outcomes don’t matter for the decision; in other 
words, the choice between two options only depends on those outcomes on which 
the two options differ; the common outcomes are neglected. 
4
among three possible outcomes, he can obtain the best outcome with probability p 
and the worst outcome with probability 1-p, and a lottery Y, where he can obtain the 
middle outcome with certainty, then it is always possible to find a probability p such 
that the decision maker is indifferent between X and Y (Jungermann et al., 1998). 
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Decision theory assumes that the rational decision-maker wishes to select an action that 
is logically consistent with his basic preferences for outcomes and his feelings about the 
rth of 
 alternative.  
ision-makers and the 
ited time, 
 in the application of normative decision theory arises from the fact that the 
nge of theoretically possible alternatives available to choice is often quite large. In 
, the outcomes are considerably more complex than in our simple 
the theory of 
likelihoods of the events upon which those outcomes depend. Given this assumption, 
the practical problem becomes one of listing the alternatives, comparing the wo
one outcome with the worth of another one directly by translating both into a common 
scale of utility, and scaling the likelihood of occurrence of each outcome so that 
subjective expected utility can be calculated for each
Although this theory originated primarily out of normative concerns, there are those 
who argue that it has a relevance for describing how decisions are actually made. 
Much debate and empirical research has centred around the question of whether this 
theory can actually describe both the goals that motivate real dec
process they employ when making their decisions.  
Traditional models of rational decision making tend to ignore the fact that individuals 
have to make inferences on aspects of the world under constraints of lim
knowledge, and computational capacity.  As Gigerenzer (1999) observes, “they treat the 
mind as a Laplacean Demon equipped with unlimited resources.”  
The moment one moves beyond simple constrained settings, such as those treated by 
SEUT, to real-world situations that people actually live through, the time, knowledge, 
and computation that  rational choice theory demands grow unfeasibly large.  
A problem
ra
addition to carrying an umbrella, the traveller in our earlier example may have the 
options of carrying a raincoat, getting a ride, waiting for the rain to stop and many 
others. Likewise
example.  
 
As an alternative to SEUT, in the 1950’s Herbert Simon introduced 
bounded rationality which provides a new key for understanding how actual people 
make decisions. 
This theory postulates that decision-makers do not think probabilistically and that they 
try to avoid the necessity of facing uncertainty directly. Likewise, they avoid the 
problem of evaluating utilities and comparing incommensurable features. 
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Simon (1959) observed: “The classical theory is a theory of a man choosing among 
fixed and known alternatives, to each of which are attached known consequences. But 
er to deal with 
ality is 
levant aspects of her environment, 
                                                          
when perception and cognition intervene between the decision-maker and his objective 
environment, this model no longer proves adequate. We need a description of the choice 
process that recognises that alternatives are not given but must be sought; and a 
description that takes into account the arduous task of determining what consequences 
will follow on each alternative.” 
At the basis of Simon’s (1957) theory of “bounded rationality” is the idea that cognitive 
limitations force decision-makers to construct simplified models in ord
the world. Simon argued that the decision-maker: “[….] behaves rationally with respect 
to his (simplified) model, and such behavior is not even approximately optimal with 
respect to the real world. To predict his behavior, we must understand the way in which 
this simplified model is constructed, and its construction will certainly be related to his 
psychological properties as a perceiving, thinking and learning animal.” 
In opposition to the concept of optimization, a key principle of bounded ration
that of satisficing, whereby individuals strive to attain some satisfactory, though not 
necessarily maximal, level of achievement. Simon (1956) sustained that “however 
adaptive the behavior of organisms in learning and choice situations, this adaptiveness 
falls far short of the ideal of “maximizing” postulated in economic theory. Evidently 
organisms adapt well enough to “satisfice”: they do not, in general, optimize”.1  
Simon introduced the concept of procedural rationality, as opposed to that of 
substantive rationality assumed by the economy orthodoxy. Substantive rationality is 
about outcomes. It occurs when behavior is appropriate to attain a given goal, under 
given conditions (constraints). A person is substantively-rational if she is assumed to 
have a sufficient amount of information about all re
the ability to compute benefits and costs of available alternative courses of action, 
information about the probability of each outcome of choice, and a willingness and 
ability to understand and consider simultaneously all current and future available 
alternatives. Assuming that individuals are substantially rational, and that they have a 
definite goal, economics can be done with calculus. 
1 The topic of satisficing will be treated in more detail in chapter 3.2. 
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The concept of procedural rationality, on the contrary is more related to the process than 
to the outcomes of decision-making. It is part of a model of behavior in which the 
otivation to act comes from drives, and the termination of action occurs when the 
plex problem-solving 
 problem. Such 
pertoire; they allow to make inferences with limited time 
which guide the search for 
formation and alternatives, and provide rules for stopping search and making 
 the first assumes that search can go on indefinitely while the latter 
attention, money and other resources being spent. More specifically, this vision of 
m
drive is satisfied. The relationship between drives and satisfaction depends on the 
aspirations and experience of individuals. Boundedly rational decision-makers are 
forced to proceed by trial and error, modifying plans that do not yield satisfactory 
outcomes and maintaining those that do until they fail.  
 
The adoption on part of the individuals of strategies with the purpose of individuating 
and choosing satisficing options has been largely analysed in com
situations such as, for example, the game of chess. It has been shown how the 
impossibility to keep under control and to manipulate a multiplicity of information 
forces the decision-maker to adopt strategies aimed at simplifying the
strategies, known as heuristics, are procedures which do not grant the solution of the 
problem but which allow the subject to come closer to the mete.  
Many heuristics are natural in that they derive from cognitive mechanisms which 
belong to the mind’s normal re
and knowledge and don’t require to compute probabilities and utilities.  
The premise of bounded rationality is that much of human reasoning and decision 
making can be modelled by fast and frugal heuristics 
in
decisions (Gigerenzer, 1999).  
One of the key differences between unbounded rationality and bounded rationality, 
indeed, is that
involves only limited information and alternatives search. 
 
Sometimes the term bounded rationality is used in connection with theories about 
optimization under constraints. Gigerenzer (1999) warns that we shouldn’t confuse the 
two concepts: 
“The models in the class we call “optimization under constraints” assume that a 
stopping rule optimizes search [for information] with respect to time, computation, 
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rationality holds that the mind should calculate the benefits and costs of searching for 
each further piece of information and stop search as soon as the costs outweigh the 
 glance, but a closer look 
an require even more knowledge and 
Imagine a decision maker who has to solve an optimization problem in order to 
 
aker must devise a method for 
ore it can be applied. This leads to two levels of 
ecision-making activities which both take time: 
al approach to the problem of Level 2? One can hardly imagine that 
 some 
me must be spent to find an optimal method for solving the task of Level 2. Thus we 
 is clear that in this way we obtain an infinite sequence of levels k = 2,3,… provided 
benefits (e.g., Anderson and Milson, 1989; Sargent, 1993). The rule “stop search when 
the costs outweigh the benefits” sounds plausible at first
reveals that optimization under constraints c
computation than unbounded rationality.”  
In other words, it is argued that the task the individuals have to solve might be much 
more complicated with these constraints than without them. 
Selten (1999) provides the following example: 
“
maximize utility over a set of decision alternatives. Assume that decision time is scarce 
in the sense that there is a deadline for choosing one of the alternatives. The decision 
maker has to do his best within the available time.
 
In the case of an unfamiliar problem, the decision m
finding the alternative to be chosen bef
d
 
Level 1: Finding the alternative to be chosen 
Level 2: Finding a method for Level 1. 
 
What is the optim
this problem is familiar. Presumably a decision-maker who does not immediately know 
what to do on Level 1 will also not be familiar with the task of Level 2. Therefore,
ti
arrive at Level 3. 
It
that finding an optimal method for Level k continues to be unfamiliar for every k. 
 
Level k: Finding a method for Level k-1. 
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It is reasonable to assume that there is a positive minimum time which is required for 
e decision-making activities at each Level k. Obviously this has the consequence that th
an optimization approach is not feasible when decision time is scarce.”  
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1.2 Bringing psychology into economics 
 
Judgement and decision, as other cognitive abilities, are naturally determined by the 
way the mind works and therefore can’t be fully understood, unless we know the 
characteristics and the constraints of the human cognitive system. 
 
Proponents of unbounded rationality generally are aware of the fact that their models 
assume unrealistic mental abilities, but nevertheless defend them by sustaining that 
individuals act as if they were unboundedly rational. Following this interpretation, 
rational choice theory does not describe the process but merely the outcome of 
reasoning.  
Another common defence is that, while psychology investigates humans in all their 
richness, economics requires models characterized by mathematical convenience and 
tractability, that are not so rich as to retard the process of drawing out their economic 
implications. As a response to this argument, Thaler (1994) ironically observes: “[…] 
rational models are simple and elegant with precise predictions, while behavioral 
odels tend to be complicated, and messy, with much vaguer predictions. But look at it 
has 
ost of the 
m
this way. Would you rather be elegant and precisely wrong, or messy and vaguely right?  
 
Rabin (1996) as well recollects a parable being used to make fun of “economists’ taste 
for easy methods of investigation”: a drunk man is looking for his wallet at night under 
a street lamp. Asked whether he lost the wallet near the street lamp, he replies no, he 
lost it elsewhere, but he is searching for it under the street lamp because it is easier to 
see there. 
 
A large amount of experimental evidence (see chapters 1.3.2 and chapter 5.1), 
demonstrated that several axioms and principles of the economic normative theories are 
empirically falsified (see, for example, Tversky, Kahnemann, 1986; Thaler, 1987, Kagel 
and Roth, 1995). Many experimental studies indeed, have rigorously tested the 
foundations of traditional economic theory and have given a solid proof that m
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basic properties of preference structures and the underlying utility theory are 
systematically violated by individuals. 
In light of the tensions and of the discrepancies between the microeconomic and the 
sychological approach, some economists have felt the need to modify standard theories 
ic research will take longer. But even in 
s to remedy them.”  
sed in judgement and decision have been shown to 
ople’s 
 subjects 
p
of decision making in a way that can prove to be more realistic in the study of economic 
behavior. 
An example is given by Rabin (1996) who sustains: “As messy as complicating our 
familiar model of humans will be, however, it is not legitimate for economics to 
continue to ignore psychological research. The latter systematically explores human 
judgement and behavior, and can teach us important facts about how humans differ 
from traditional economic assumptions. Many psychological findings are robust 
enough, tractable enough, and of enough potential economic importance that we ought 
begin to incorporate them into economics. Other findings raise more fundamental 
challenges, and incorporating them into econom
these cases, economists ought to become aware of the shortcomings of our models, 
regret these shortcomings, and keep our eyes open for way
 
In the last twenty years, the psychological current known as cognitivismus has 
developed a considerable amount of research aimed at understanding the functioning of 
the cognitive system and the conditions and constraints to which it is subject. This line 
of research has identified a multiplicity of operations and constraints related to the 
perception, storage, elaboration and retrieval of information extracted from the 
environment. The strategies that are u
be clearly conditioned by these cognitive constraints.  
Miller (1956), in his famous study of classification and coding, has shown that pe
ability to process sensory signals is subject to severe limitations (see chapter 2.2.2).  
About the same time Bruner, Goodnow and Awstin (1956), observed human 
performance in concept formation tasks and were led to conclude that their
were experiencing a condition of “cognitive strain” and were trying to overcome it by 
means of simplification strategies.  
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The processing of conceptual information is currently viewed as a serial process that is 
constrained by limited short-term memory and a slow storage in long-term memory 
ewell and Simon, 1972). 
nts to which the cognitive 
on of information is selective, since the stream of 
timulation is continuous and the system seems not to be well equipped in order to 
 a sort of sensorial record for a very short time, about 3 seconds; afterwards the 
 the functioning of the other two levels of the human 
assumed that information is permanently stored. Nevertheless, the problems connected 
with this storage are related to the possibility of a correct retrieval of information. It is 
(N
 
In the following are presented some examples of the constrai
system is subject. 
A first limitation can be observed in the moment in which individuals extract 
information from the environment, i.e. the first step in the process of elaboration of the 
cognitive system. The acquisiti
s
handle the huge amount of information coming from the environment. Individuals seem 
not to be able to contemporaneously elaborate two pieces of information and therefore 
they need to select the stimulation source, i.e., to filter information before it is 
elaborated (Broadbent, 1958; Treisman, 1960). 
This limitation can be partially overcome through the automatization of processes, as in 
the case of language learning, writing or playing a piano. 
In addition to a limitation due to the capacity of the channel, the system is also 
penalised  by a limited duration of information storage at a sensorial level, i.e., in the 
very first phase of acquisition. It has been demonstrated that sensorial inputs can remain 
in
information results almost totally deteriorated (Sperling, 1960). What gets lost in 
entrance is somehow integrated by the already acquired information, as in the case of 
words recognition (Massaro, 1979).   
There are also problems in
memory, i.e., in the short- and long-term memory (Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968).  
As to the short-term memory, it is generally recognised that it’s a storage that can’t 
contain much information and that the duration is short. For example, Miller (1956) has 
hypothesised that an individual can keep at most seven pieces of information.  
Long-term memory doesn’t have limitations as to the storage capacity; moreover it is 
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already known that retrieval is often the result of a reconstruction process in which 
information loses its original characteristics.  
a m
 
 general the economic-psychological research can be roughly categorized by how 
 of outcomes. 
hile applying this principle to consumption and income, Kahneman and Tversky 
                                                          
 
As we said earlier, in the last decades many economists have tried to incorporate in their 
models the findings coming from the psychological research. 
This tte pt has given birth to a new transmethodological discipline, economic 
psychology, which makes a wide use of experimentation, and in which psychological 
and economic aspects converge in an organic, unitary, and multidisciplinary approach to 
the study of economic behavior. 
In
radically it challenges the two basic components of the standard economics model of the 
individual: that she has stable, well-defined preferences over a choice set X, and that she 
rationally maximizes those preferences, i.e. she Max U(x). 
I’ll first discuss psychological research which involves the least radical departure from 
mainstream economics in that it explores ways to make U(x) more realistic within the 
rational-choice framework, and requires relatively small modifications of the familiar 
economic models. The basic idea is that many psychological findings can be 
incorporated in economic models simply by modifying the utility functions we employ.  
 
Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory2 (1979) suggests that a person’s preferences 
often depend on changes in outcomes with respect to reference levels (which can 
correspond to a status quo,  an expectation or an aspiration level),  rather than merely on 
absolute levels
W
(1979a) stress that the salience of changes from reference points is a basic aspect of 
human nature: “An essential feature of the present theory is that the carriers of value are 
changes in wealth or welfare, rather than final states. This assumption is compatible 
with basic principles of perception and judgment. Our perceptual apparatus is attuned to 
2 The topic will be treated in more detail in chapter 5.1. 
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the evaluation of changes or differences rather than to the evaluation of absolute 
magnitudes.” 
Understanding that people are more sensible to changes than to absolute levels suggests 
that we might incorporate into utility functions such factors as, for example, habitual 
levels of consumption. Rabin (1996) has observed: “For instance, instead of utility at 
time t , tu , depending solely on present consumption, tc , it may also depend on a 
“reference level” r , determined by fat ctors like past consumption or expectations of 
ption. Hence, instead of m cu , 
r wealth levels. That the displeasure from a 
onetary loss is greater than the pleasure from a same sized gain is also implied by a 
ntional risk aversion is that the 
their 
as equal-
d well-being is 
diminishing sensitivity reflects a more fundamental feature of human cognition and 
positing a utility function of the for  )(future consum tt
utility should be written in a more general form, ),( ttt cru ”. 
  
A further aspect that has been regularly observed by Kahneman and Tversky is that 
losses resonate more than gains. In a wide variety of domains, people are more averse to 
losses than they are attracted to same-sized gains. One of the main fields where loss 
aversion occurs is in preferences ove
m
concave utility function, which economists typically use as the explanation for risk 
aversion. The difference between loss aversion and conve
utility function abruptly changes slope at the reference level, so that people, even in 
situations involving small amounts of money, are significantly risk averse”. People 
dislike losing $10 more than they like gaining $11; this implies that they prefer 
status quo to a 50/50 bet of losing $10 or gaining $11. Tversky and Kahneman (1991) 
suggest that people feel moderate losses roughly twice as much intensively 
sized gains).  
 
In addition to loss aversion, another important feature of how people assess departures 
from their reference levels is that they display diminishing sensitivity to changes in 
monetary oucomes. So, for example, the marginal change in perceive
greater for changes that are close to one’s reference level than for changes that are 
further away. As with loss aversion, Kahnemen and Tversky (1979a) argue that 
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motivation: “Many sensory and perceptual dimensions share the property that the 
psychological response is a concave function of the magnitude of physical change.  
Diminishing sensitivity implies that the slope of a person’s utility function over wealth 
becomes less steep as her wealth gets further away from her reference level. Because for 
sses relative to the reference level, “further away” means lower wealth levels, 
diminishing sensitivity  implies that, while people are likely to be risk averse over gains, 
ey are often risk loving over losses.  
llsberg (1961) and other researchers have observed that people are often uncertainty 
 behavior in experimental settings has 
ch as fairness, reciprocal 
inent 
                                                          
lo
th
 
Research beginning largely with Ellsberg (1961) has shown that the way probabilities 
enter people’s preferences depends on the nature of the uncertainty from which those 
probabilities are derived.  
E
averse or ambiguity averse. In other words people’s dislike of known or objective 
uncertainties (risk) is less severe than their dislike of unknown, ambiguous, or 
subjective uncertainties (uncertainty)3.  
 
A further line of research has examined social motivations, i.e. the concern by people 
for their effects on others, in economic decision making. 
Pure self interest, which is assumed by rational choice theory, seems clearly not a fully 
adequate description of human motivation. Realism suggests that economists should 
move away from the presumption that people are motivated solely by self interest. 
Virtually every researcher that has examined
concluded that preferences depart from pure self interest in non-trivial ways4.  
It has been shown that people are driven by motives su
altruismus, and revenge. It has been experimentally verified that people contribute to 
public goods more than can be explained by pure self interest, that those free to allocate 
money as they like do not universally  keep all the money for themselves, and that 
people sacrifice money in order to retaliate against an unfair treatment.  
The view that “social motivations” are unimportant in economic phenomena has 
diminished considerably in recent years. In some domains, there have been prom
3 For a description of the Ellsberg Paradox see chapter 5.1. 
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attempts to incorporate social motivations into economic analysis. One example is the 
approach to the study of altruismus (which consists in the fact that people put positive 
value on the well-being of others). Roughly, this approach says that person 1 acts as if 
she is maximizing preferences of the form: 
 
)()()1()( 211 xHrxHrxU ⋅+⋅−≡   
 
where )(1 xH  is person 1’s material well-being from outcome x , and )(2 xH  is person 
2’s material well-being. By letting r  be small, we can capture the idea that people are 
mostly self interested; by assuming , we can investigate wh
thers affects behavior and welfare.  
seek uniformly to share equitably. Rather, 
eople’s concerns regarding other people’s well-being depend on the behavior of these 
mists (see, for example, Croson, 1995). Many of these 
rrelation between 
subjects’ contribution levels and their beliefs about how others were contributing.  
                                                                                                                                                                         
0>r en and how concern for 
o
 
Psychological evidence, moreover, has shown that, besides altruismus, reciprocity also 
plays an important role as social motivations. Social preferences are not merely a 
function of  wealth levels or even changes in wealth levels: People do not seek 
uniformly to help other people, nor do they 
p
other people. The same people who are altruistic towards deserving people are often 
indifferent to the needs of undeserving people, and often motivated to hurt those whom 
they believe to have behaved unfairly. If somebody is being nice to you or others, you 
are inclined to reciprocate and to be nice to him. If somebody is being mean to you or 
others, you are inclined to be mean to him. 
This reciprocal nature of preferences is at the basis of the distinction between simple 
altruism, as outlined earlier, and reciprocal altruism.  
The voluntary provision of public goods has been studied extensively by psychologists 
and experimental econo
experiments suggest that contributions towards public goods are not the result of simple 
altruism but rather of reciprocal altruism. When subjects in public goods experiments 
are debriefed about their beliefs, there seems to be strong positive co
 
4 See chapter 1.3.2 for a description of the experiments on the topic. 
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 Another way that reciprocity manifests itself is through revenge or punishment; people 
do not only refuse to cooperate with others who are being uncooperative, but are also 
willing to sacrifice their own well-being to hurt others who are being unfair. A 
consumer may refuse to buy a product sold by a monopolist at an unfair price, even if 
she hurts herself by not buying the product. An employee who believes she has been 
istreated by a firm may engage in costly acts of sabotage, eventually to the point of 
iolently retaliating against her employers. Members of a striking labor union may 
strike l gry, or want to punish a 
rm for being unfair.  
 
A cr  of the psycho rocity is that, not just the actions of others, 
but also the perceived intentions, mo es, and volition of others are fundamental to how 
eople react to a given behavior. When motivated by reciprocal (rather than simple) 
ltruism, people differentiate between those who take a generous action by choice and 
ose who are forced to do so (Falk, 2003).5  
ion-making literature of the emotional states 
at accompany the decisional process, some researchers have formulated a normative 
th ory where nal comp gret is a and enter
computation  outc 2; L en, 
al nucle he theory is that we experience regr if we realise tha
uld have n better if we h ded in a differe . For instance, i e 
w nt to go out on a clo e decide to take the umbrella with us we will 
gret this decision if it doesn’t rain; on the other hand we will be happy of our decision, 
 it should start raining. 
he strategy that incorporates the anticipation of regret is denominated “minimax 
                                    
m
v
onger than is in their material interest because they are an
fi
ucial feature logy of recip
tiv
p
a
th
 
Despite the substantial neglect in the decis
th
e the emotio
 of the utility of
onent of re
omes (Bell, 198
nticipated 
oomes and Sugd
s in the 
1982). The 
conceptu us of t et t our 
choice wo bee ad deci nt way f w
a udy night and w
re
if
T
regret” and has been proposed by Savage (1951). In order to understand how it is 
applied let’s consider the example represented in Tables 1.3 and 1.4.  
                      
ion of the experiments on altruismus, reciprocity, and the role of intentions, see chapter 
1.3.2. 
5 For a descript
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A tourist has bought a trip to China which costs $ 8000 and has to decide whether to 
insure or not against the loss of the amount paid to the travel agency. If he subscribes 
the insurance, whose premium is $100, he will receive the whole $8.000 back, even in 
the case that he is responsible for the trip not taking place. The agency, on her part, has 
to pay back the whole amount if she is responsible for the trip not taking place. This 
situation is represented in Tab.1.3. 
 
 
Tab. 1.3 Costs and benefits of subscribing the insurance 
 
 Tourist’s responsability Agency’s responsability 
Insurance 8.000 - 100 8.000 – 100 
No insurance 0 8.000 
 
 
 
 
Tab. 1.4 Payoffs and regret matrixes 
 
 Tourist’s Agency’s Tourist’s A
responsability responsability responsability responsabili
gency’s 
ty 
Insurance 7.900 7.900 0 100 
No insurance 0 8.000 7.900 0 
 Payoffs matrix Regret matrix 
 
 
 
By subscribing the insurance, the tourists always looses the value of the premium in 
both cases that the tourist or the agency is responsible for the trip not taking place. The 
choice depends on how the tourists will evaluate the probabilities related to the different 
outcomes. 
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The strategy “minimax regret” is based on the transformation of the matrix of the 
payoffs in equivalent “regret” values corresponding to the positive differences between 
ach payoff and the value of the highest possible payoff. These new values reflect the 
rist, the regret values are those indicated in the regret matrix. If the 
tter being responsible of the trip not taking place. A rational decision 
he insurance (see Tab 1.4). 
 documented set of systematic 
decision 
                                                          
e
“lost of opportunity” of the player, or the regret, once the events have taken place, for 
not having chosen the strategy that offered the highest monetary outcome (see Colman, 
1999). 
In the case of our tou
tourist is responsible for the trip not taking place, the regret will be zero if he has 
subscribed the insurance, since he will receive back the amount paid. The regret will 
also be zero if he has not subscribed the insurance, and receives his money back from 
the agency, the la
for the tourist would be to subscribe the insurance; this would allow him to experience 
the minimum among the highest regrets in the matrix, i.e., the one associated to the 
value corresponding to the payment of £ 100 to subscribe t
 
I’ll now turn to psychological evidence which shows that people make systematic errors 
in their attempts to MaxU(x). This line of research therefore poses a more radical 
challenge to the traditional economic models.  
Kahneman and Tversky (1974) have introduced a program of research on judgment 
under uncertainty, which came to be known as “Heuristic and biases approach”.  
The goal of the research was to understand the cognitive processes that lead to both 
optimal decisions (from the point of view of rational choice) and biased ones. The study 
of the discrepancies between the two has yielded a well
errors (or biases6) that individuals make in the  judgment of events or in making 
decisions.  
Within this program, heuristics have often been invoked as the explanation for such 
errors (mainly deviations from the laws of probability) in human reasoning.  
To some extent, even the findings of the research related to the biases in 
making could be compatible with the framework of utility theory if one is willing to 
6 The biases identified by Kahnemann and Tversky and the relative experiments are discussed in detail in 
chapters 1.3.2 and 5.1. 
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incorporate into the theory systematic errors that people make in their attempt to 
maximize.  
 
The array of psychological findings I’ll review in the following, instead, points to a 
g to modify the standard assumptions about U(x), or to allow that 
ion. This means 
 elicited. Two crucial 
ssumptions of utility theories indeed, are description invariance and procedure 
more radical critique of traditional economic models. The varied material of this section 
suggests that maximizing utility is not the right way to conceptualize some types of 
economic behavior.  
Even if one is willin
people make systematic errors in their attempts to maximize U(x), it is sometimes 
misleading to conceptualize people as attempting to maximize well-defined, coherent, 
or stable U(x)’s.  
I begin by reviewing evidence on framing effects, preference reversals, and context 
effects, in which people prefer some option x to y when the choice is elicited one way, 
but prefer y to x when the choice is elicited another way.  
 
The SEU model describes decisions under uncertainty as a result of a combination of 
the factors probability and utility of the consequences of the given opt
naturally that other factors, which are relevant for the result, can’t play any role in the 
decision. In particular this means that in order to make a decision it is not relevant the 
way the options are described, or the way the preferences are
a
invariance: different representations of the same choice problem, and different 
elicitation procedures, should yield the same preference. 
Nevertheless it has been shown that this implication of a so called descriptive and 
procedural invariance is often empirically violated (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986): 
people are not indifferent between options which are formally equivalent, but differently 
described; moreover people reverse their preferences over options when the same 
decision problem is presented as a judgment task rather than as a choice task7.  
Invariance violations are especially troublesome for utility theories and provide the 
strongest indications that people often lack a stable preference ordering that has even 
                                                          
7 The experiments on the topic are described in chapter 5.1. 
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minimal robustness to different ways of uncovering these preferences. Preferences seem 
rather to be constructed from procedural rules and to be influenced by contextual 
factors. 
 
Thaler (1980) brings as real-world example the effect of labeling a difference between 
two prices as a surcharge or a discount. It is easier to forgo a discount than to accept a 
urcharge because the same price difference is valued as a gain in the former case and as 
rovided 
vidence that consumers are better disposed to buy a product when this is described as 
 of transitivity or even stochastic transitivity. It suggests that no 
from principles which are of a completely different sort from those generally accepted” 
(Grether and Plott, 1979). 
s
a loss in the latter.  
Money illusion also provides a good example of the importance of framing effects for 
economics. Doubling all wages and prices, or denominating them in one currency rather 
than another, shouldn’t make anyone feel richer.  
Kahneman et al. (1986a) show that people pay more attention to nominal rather than 
real changes in wages and prices when they judge the fairness of firm behavior. For 
instance, a nominal wage increase of 5% in a period of 12% inflation irritates people 
less than a 7% decrease in a period of no inflation. In general, people react more to 
decreases in real wages when they are also nominal decreases, and react negatively to 
nominal price increases even if they represent no increase in real price. 
Similar framing effects have been reported by Levin and Gaeth, (1988), who p
e
being 75% lean than when it is described as containing 25% fat.  
 
The related phenomenon of preference reversals represents an even more fundamental 
challenge to the assumption that choices reflect stable, well-defined preferences. 
Tversky and Thaler (1990) quote two economists who experimentally confronted and 
failed to refute evidence on preference reversals: “Taken at face value the data [showing 
preference reversals] are simply inconsistent with preference theory and have broad 
implications about research priorities within economics. The inconsistency is deeper 
than the mere lack
optimization principles of any sort lie behind the simplest of human choices and that the 
uniformities in human choice behavior which lie behind market behavior may result 
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Tversky and Thaler (1990) conclude their paper with a similarly strong statement: 
“People do not possess a set of pre-defined preferences for every contingency. Rather, 
preferences are constructed in the process of making a choice or judgement. Second, the 
context and procedures involved in making choices or judgements influence the 
preferences that are implied by the elicited responses. In practical terms, this implies 
that behavior is likely to vary across situations that economists consider identical.”  
l of microwave oven 
creases when a second, more expensive model is added to their choice set. Adding the 
f other options is folk wisdom among salespersons.  
e-consistency 
 
Further research on “context effects” raises doubts regarding the standard assumption 
that there exist stable preferences independent of the context. Simonson and Tversky 
(1992) challenge the idea that consumer preferences for goods are independent of their 
menu of choices. They provide examples8 where, because of context effects, the 
addition of one option to a set of choice options may actually increase the proportion of 
consumers who choose one of the already existing options. They provide evidence that 
the proportion of consumers who choose a particular mode
in
more expensive model makes more salient the convenience of the other model, and thus 
makes it more attractive. The more general principle that an unattractive option can 
enhance the attractiveness o
 
A further phenomenon that puts into question the assumption of stable and coherent 
preferences, is the one referred to as time variant preferences. People like to experience 
rewards soon and to delay costs. They procrastinate on tasks that involve immediate 
costs and delayed rewards and do things soon when they involve immediate rewards 
and delayed costs. Economists traditionally model such tastes by assuming that people 
discount streams of utility over time exponentially. An important qualitative feature of 
exponential discounting is that it implies that a person’s intertemporal preferences are 
time-consistent: a person feels the same about a given intertemporal tradeoff no matter 
when she is asked. 
Psychological research, nevertheless, suggests that the assumption of tim
is importantly wrong. Rabin (1996) describes the observed inconsistencies as follows: 
                                                          
8 For a description of the experiments of context effects see chapter 1.3.2. 
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“people have a short-term tendency to pursue their immediate well-being in a way that 
their long-run selves do not appreciate. While today we feel that it is best that we don’t 
vereat tomorrow, tomorrow we tend to overeat; while today we feel we should write a 
ents, we give stronger relative weight to 
payoffs hyperbolically 
Reason-based choice can help interpreting some of the research on context effects. One 
argument of Simonson (1989), Tversky and Simonson (1993), and Simonson and 
Tversky (1992), for instance, is that an option A is more likely to be chosen when there 
o
referee report tomorrow, tomorrow we tend to put it off. More generally, when 
considering tradeoffs between two future mom
the earlier moment as it gets closer. 
The preference for immediate gratification in large part reflects psychological findings 
that, to a close approximation, people discount future streams of 
rather than exponentially. [….]The most relevant feature of hyperbolic discounting is 
that, at every moment, a person discounts near-term incremental delays more severely 
than she discounts distant-future incremental delays. Hence, a person’s preferences 
today over her future delays are different than her future preferences over those same 
delays, so that preferences are not time consistent.” (On the topic see, for instance, 
Ainslie, 1992; Loewenstein, 1996; Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995) 
 
Some researchers provide evidence that we sometimes make one choice rather than 
another because we have justifiable reasons for making that choices, rather than because 
of underlying preferences.  
Rather than maximizing utility, research suggests that people may make choices in part 
by asking themselves whether they have a reason to choose one option over another. 
Shafir et al. (1993) describe this research program as follows: “[….] a focus on reasons 
seems closer to the way we normally think and talk about choices. When facing a 
difficult choice (e.g., between schools, or jobs) we try to come up with reasons for and 
against each option-we do not normally attempt to estimate their overall values. Second, 
thinking of choice as guided by reasons provides a natural way to understand the 
conflict that characterizes the making of decisions. From the perspective of reason-
based choice, conflict arises when the decision-maker has good reasons for and against 
each option, or conflicting reasons for competing options. Unlike numeral values, which 
are easy to compare, conflicting reasons may be hard to reconcile.”  
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exists an option B that is clearly dominated by option A, apparently because the 
existence of the option B provides a reason to choose option A.9
e on heuristics differs from that on biases in that the focus of attention is 
e paradigm of full 
tionality must be relaxed in order to account for some well-documented distortions, 
ther in trying to identify its procedural 
d adjustment (judgments relying 
n what comes first).  [….our research] program dispenses with the focus on coherence 
 
Among the psychological lines of research which more radically challenge the full 
rationality paradigm is the one on heuristics.  
The literatur
shifted from the outcomes of choice and their consistency with normative theories, to 
the underlying cognitive mechanisms producing those outcomes. 
The two areas are closely related, as violations of rational choice models are often due 
to the adoption of simplifying decision making procedures . However, the shift of focus 
from outcomes to processes themselves implies the adoption of a partly different 
theoretical framework. The contributions on biases show that th
ra
but at the same time retains the ideal of maximization or optimization.  
The framework underlying choice processes, on the contrary, starts from the Simonian 
paradigm of bounded rationality and goes fur
manifestations, dispencing with the focus on optimization, and, for a great part, with 
calculations of probabilities and utilities as well.   
This view is supported by Gigerenzer et al. (1999) who claim: “ [The] experimental 
results [of Kahneman and Tversky (1974)] were typically interpreted as indicating some 
kind of fallacy, which was usually attributed to one of three main heuristics: 
representativeness (judgments influenced by what is typical), availability (judgments 
based on what comes easily to mind), or anchoring an
o
criteria (e.g., the laws of probability) as the yardsticks of rationality. Instead, we study 
the correspondence-based performance of heuristics in real-world environments, 
situations where optimal strategies are often not known or not feasible. In contrast, 
proponents of the heuristics-and-biases program typically assume that each reasoning 
task has exactly one normative answer, which is derived by applying a law of 
                                                          
9 For the experiments on the topic see chapter 1.3.2. 
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probability in a content-blind way, without looking at the specifics of the task or 
environment”.  
The “adaptive toolbox” of Gigerenzer et al. (1999) is a metaphor illustrating how 
bounded rationality can actually be implemented in the human mind. It refers to a 
collection of rules or heuristics rather than to a general-purpose decision-making 
algorithm.  
The essential features of the heuristics in the toolbox are, first, their psychological 
ological rationality (their success 
onment”, 
ely, in a 
e further clues as to the nature of the 
 dimensions: search for alternatives (the choice set) and 
r cues (features, consequences, etc.) and are 
related to situations in which the alternatives (such as job candidates or stocks) are 
already known. Thus, the vision of bounded rationality into satisficing and fast and 
plausibility (they are fast, frugal, and computationally cheap rather than consistent and 
coherent, in that they are conditioned on constraints of limited knowledge, time, search, 
and cognitive abilities; second, their domain specificity (they are strategies that are 
specialized rather than domain general); third, their ec
lies in their degree of adaptation to the structure of environments).  
 
In his 1956 article entitled “Rational choice and the structure of the envir
Herbert Simon pointed out that there are two sides to bounded rationality: the cognitive 
limitations and the structure of environments.  
The concept of ecological rationality refers to the fact that the kind of simplifications an 
organism has to operate in order to behave approximately rationally, or adaptiv
particular environment, may depend not only on the characteristics (sensory, neural, 
etc.) of the organism, but equally upon the structure of the environment. Hence, we 
might hope to discover, by a careful examination of some of the fundamental structural 
characteristics of the environment, som
approximating mechanisms used in decision making.  
 
Fast and frugal heuristics can be used to solve problems of search. One can think of 
search as an exploration of two
cues (to evaluate the alternatives). On the one hand, Simon’s concept of satisficing 
involves sequential search for alternatives, but not for cues (simon, 1955). On the other 
hand, the fast and frugal heuristics studied by our Gigerenzer’s research group 
(Gigerenzer et al., 1999) involve a search fo
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frugal heuristics reflects the type of search: search for alternatives (satisficing) or search 
for cues (fast and frugal heuristics). 
A computational model of a heuristic specifies the precise steps of information 
gathering and processing that are involved in generating a decision; in other words,  it 
specifies the principles for guiding a search for alternatives and information, stopping 
that search, and making a decision.  
 
Heuristics have different levels of complexity and accuracy depending on such factors 
as the amount of information available, the level of individuals’ rationality and the level 
of involvement in the particular task at hand (hogarth, 1987). Heuristics have been 
of 
on is selected by simply summing the values of the attributes for each 
alternative and then comparing the results. 
extensively studied in the field of consumer behavior. 
Bettman, Johnson, and Payne (1991) provide a classification of the most common 
heuristics together with an indication of the situations in which each of them is most 
likely to occur. The following brief description is largely based on their work. 
The Weighted Additive (WADD) Rule can be considered the heuristic that consumers 
are supposed to use according to normative theory decision making. 
It implies taking into account the values of each alternative on all the relevant attributes 
and considering the relative importance of each attribute to the decision maker. 
According to the WADD Rule, a weighted value for each attribute is obtained by 
multiplying the weight times the attribute value. All attribute values are then summed 
up to arrive to an overall evaluation of the alternative. The alternative that presents the 
highest overall evaluation is then chosen.  
In the real world, this particular heuristic is seldom used, due to the large amount 
information processing that requires. Moreover, even though consumers are normally 
aware of the relative importance of each attribute to them, nevertheless they are not 
always able to assign weights. 
As a result, simpler heuristics are usually preferred. A simplification of the WADD rule 
eliminates different weights for the attributes assuming that they all are equally 
important. An opti
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The satisficing heuristic10 requires a cutoff level to be set for each attribute. Alternatives 
are then evaluated one at a time in the order in which they occur, and the value of each 
attribute is compared to the cutoff level. If the value of any of the attributes is below the 
cutoff level, that alternative is rejected. The first alternative that meets the cutoff 
requirements for each attribute is then chosen. If no alternatives pass the cutoff 
requirements, then the cutoff levels are relaxed and the process repeated all over again. 
attributes in terms of 
n heuristic is the elimination by aspects (EBA). The first formulation of 
 a 
ted according to its relative importance, and alternatives that do not 
e 
                                                          
The alternative that will be selected depends on the level of the cutoffs and on the order 
in which alternatives are considered. For instance, if option A and option B both meet 
all the cutoff requirements, then the choice of either one will depend on which one is 
evaluated first. 
The lexicographic Heuristic requires a complete ranking of the 
relative importance. The consumer determines the most important attribute and then 
examines the values of all alternatives on that attribute. The alternative that  presents the 
best value on the most important attribute is selected. If two alternatives are equal in the 
sense that they present equal values on that attribute, then the second most important 
attribute is considered, and the procedure continues until one option is chosen. 
A widely know
this model of choice is due to Tversky (1972). It is based on the idea that individuals do 
not choose objects per se; rather, they tend to choose the collection of features (or 
aspects) of which are composed. In its original formulation, EBA determines that at 
every step a particular aspect is picked randomly. Then, all alternatives that do not have 
that aspect are eliminated; if only one option is left, the process is over; otherwise,
second aspect is selected and other alternatives eliminated until there is only one left. 
The elimination by cutoffs heuristic is procedurally very similar to the lexicographic 
rule, with the difference that a cutoff level is established for each attribute and all 
alternatives that do not meet the cutoff requirement are eliminated. At every step an 
attribute is selec
meet the cutoff level for that attribute are eliminated. The process continues until ther
is one option left. 
10 See also chapter 3.2. 
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The Majority of Confirming Dimensions Heuristic determines that comparisons be 
made between pairs of alternatives. The values on each attribute are compared between 
two alternatives. The alternative with a higher number of winning attributes remains, 
while the other is rejected. The winner is then compared with the next alternative in the 
tion of the choice menu in terms of 
etermine that certain 
s in various types 
f situations: maybe the simplest and the most common one in low involvement 
yer, 1984) strategies price 
set. The process of pairwise comparisons continues until all alternatives have been 
evaluated and the final winning identified. 
It is to be noted that the use of a similar heuristic can in part account for the attraction 
effect. Tversky and Simonson (!993) propose a tournament-like model of choice, in 
which each option is compared against each other op
its winning attributes. When one of the options is asymmetrically dominated, it is easy 
to verify that the option that dominates it is bound to be selected. 
The Frequency of Good and Bad Features (or Frequency Knowledge) is a very simple 
heuristic that implies that consumers develop certain criteria to d
features are good or bad; then, the consumer may simply count the number of good and 
bad features. The choice can then vary according to whether the consumer prefers the 
option with the smallest number of bad features or the one with the biggest number of 
good features. 
Several other types of simpler heuristics seem to be used by consumer
o
situations is the habitual heuristic: choose what you chose last time. Another heuristic, 
called affect referral (Wright and Barbour, 1975) consists in recalling from memory 
previously formed global evaluations for similar alternatives and choose accordingly. 
Other heuristics used in low-involvement choices are (Ho
oriented (buy the cheapest brand), strategies performance oriented (buy the brand that 
seems the best), affective strategies (buy the brand that is most familiar to you), in store 
strategies (buy the first brand that you find), and strategies that are combinations of the 
preceding ones. 
The most usual distinction is between compensatory and noncompensatory heuristics. 
In general, a heuristic is compensatory if good values on some attributes can 
compensate for poor values on other attributes. For example, rules such as the WADD 
or equal weight are defined as compensatory. 
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On the contrary, a rule is defined as noncompensatry if it does not permit such 
compensation. Traditionally noncompensatory heuristics are also called sequential, as 
f 
ompensatory rules implies the evaluation of tradeoffs between values that can 
ter probability that a suboptimal alternative is chosen. In fact, 
h bad alternatives are eliminated using a very simple sequential 
ility and local procedural preferences.  
ssible aspiration levels form a grid in the 
they typically involve a sequential elimination of options or subsets of options: 
examples of this second type are the lexicographic rule, or the Elimination by Cutoffs. 
Compensatory rules are normally considered more difficult and elaborate, in that they 
require a greater processing effort. Therefore, especially in cases of low involvement 
purchases, consumers tend to avoid using them. It is also suggested that the use o
c
sometimes be emotionally difficult (Hogarth, 1987). 
Sequential heuristics, on the other hand, are less efficient than compensatory ones 
because they allow a grea
with EBA rule, for any set of alternatives, a particular sequence of aspects can be 
specified that determines the worst option in the set to be selected. 
In a large number of concrete examples, consumers may use mixed strategies according 
to the phase of the choice process. For instance, a typical choice strategy may imply an 
initial step in whic
heuristic (such as EBA, or Elimination by cutoffs). Then, the few options left may be 
examined more carefully through the use of a compensatory strategy.  
 
Selten’s (1998) aspiration adaptation theory provides a general framework for decision 
making in which several goals, each with an aspiration level, exist, and the goals need 
not to be commensurable. Decision making is modelled within a multi-goal framework 
with goal incomparab
As Selten (1999) describes it: “One of the features of aspiration adaptation theory is that 
it models decision making as a multi-goal problem without aggregation of the goals into 
a complete preference order over all decision alternatives. The decision maker has a 
number of real-valued goal variables. For each goal-variable, more is better [……] an 
aspiration level is a vector of values for the goal variables. These values, the partial 
aspiration levels, vary in discrete steps. The po
space of the goal variables. We refer to it as the aspiration grid. Aspiration adaptation 
takes the form of a sequence of adjustment steps. An adjustment step shifts the current 
aspiration level to a neighbouring point on the aspiration grid by a change of only one 
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goal variable. An upward adjustment step is an increase and a downward adjustment 
step is a decrease of a goal variable. 
Upward adjustment steps are governed by an urgency order, a ranking of the goal 
ariables without ties. Downward adaptations decrease a retreat variable. The retreat 
psychological concept of 
n a consumer emits a behavior, such as buying a product, the 
ause the product 
l game research (Roth 
er the case that payoffs may be negative. The learning 
process underlying the payoff sum model is characterized by limited information 
v
variable is not necessarily the last urgent one. Urgency order and retreat variable may 
depend on the gread point. The aspiration grid, together with the assignment of an 
urgency order and a retreat variable to every grid point, forms an aspiration scheme.”  
 
Within the framework of bounded rationality the topic of learning has received 
particular attention too. Many models are related to the 
reinforcement learning.   
The latter refers to a  process in which an individual learns to perform behaviors that 
produce positive outcomes and to avoid those that yield negative outcomes.  
Formally, reinforcement learning can be defined as a process in which the frequency of 
occurrence of a bit of behavior is modified by the consequences of the behavior 
(Reynolds, 1968).  
Thus, for instance,  whe
consequences of the behavior will change the probability of that behavior occurring 
again. If the behavior is positively reinforced, say by the product performing well or by 
friends complimenting the person on his or her purchase, the likelihood of the purchase 
being made again will increase. If the behavior is punished, say bec
failed or because friends ridiculed the purchase, the likelihood of making the purchase 
again will decrease.  
The payoff sum mode, has been very successful in experimenta
and Erev, 1995). In the simplest version of this model, the probability of choosing an 
alternative is proportional to its payoff sum, defined as follows: Before period 1, the 
payoff sum is equal to a positive initial value. The payoff sum of an alternative is 
increased by the period payoff just obtained after a period in which the alternative has 
been chosen; otherwise it remains unchanged. 
This model is applicable to situations in which payoffs are always nonnegative; 
however, modifications also cov
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gathering in the sense that it needs no other information  than the feedback about 
ayoffs. This is an important property which makes this model applicable to situations 
ent. 
earning direction theory (Selten and Stoecker, 1986; Selten and Buchta, 1999) is 
 
g direction theory refers to the analysis of what could have been done better, in 
 light of qualitative 
p
in which the decision-maker is ignorant about his environm
 
L
another successful approach to learning that is quite different from reinforcement 
theory. The basic idea illustrated by Selten (1999) through a simple example: “Consider 
an archer who repeatedly tries to hit the trunk of a tree with a bow and arrow. After a 
miss he will have the tendency to aim more to the left if the arrow passed the trunk on 
the right-hand side and more to the right in the opposite case. 
The example is not as trivial as it may seem to be. The archer is guided by a qualitative 
causal model of his environment. This model relates changes of the angle at which the
bow is held to changes of the direction in which the arrow flies. After a miss he sees on 
which side of the trunk the arrow has passed. This feedback and the qualitative causal 
model enable the archer to draw a qualitative conclusion about what would have been 
better in the previous period. He can determine in which direction a better alternative 
could have been found. 
[….] Learning direction theory can be applied to repeated decision tasks in which a 
parameter pt has to be chosen in  a sequence of periods t=1,…, T, provided that the 
decision-maker has a qualitative causal model and receives feedback, which enables 
him to infer in which direction a better choice could have been found. 
The theory predicts that the parameter tends to be changed in the direction indicated by 
the inference, if it is changed at all. This is a weak prediction which, however, has 
proved to be successful in about a dozen experimental studies ”   
Learnin
contrast to ex ante rationality which reasons about future consequences of possible 
actions. “Bayesian rationality is ex-ante in the sense that it looks to the future and 
optimises on the basis of current beliefs. Contrary to this, boundedly rational behavior is 
often based on ex-post rationality. Experiences are interpreted in the
beliefs and behavior is adjusted accordingly without any attempt at forward looking 
optimization.” (Selten, 1998b).  
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1.3 Experimental Economics 
The experimental method has started to be accepted and widely used in 
ic research, has 
ffered the chance to test the validity of economic models and to fill in the relative gaps.   
 of this approach (Kagel, Roth, 1995; Hey, 1991 and 1994; Friedman, 
f 
liability of theories and generate new theoretical models or corrections to the original 
 experimenter to manipulate 
and compare the results.  
 
1.3.1 The experimental method 
 
Experimental economics is a relatively new interdisciplinary approach to the study of 
decision making which has originated from the need to modify standard theories of 
decision making in a way that can prove to be more realistic in the study of economic 
behavior. 
economic research in the 1980s and 90’s. An early experimenter (experimentalist) 
Maurice Allais, and two more actual experimenters, Daniel Kahneman and Wernon 
Smith, even won respectively the 1988 and 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics.  
The introduction of the experimental approach in the field of econom
o
In experimental economics psychological and economic aspects converge in an organic 
and unitary attempt to gain a realistic comprehension of the cognitive processes that 
underlie choice mechanisms. 
The purpose
Sunder, 1994) is to artificially re-create in the laboratory the specific situations on 
which it is meant to investigate, with the aim of collecting empirical data in a controlled 
environment. This way it is possible to verify the actual correspondence between 
economic theories and empirical data, and to fill in the eventual gap between hypothesis 
and real observations. At the experimental level thus, one can test the degree o
re
ones.  
The main advantages offered by the laboratory methodology are control and 
repeatability. Control refers to the possibility for the
laboratory conditions and experimental variables in order to design and structure the 
most appropriate situation in which to study the object of research.  
By repeatability it is meant the possibility for other researchers to independently 
reproduce the experiment in the same environmental conditions and, therefore, to verify 
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 The conventional methods used by experimental economists are often different from the 
ubjects 
port what they would do in particular situations, or of questionnaires where subjects 
on is not allowed. In 
tuality an experimenter would loose control of the 
xperiment in that the subjects might behave according to their own perception of the 
psychological and economic experimental evidence on individual decision making, 
those established in psychological studies of decision making. In psychology 
experiments, subjects are often not paid according to their performance, or are paid 
small amounts. 
Much psychological research indeed consists of hypothetical choices in which s
re
are asked to give answers without being provided with extrinsic incentives for correct 
answers.  
In experimental economics, in contrast, much importance is attributed to rewarding the 
experimental subjects proportionally to their performance in the experiment; monetary 
incentives, are considered to be a fundamental means for inducing individuals to 
concentrate on their task and not making casual or unreliable choices.   
 
A further difference is that in economic experiments decepti
psychology experiments it is a custom to deceive the subjects by not telling them the 
truth about the real purpose of the experiment or about the situations they face in the 
experiment. 
In economics, on the contrary, deception is forbidden. This is a convention that 
experimental economists have established in order to avoid that the subjects might not 
believe the experimenter. In this even
e
experiment and not respond to the incentive structure intended by the experimenter.     
 
Many economists have (until very recently) been fundamentally dismissive of 
laboratory evidence. A major complaint has been that the stakes involved are generally 
too small to be used for predicting real-world behavior.  
The view that responses elicited from subjects will be informative only if substantial 
financial stakes are involved nevertheless has been falsified in a number of empirical 
studies. Camerer (1995), in by far the most comprehensive and integral review of 
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finds very few instances where the financial-stakes replications of psychological 
experiments have reversed the inferences about theory drawn from those experiments. 
While there are some areas where the low stakes critique may be true in that answers to 
hypothetical questions are likely to be misleading, we have to acknowledge that the list 
of examples (preference reversals, ultimatum-game sharing) lengthens where 
psychological findings are robust to the scale of financial stakes (Rabin, 1996).  
ys act optimally. Moreover, as to the argument of 
it has been claimed that even if it were true that sufficient learning and 
ufficient stakes eliminate irrationalities, it is tenuous to argue that only the behavior of 
“heuristics and biases” program11 were scientists, highly trained in statistics, evaluating 
                                                          
 
A further common critique to the use of experimentation is that participants are 
amateurs thrown into a completely alien and artificial environment, and are not given 
ample opportunity to learn. Experimentalists have replied by observing that, although 
this argument may have some truth in it, it runs counter to the prevailing neoclassical 
assumption that economic agents alwa
artificiality, experimentalists counter it by observing that as experiments are often 
designed to test some economic theory; if the experiment is artificial, then so must be 
the economic theory which underlies it, whatever that might be.  
In addition 
s
experienced people engaging in large-stakes activities is economically important. The 
sum-total of low stakes transactions (e.g., retail purchases of cola) is a big part of the 
economy, and the behavior of novices (e.g., new home buyers) is something that 
economists should be curious about.  
 
Much empirical evidence moreover has been collected with the purpose to analyse the 
validity of experimental findings in real-world situations where decision-makers use 
familiar sources of information to make decisions that are important to themselves and 
to others; these studies suggest that the laboratory results will generalize. Cognitive 
limitations appear to pervade a wide variety of tasks in which intelligent individuals 
serve as decision makers, often under conditions that maximise motivation and 
involvement. For example, the subjects studied by Tversky and Kahneman (1971)in the 
11 See chapters 1.2 and 1.3.2. 
 48 
 
problems similar to those they faced in their research. Overdependence on specific 
evidence and neglect of base rates12 has been observed among psychometricians 
sponsible for the development and use of psychological tests (Meehl and Rosen, 
955). When Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) observed anchoring bias13 in subjects’ 
sults, on the floor of a 
as Vegas casino (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1973).  
experimental 
sychology; in psychological experiments indeed subjects do not usually make repeated 
                                                          
re
1
evaluations of gambles, they repeated the study, with identical re
L
 
As to the problem of learning, many experimental economists try to overcome it by 
getting their subjects to repeat the experiments two or more times (this is a further 
characteristic which distinguishes experimental economics from 
p
choices under stationary replication). 
It is quite clear from such repeated experiments that behavior does improve with 
repetition, that the magnitude of the improvement varies from subject to subject and that 
some subjects would never reach the optimal strategy regardless of the number of 
repetitions. 
 
An additional critique to experimentation is that the subjects might be motivated by 
considerations other than the financial. This may well be true.  
This critique has a relevance mainly in relation to psychology experiments where the 
subjects are told cover stories containing stimuli with natural labels that may induce 
non-monetary utilities; This problem is usually avoided by economic experimentalists 
in that they try to reduce at a minimum the use of cover stories and natural labels by 
employing stimuli as neutral as possible. Nevertheless, even in economic experiments, 
subsists the possibility that subjects are motivated by non-monetary considerations as in 
the case, for example, that they try to behave as they think the experimenter expects 
them to behave, or that they don’t make socially unacceptable choices because they are 
afraid of being judged by the experimenter. In order to avoid such problems it is up to 
the experimenter to design the experiment in such a way that his influence on the 
12 See chapter 5.1. 
13 See chapter 1.3.2. 
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subjects be minimal. Anonimity of the subjects or computerized experiments, for 
example can avoid many of such problems. 
 
 
 1.3.2 Experimental evidence on bounded rationality 
 
In this section I’ll review the main experiments that have been carried out within the 
framework of bounded rationality14. I limit this review to those experiments that do not 
involve probabilistic decision making. The numerous experimental studies on decision 
making under risk and uncertainty indeed will be treated in chapter 5.1). 
 
Thaler (1980; 1985) has identified a striking effect which is related to the phenomenon 
l 
steps of 50 cents. 
ome of the students who had not received a mug (the choosers) were given a similar 
of loss aversion: the endowment effect. Once a person comes to possess a good, she 
immediately values it more than before she possessed it. Tversky and Kahneman (1991) 
describe an experiment conducted by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) that nicely 
illustrates this phenomenon: 
“Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler tested the endowment effect in a series of experiments, 
conducted in a classroom setting. In one of these experiments a decorated mug (retai
value of about $5) was placed in front of one third of the seats after students had chosen 
their places. All participants received a questionnaire. The form given to the recipients 
of a mug (the sellers) indicated that “You own the object in your possession. You have 
the option of selling it if a price, which will be determined later, is acceptable to you. 
For each of the possible prices below indicate whether you wish to x) Sell your object 
and receive this price; y) Keep your object and take it home with you…” The subjects 
indicated their decision for prices ranging from $0.50 to $9.50 in 
S
questionnaire, informing them that they would have the option of receiving either a mug 
or a sum of money to be determined later. They indicated their preference between a 
mug and sums of money ranging from $0.50 to $9.50. The choosers and the sellers face 
precisely the same decision problem, but their reference states differ. [….] the mug is 
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evaluated as a gain by the choosers, and as a loss by the sellers. Loss aversion entails 
that the rate of exchange of the mug against money will be different in the two cases. 
als without mugs consider not 
user (1988), and Knetsch   (1989), 
ugs. Each student was then offered the opportunity to exchange her object 
r, and Schwarz (1982) have analysed social motivations in decision 
Indeed, the median value of the mug was $7.12 for the sellers and $3.12 for the 
choosers in one experiment, $7 and $3.50 in another. The difference between these 
values reflects an endowment effect which is produced, apparently instantaneously, by 
giving an individual property rights over a consumption good.” 
The behavior described here has been interpreted as a case of loss aversion similar to 
that identified in choice among lotteries. Individuals who are randomly assigned mugs 
incorporate the possession of the mug in their reference levels or endowments, and 
consider not having a mug as a loss, whereas individu
having a mug as remaining at their reference point.  
 
Knetsch and Sinden (1984), Samuelson and Zeckha
have observed an analogous phenomenon, the status quo bias, which takes place in 
multiple-good choice problems. Here, loss aversion implies that an individual’s 
willingness to trade one object for another depends on which object she possesses at the 
beginning. Individuls tend to prefer the status quo to changes that involve losses in 
some dimensions, even when these losses are coupled with gains in other dimensions.  
Knetsch and Sinden (1984) and Knetsch (1989), for instance, demonstrated the status 
quo bias by randomly giving one group of students candy bars, and to another group 
decorated m
for the other one, i.e. a mug for a candy bar or vice versa. 90% of both mug-owners and 
candy-owners chose not to trade. Since the objects were allocated randomly and 
transaction costs were minimal, the different behavior for the two groups of subjects 
must have reflected preferences that were induced by the allocation.  
 
Guth, Schmittberge
making. The idea that people aren’t driven solely by maximization motives but also by 
social motivations (people, for example,  have a concern for fairness and are motivated 
to retaliate when they feel they have been mistreated) is a fairly obvious intuition, and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
14 This chapter has no ambition to thoroughly review the immense literature on the topic; the purpose is 
rather to report the most relevant results coming from experimentation. 
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well understood by psychologists. More recently, it has been widely explored by 
experimentalists who have investigated many variants of the “ultimatum game”.  
In the ultimatum game two people are required to split some fixed amount of money 
according to the following rules: A proposer offers some division of (say) $10 to a 
decider. If the decider accepts, they split the money according to the proposal. If the 
decider rejects, they both get nothing. Under the assumption of rational self-interest  the 
sult would be clear: proposers will never offer more than a penny, and the decider will 
r those repeating the game a week later.  
ayer who offers an 
atum game, a dictator game 
oses.  
s. In the dictator game, but not in the ultimatum game, the 
uthors observe that the modal offer is the equilibrium offer, at which the dictator offers 
zero to the receiver. Forsythe et al. conclude that “players are more generous in the 
ultimatum game than in the dictator game”, and so they reject the fairness-hypothesis as 
re
accept any offer of at least a penny. Experiments provide clear evidence contrary to 
such behavior: even in one-shot settings, deciders are willing to punish unfair offers by 
rejecting them, and proposers tend to make fair offers.  
About 20 % of offers indeed were rejected. The average demand that players 1 were 
observed to make was for under 70%, both for players playing the game for the first 
time and fo
The decision by proposers to make fair offers can be the consequence of at least two 
motivations: The first hypothesis that has received some attention is the possibility that 
they may behave altruistically, at least to the extent that they try to be fair; in other 
words the proposers themselves may have a preference for being fair. The second 
hypothesis is that self-interested proposers might correctly predict that deciders will 
retaliate against unfair offers by rejecting them.  In this case, a pl
equal division may be doing so in order to avoid a negative reaction by the other 
bargainer.  
To explore the two hypothesis, Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton (1994) compared  
the results of ultimatum and “dictator games”. Like an ultim
is a two-player game in which a dictator offers a division of some resource to a receiver. 
However, unlike an ultimatum game, in a dictator game the receiver may not reject this 
proposal (and cause both players to receive zero); the players receive whatever the 
dictator prop
Therefore in a dictator game the dictator’s proposal can be interpreted as a pure 
expression of his preference
a
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the primary explanati Nevertheless the authors also 
bserve a concentration of offers of equal division in the dictator game, and this is the 
odal result in the ultimatum game. So the data support the hypothesis that some of the 
subjects may be primarily motivated by considerations of fairness, although the high 
concentration of equal division offers observed in the ultimatum game cannot be 
attributed exclusively to a desire for equal divisions on the part of the proposers. 
 
Falk (2003) has carried out an experiment in which he tested the role of intentions in the 
propensity to retaliate against negative actions. He made his subjects play 4 mini-
ultimatum games. The games are shown in Fig. 1.2 a-d.  
In each game the proposer (P) makes a proposal of how to split 10 points. If the 
responder (R) accepts, the points are splitted as proposed by P. If R rejects they both get 
0 points.  
P can always choose between two allocations X and Y. The alternative X is always the 
same in all 4 games (8 for P and 2 for R). The alternative Y varies in each game. In the 
(5/5)- game for instance P and R get both 5 points. In the other three games the 
alternative Y corresponds respectively to a (2/8), (8/2), and (10/0) split. The responders 
were requested to make their decisions (accept or reject) for both allocations of each 
game before they were told which allocation P had actually chosen. 
The simplest prediction for the four games is the standard economic one: the (8/2) offer 
should never be rejected since a responder driven solely by self interest always prefers a 
payoff of 2 to a payoff of 0. On the other hand, if the responders are not driven just by 
self interest, it is possible that they reject the (8/2) offers.   
The behavior could be explained in part by an aversion to unequal divisions, due either 
to a principle of fairness, or to the respondents’ envy, where the respondents prefer the 
outcome $0/$0 to $8/$2 because they don’t like to walk away with less money than the 
proposers.  
 this were the cases, an individual who rejects  the (8/2) offer in one game should 
ject it in all other games.  
on for the generous offers observed. 
o
m
If
re
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Fig. 1.2 The mini-ultimatum games 
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The alternative X is always the same in all 4 games (8 for P and 2 for R). The alternative Y varies in each 
game. Source: Falk (2003) 
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Yet this does not seem an adequate explanation of the respondents motivation in turning 
down offers. Rather, it seems more likely that they don’t like the idea of the proposer 
having chosen to make an unfair offer, and hence retaliate. This interpretation that 
’s rate has been 44,4%. 
 the responder. In such a situation 
erpret the intentions of P as unfair. In 
rejection rate. The latter indeed has bee only 8,9%.  
 general, the results of this experiment show clearly that individuals give importance 
s of choice, i.e. to fair outcomes, but also to the intentions 
ith which a choice is made. 
 their research on heuristics and biases, Kahneman and Tversky (1974) have observed 
used by individuals when making judgments or estimations, 
 the one called anchoring and adjustment.  
rejection of unfair offers is an act of retaliation relies on the fact the proposer chose the 
unfair offer. To highlight this issue, consider first the (5/5) variant of the ultimatum 
game in Fig. 1.2 a-d.  
In this variant the (8/2) offer is clearly an unfair offer, since P has also the possibility to 
choose the fair (5/5) split. By not choosing the latter he signalizes unfair intentions. A 
rejection in this game could be admissible both from the perspective of pure aversion to 
unequal divisions and from the perspective of aversion against unfair intentions. In this 
game the rejection
Let’s now move to the (2/8) game. Here P doesn’t have the possibility to choose a fair 
allocation; he has to be unfair either to himself or to
it’s plausible to expect that many responders don’t find the (8/2) offer so unfair, in that 
they understand that P has to be unfair either to himself or to R. In this game in fact the 
rejection rate has been 26,7%.  
In the (8/2) game P doesn’t have alternative, i.e. he can’t offer anything else but the 
unfair allocation. In this situation R would not int
this game indeed the rejection rate has been only 18%. 
In the (10/10) game  The (8/2) offer is the fairest allocation that P can choose. If P 
chooses this alternative he signalizes fair intentions, and therefore we should expect a 
very low 
In
not only to the consequence
w
 
In
that one strategy commonly 
is
Usually this kind of heuristic consists of two phases: the first phase implies the 
generation of a preliminary judgment based on a natural starting point, or on the 
retrieval of a judgment previously made, i.e. the anchor; the second phase consists in the 
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adjustment of the estimation made in the first phase by using additional information 
(Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971). Often, the adjustment is smaller than it should be, 
considering the importance of the new information.  
A demonstration of the effects connected with the use of this strategy has been given by 
versky and Kahneman (1974). A group of subjects was asked to estimate the 
 numbers 
h different groups of subjects and for each group was 
as in which individuals incur by adopting this heuristic is that they underestimate 
d to estimate the following 
roduct: 
T
percentage of African countries present in the United Nations starting from a number 
extracted by chance by spinning, in front of the subjects, a wheel containing
from 0 to 100. The subjects were requested first to state if the number of countries was 
greater or smaller than the number extracted; and then to estimate the percentage they 
thought to be true by starting from the given number and increasing or diminishing it 
correspondingly.  
The experiment has been run wit
extracted a different number with wheel procedure.  
The results showed that estimations were affected by the numbers arbitrarily given; the 
median estimations, for example, for the groups were the numbers 10 and 65 had been 
extracted, were 25% and 45% respectively. 
The bi
the values because of an insufficient adjustment.  
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) have provided a further example in which they gave a 
mathematical expression to two groups of high-school students. The subjects were 
asked to estimate the result in five seconds. One group ha
p
 
8 x 7 x 6 x 5 x 4 x 3 x 2 x 1 
 
the other group had to estimate the same product but in an inverse sequence: 
 
1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8 
 
In order to answer quickly the subjects executed only a part of the products and then 
estimated the global result by adjustment. This procedure brought the subjects of both 
groups to underestimate the global product in that the adjustments were insufficient. In 
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the first case, nevertheless, the first partial products gave as a result a greater value than 
in the second case. This simple fact was enough to affect the median estimate of the two 
 further tendency that has been systematically observed in the psychology of thought 
our cards, marked E, K, 4, and 7. Each card has one letter on one side 
ew subjects think to turn over the 
, but they should because the rule is falsified if the 7 card has a vowel on the other 
dence could actually never test 
soning, known as the problem of triplets.  
e
nter told the subjects if the 
iplet conformed to the rule or not. The rule, a very general one, was “a sequence of 
growing numbers”. 
ost of the subjects made a hypothesis and then tested it by producing only positive 
examples, i.e. examples which constituted always confirmations for that hypothesis. For 
instance, some subjects formulated the hypothesis that the rule was “increasing numbers 
groups. The estimation of the first group was 2.250 and that of the second group was 
512, both much lower than the correct value (40.320).  
 
A
and hypothesised for the first time by Wason (1960) is the confirmation bias.  
Kagel and Roth (1995) illustrate it by reporting a tricky problem due to Wason (1968): 
“You are shown f
and a number on the other. You are given the following rule: every card with a vowel on 
one side has an even number on the other side. Which cards must you turn over to test 
whether the rule is true or false? 
In the four-cards problem, most subjects answer that E must be turned over, or E and 4. 
They think you should check the one card with a vowel (E) and perhaps check the even-
number card (4) too. The correct answer is E and 7. F
7
side.  
The four-card problem suggests that in testing an hypothesis, people instinctively seek 
evidence that could confirm the hypothesis: for example, finding a vowel on the other 
side of 4 would provide support for the rule, but that evi
whether the rule is always true (as turning over the 7 can).  
 
Wason (1960) gave a further proof of the confirmation bias in a famous experiment on 
inductive rea
The subjects had to guess the rule underlying a triplet of numbers such as “2, 4, 6” 
given by the experim nter. They had to submit triplets which constituted an example of 
an hypothesis they had made. For each triplet the experime
tr
M
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with a constant interval”, and produced triplets coherent with the hypothesis, such as 
“10, 12, 14”, or “23, 25, 27”.  
On the contrary, it would have been diagnostically more useful to generate examples 
elevant new information contradicting 
tion of the choice set (Ratneshwar et al., 1987). 
ing to the se
which falsified the hypothesis, such as “6, 4, 2”, adopting a procedure that, from the 
logical point of view, is the most effective. 
 
Further experimental evidence (Lord et al., 1979) has shown that once forming strong 
hypothesis, people often are less attentive to r
their hypothesis. 
people tend to interpret subsequent evidence so as to maintain their initial beliefs. The 
biased assimilation process underlying this effect include a propensity to remember the 
strengths of confirming evidence but the weaknesses of disconfirming evidence, to 
judge confirming evidence as relevant and reliable but disconfirming evidence as 
irrelevant and unreliable, and to accept confirming evidence at face value while 
scrutinizing disconfirming evidence hypercritically.  
 
An important part of experimental research has focused on the analysis of “context 
effects”. In choice situations, and particularly in consumer choice, context effects can be 
defined as changes in the choice process or in its results as a function of the particular 
composi
The idea that our choices depend on the context, although possibly obvious to common 
sense, is at odds with the normative models of choice, according to which preferences 
are exogenous constructs whose ordering cannot be altered by modifying contextual 
parameters. 
The so called regularity condition in rational choice, states that for any alternative x  
belong t A , where A  is in turn a subset of , the probability of choosing  B x  
out of A  cannot be smaller than the probability of choosing x  out of B . 
 
BAx ⊆∈∀ , );();( BxpAxp ≥  
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In other terms, under the regularity condition, the overall attractiveness of a particular 
option of a choice me reasing the number of other options 
vailable. 
 consumer theory this implies that the introduction of a new product competing with 
pre-existing products should not produce an increase in the market share of one or more 
of the pre-existing products. 
A further specification of the regularity condition is the basic principle that inefficient, 
dominated alternatives should not affect choice. 
In consumer theory the principle is specified by saying that the introduction of 
dominated products in the consumer’s choice menu should not alter the preference 
ordering between existing products (and should not alter their market share at all). 
Despite the intuitive appeal of the regularity condition, a number of experiments have 
shown that consumers violate it in a variety of settings. In particular, the violation most 
strongly occurs when the option being added is dominated by one of the pre-existing 
alternatives, as it happens in the “attraction effect”. For example, imagine that a group 
of subjects has to choose between two products A and B. A has superior quality but it’s 
more expensive than B. Subjects thus face a price/quality tradeoff. Fig.1.3 represents A 
and B in a two-dimensional diagram in which a quality index is reported on the y axis 
and convenience (as it may be expressed by 1/P, where P is the price) is reported on the 
X axis. 
agine that 55% of subjects actually choose A, while the remaining 45% choose B. 
 named decoy) is added, which is 
resents a tradeoff with A). 
, in other words, must fall within the shaded area in Fig. 1.3 to be dominated by B 
 B and 
0% would choose A).  
 
 
nu cannot be increased by inc
a
In
Im
Now, suppose a third product C (usually
asymmetrically dominated by B (C is inferior to B both in price and quality, but it still 
p
C
only. 
Various experiments (Huber et al., 1982) have shown that in this second case no one 
chooses C, which is clearly inferior, but its mere presence causes a substantial shift of 
preferences from A towards B (in our example, 60% of subjects would choose
4
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 Fig. 1.3 The attraction effect 
 
 
Quality 
 
C 
B 
A 
Convenience 
 
 
Product A has superior quality but is more expensive than B. C (the decoy) is asymmetrically dominated 
by B (C is inferior to B both in price and quality, but it still presents a tradeoff with A). 
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ically invariant: The target option (B in our example) displays 
The attraction effect is one of the most robust biases in consumer choice. Experiments 
have been replicated using different product classes, from chocolate bars to TV sets to 
beer. The pattern is typ
always a consistent gain in terms of preference shares when the decoy is added.  
 
 
Simonson and Tversky (1992) propose the notion of tradeoff contrast as a possible 
background against which they appear to us. Thus, the same figure will 
e perceived differently according to the background against which it is positioned. 
 way in which people value tradeoffs 
to emerge in two different ways: the first one (background 
hase 
generalization for a variety of context effects, among which the attraction effect can be 
considered a particular case. 
The principle of tradeoff contrast can be intuitively grasped if one imagines it analogous 
to a sort of perceptual illusion: In everyday settings, we often tend to perceive entities in 
relation to the 
b
In much the same way, a product may be judged as more desirable if placed among 
inferior products, and vice-versa. 
This judgmental bias can also influence the
between attributes. As an example, suppose you want to buy a new computer and you 
are offered the following two options: 
 
- Computer X, priced $1200, with 960K memory 
- Computer Y, priced $1000, with 640K memory. 
 
X is the high price, large memory option, while Y is the lower price, smaller memory 
option. 
You have to resolve a tradeoff, as your choice depends on your willingness to pay $200 
more to get 320K of additional memory: restated differently, the cost for you of 
obtaining 1K additional memory is $0.625 ($200/320K). 
Simonson and Tversky found that people are more inclined to choose the more 
expensive computer if the choice menu includes other pairs of options for which the 
price/quality exchange rate is higher than $0,625, that is pairs of options for which the 
cost of additional memory is higher than the one implied by the target. 
Similarly, if the choice menu includes pairs of options for which the cost of additional 
memory is lower than the target, people are more inclined to select the less expensive 
computer in the target. 
Tradeoff contrast was found 
contrast) refers to alternatives encountered by consumers during past purc
experiences. The second (local contrast) refers to pairs of options that are included in 
the same choice set along with the target. 
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 nother principle related to the emergence of context-dependence phenomena is 
xtremeness aversion, which may account for the compromise effect which was found 
to emerge in experiments. In many settings, individuals seem to avoid options which 
present extreme values, preferring instead options that represent a compromise between 
two extremes. 
 
Simonson and Tversky (1992) carried out an experiment with three different models of 
cameras which differed from one another only on two attributes: price convenience and 
quality.  The situation is described in Fig.1.4.  
On the abscissa is represented the first attribute (price convenience) and on the ordinate 
the second attribute (quality). X, Y, and Z represent the three models of cameras.   
A first group of experimental subjects was presented only models X and Y and was 
asked to make a choice between the two. A second group of subjects was presented the 
three models and was asked the choose one of them.  
The results of the experiment show that X and Y were equally popular in the first group, 
i.e. each model was chosen by 50% of the subjects. In the second group, instead, the 
addition of Z increased the popularity of Y relative to X from 50% to 72%.  
his particular anomaly may be justified by the notion of loss aversion, which can be 
aturally extended to contexts of consumption acts by picturing the attributes of each 
 two options in turn). By extending the notion of loss aversion 
 a context of choice between alternatives, it is possible to hypothesize that individuals 
nd to weigh disadvantages more heavily than corresponding advantages when 
ptions X and Z present large 
nd disadvantages relative to both. 
nder the hypothesis of loss aversion, individuals select the option that minimizes the 
overall disadvantages (losses), and this leads to the choice of Y. 
A
e
T
n
goods advantages and disadvantages relative to all other goods in the choice set (note 
that in this case the reference point against which gains and losses are valued is not the 
status quo, but each of the
to
te
evaluating different options. In Fig. 1.4 option Y has middle values with respect to X 
and Z along both dimensions. The two extreme o
advantages and disadvantages relative to one another, and smaller advantages and 
disadvantages relative to Y. 
Y, on the other hand, presents small advantages a
U
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Fig. 1.4 Extremeness aversion 
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The two extreme options X and Z present large advantages and disadvantages relative to one another, and 
herefore, Y will benefit from the presence of both X and Z in the choice menu relative 
-theoretic point of view, this result is another violation of the regularity 
ondition although no dominated option is added, since the middle option is supposed to 
ced. 
smaller advantages and disadvantages relative to Y. Y, on the other hand, presents small advantages and 
disadvantages relative to both. 
 
 
T
to binary choices between Y and Z, or Y and X alone. 
From a decision
c
score better when the third option is introdu
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Simonson and Tversky introduce the two terms compromise and polarization to 
distinguish between the case in which extremeness aversion applies to both attributes 
from the one in which it applies to one attribute only. 
That is, a compromise effect occurs when adding Z to the (X, Y) pair favors Y over X 
nd adding X to the (Y, Z) pair favors Y over Z. 
he experimental evidence above described (see also Simonson (1993) for a review) 
act that the process of evaluation of alternatives is comparative in nature, 
at is the attractiveness of every option closely depends, among other factors, on the 
ecent research has established the important role that reasons play in decision making. 
ked either to choose among existing 
a
In the case of polarization only one of the two outcomes occurs.  
 
T
suggests the f
th
options with which it is compared.  
 
R
For instance, Tversky and Shafir (1992b) show that when people are searching for 
alternatives, they do not merely search to find a high-value option, as assumed in 
conventional search theory, but also seem to search for a reason to end their search and 
make one particular choice.  
Tversky and Shafir (1992b) conducted an experiment where subjects were posed a 
hypothetical apartment-search problem, and were as
options, or to engage in costly further search. Shafir et al. (1993) summarize it as 
follows: 
“Subjects were presented choices between hypothetical student apartments. Some 
subjects received the following problem: 
 
Conflict: 
 
Imagine that you face a choice between two apar  th  following 
characteristics: 
 
x) $290 a month, 25 minutes from campus 
tments with e
y) $350 a month, 7 minutes from campus 
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Both have one bedroom and a itchenet . You can choose now between the two 
apartments or you can continue to search for apartments (t
k te
o be selected at random from 
the list you received). In the latter case, there is some risk of losing one or both of the 
apartments you have found. 
 
Other subjects received a similar problem except that option y was replaced by option 
x’, to yield a choice between: 
 
Dominance: 
 
x) $290 a month, 25 minutes from campus 
x’) $330 a month, 25 minutes from campus 
 
Note that […] the choice between x and y - the conflict condition - is nontrivial because 
[…x is better on one dimension and y is] better on the other. In contrast, the choice 
between x and x’ - the dominance condition-involves no conflict because the former 
strictly dominates the latter. Thus, while there is no obvious reason to choose one option 
jects requested an additional alternative 64% of the time in the conflict 
n when there was a compelling reason and the 
learly 
would also 
 since she coul
over the other in the conflict condition, there is a decisive argument for preferring one 
of the two alternatives in the dominance condition. 
On average, sub
condition, and only 40% of the time in the dominance condition. Subjects tendency to 
search for additional options, in other words, was greater when the choice among 
alternatives was harder to rationalize, tha
decision was easy.” 
The greater propensity to search further under the conflict condition than under the 
dominance condition is inconsistent with the utility-maximization model. C
)()( xUxU ′>  for all subjects; it is indeterminate whether subjects consider 
)()( yUxU >  or )()( xUyU > . But if the decision to keep searching were based  merely 
on the computation of the utility, V , of continuing search, than any subject who would 
choose to stop under the dominance condition, indicating that VxU ≥)( , 
choose to stop under the conflict condition, d always choose x  where 
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VxU ≥)( , or choose , if UyU > egate data therefore contradicts the 
utility maximization assumption
Tversky and Shafir interpret th that the choice in the conflict 
condition is difficult, in that it lacks a clear reason to choose x versus y; it is hard to 
weight the pros and cons of the two alternative. The dominance condition, on the other 
hand, yields an obvious choice – x is as good as x’ on one dimension and better than x’ 
n the other dimension. This provides an obvious reason to choose x. The experiment 
for reasons rather 
an merely by the search for options that maximize utility. 
se of pure luck or because of a 
erformance (for example in a television quiz). Which outcome, win $1000 by luck or 
ried out an experiment in which the subjects 
ey would have 
 information that they would receive the mugs on the 
asis of a test they had previously made; the other half received the information that 
wing way. The subjective utility consists of two 
components: The utility of the coffee mug itself and the utility brought by the good 
feeling (for example, pride) of having performed well and received a price.  
 
 
y )(x . The  aggr)(
. 
ese results by claiming 
o
suggests that search behavior may in part be explained by the search 
th
 
A further phenomenon which constitutes a deviation from rational choice theory is the 
one known as “source dependence”. It consists in the fact that the judgment about the 
utility of an outcome is always influenced by how the outcome has been obtained or 
what has caused the outcome. You can win $1000 becau
p
win $1000 because of performance, would you judge better? Probably, as most of the 
people, the second one.  
Loewenstein and Issacharoff (1994) car
were shown some attractive coffee mugs and were told that later th
received them.  
A half of the subjects received the
b
they would receive the mugs by chance.  
The subjects had to state for how much money they would accept to sell the mug.  
The people who thought they had received the mug because of their performance valued 
it significantly higher than people who thought they received the mug by chance.  
These results confirms the hypothesis of source dependence of judgments, and were 
interpreted from the authors in the follo
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Section 2 
Categorization 
 chapter one I introduce the concepts of category and categorization, and discuss 
t can be processed and 
 is perceived as being 
maller than the distance between stimuli belonging to two different categories, even 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this section I review the psychological literature on categorization. 
 
In
people’s predispositions to recognize correlational structures in the environment. I also 
describe the functional role of categorization, which is to contribute to “cognitive 
economy” by parsing environmental variation into units tha
manipulated more efficiently than continuous variation. 
 
In chapter two I describe the cognitive and psychophysical approaches to categorization, 
which are concerned respectively with the study of generic knowledge (GK) categories 
and sensory perception (SP) categories.  
GK categories are related to knowledge representation and processing.  
SP categories are related to psychophysical issues concerning how physical energy 
relates to perceptual experience.  
 
Chapter three is concerned with the phenomenon of Categorical perception (CP) which 
has been observed in SP categories. CP consists in a perceptual recoding of a physical 
continuum into discrete categories. This form of categorization has the consequence that 
the distance between stimuli within the same perceptual category
s
though the actual distance is the same. 
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2.1 The concepts of category and categorization 
 
Most “high level” cognition involves some process by which subjects form and modify 
mental representations of the world in order to understand and manage a reality which is 
generally too complex, multifaceted,  and uncertain to be grasped in its entirety.  
Studying mental representations is crucial in the understanding of aspects which go 
from concept formation, to memory, inference and judgement. That is why mental 
representations have been a focal interest across different branches of psychology, 
cognitive science, philosophy, and artificial intelligence. 
ategories are generally represented with higher levels including more generic 
 
mount of cognitive processing that underlies categorization, people 
es the entity into a category. For example, an auditorially 
erceived entity might be categorized as the letter b, or a visually perceived entity might 
 
Studies on memory and cognition have shown that information about the world is 
usually stored and retrieved according to hierarchical or cluster-type structures 
(categories) with different levels of abstraction (Lakoff, 1987) 
C
knowledge and lower levels containing more specific information about particular 
instances of a concept (Taylor and Crocker, 1981). Researchers often distinguish
schemas as organised structures having both spatial and temporal dimensions, from 
categories, usually intended as taxonomic classifications of objects. When the temporal 
dimension is relatively more prominent, schemas are usually referred to as scripts, 
intended as stereotypical sequences of events with associated a set of routinised 
expectations and rules of behavior.  
 
To categorize is to treat a set of things as somehow equivalent: to put them in the same 
pile, or call them by the same name, or respond to them in the same way. In spite of the 
tremendous a
typically perform categorizations effortlessly and unconsciously. 
 
Categorization provides the gateway between perception and cognition. After a 
perceptual system acquires information about an entity in the environment, the 
cognitive system plac
p
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be categorized as chair. These categories are representations, because they are structures 
in the cognitive system that stand for perceived entities in the environment.  
The representations assigned to entities during categorization play central roles in 
subsequent cognitive processing: they may be stored in memory, be combined with 
other representations, be transformed into new representations, or they may trigger 
cognitive processes, such as the intention to achieve a goal. In general, many cognitive 
rization. 
tegorize some varieties of plants into those that do or do not have bitter 
stes and than are able to respond adaptively to new instances when only visual 
atures are available.  
psychologists assume that the representations assigned during categorization constitute 
the fundamental units of cognitive processing. Most cognitive processes, indeed, begin 
with some form of catego
 
Snowdon(1987) suggests that the functional role of categorization is to contribute to 
“cognitive economy” by parsing environmental variation into units that can be 
processed and manipulated more efficiently than continuous variation. 
 
Categorization has been of interest for centuries mainly for its relevance to the problem 
of induction, i.e. how we derive generalized knowledge from specific past experiences. 
The key role of category-type structures of information is to provide expectations about 
a class of objects or events, which are than translated to novel instances, whenever 
encountered. Once a categorization has been accomplished, discovering to which 
category an object or event belongs immediately yields a tremendous amount of 
information about the properties of the object or the event that might not be directly 
perceptible (Corter and Gluck, 1992; Heit, 1992).  
The role of categories, in short, is both providing an interpretation of stimuli, and 
guiding inference, e.g. providing pre-stored expectations in substitution for missing 
information.  
This function of categorization may be important even at a relatively primitive level. 
Animals or young children, for example, use visual properties, among others, when 
learning to ca
ta
fe
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A fundamental principle of categorization pertains to the structure of the perceived 
world. Combinations of attributes in the perceived world do not appear uniformly, but 
according to a highly correlational structure that forms natural discontinuities (so, for 
example, the pair of attributes wings and feathers has a higher probability of co-
occurring compared to wings and fur). Categories can be thought of as concepts or 
images reflecting such discontinuities in a cognitive system.  
Whatever its source, knowledge of the manner in which the properties of external events 
cluster together enables us to reduce to manageable proportions the complexity of the 
environment we live in. 
 
A significant contribution to the understanding of our predisposition to recognize 
orrelational structures and in particular to recognize stimulus configurations came from 
sts) in the earlier part of 
ese century. In a series of demonstrations they showed how elements in simple visual 
isplays entered into different groupings according to general principles such as 
imilarity and proximity. The displays in Fig. 2.1a reveal that while in principle there 
ine now group together to form a pair. In the second line, the same device 
c
a group of psychologists (since termed the Gestalt psychologi
th
d
s
are various ways of segregating the rows in each array, one version tends to be favoured 
over the rest. In the top row, the dots are equally spaced and there is no obvious 
perceptual grouping to be discerned. In the second line, where the spacing is unequal, 
elements that are closer together combine to form distinct groups. In the third line, 
where proximity has been held constant but the size of the elements varies, it is 
similarity in size that determines how the elements will be grouped. 
In Fig. 2.1b, it is evident that the principles of proximity and similarity are overridden 
when a connecting line is added to component link elements in the display. In the top 
line of Fig. 2.1b, although the elements are equidistant, the elements connected by a 
horizontal l
overrides proximity effects, just as in the third line, it overrides similarity (Palmer and 
Rock, 1994). 
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Fig. 2.1 Stimulus configurations 
 
(a) Grouping by proximity and similarity; (b) Grouping via connectedness. 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
 ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·   ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
   
 
 
   ··   ··   ··   ··       ··   ··   ··   ·· 
 
 
 · ·  ·  ·  · ·  ·  ·     · ·  ·  ·  · ·  ·  · 
 
In other words, the structural descriptions assigned to a stimulus configuration encode 
information about the part-whole constituents that make up the display. Although there 
may be a number of ways of constructing a structural description, the latter is likely to 
take the same form each time the stimulus occurs. This means that we are predisposed 
to recognize regularities in our environment, and that this predisposition is shared in the 
same form by all human beings This is not just true for simple visual displays. Similar 
considerations apply to all types of stimulus configuration, and the resulting structural 
descriptions come to play a crucial role in determining which events are recognised as 
having occurred before and, hence, how our general knowledge is likely to accumulate 
over time. 
Consider the deceptively simple case of learning a serial string of 12 random letters by 
reading it aloud from a card and than recalling it from memory. Most subjects will 
require a number of read and recall attempts before they can reproduce the list without 
error and this provides the opportunity to observe their spontaneous encoding strategies 
as they execute the task. By tape-recording the subjects while they read and recall, 
researchers have found that extended pauses start to appear at specific points in the list. 
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The locations of these pauses tend to be consistent from one reading to the next and 
they mark the grouping boundaries that arise as the learner tries to impose a part-whole 
onstituent structure on the input. At recall, the same grouping patterns reappear, 
erall, the triplet pattern stands out as the 
list for 
ach of the variant groupings. By imposing a particular grouping pattern on a printed 
c
implying that the extended pauses mark the boundaries of the subjective chunks the 
learner has selected for encoding the input. Typically, random lists tend to be 
partitioned into groups of three items; groups with two or four items are less common, 
while groups featuring more than four items tend to be avoided altogether (Wilkes et al., 
1972). Thus, a typical reading of a 12-item list would consist of the subject running 
quickly through the first three items, pausing, and then repeating the same routine for 
the remainder of the items. There are occasional variations - for eight items-lists a 
grouping of fours tends to be preferred – but ov
majority choice (see also Ryan, 1969 and Broadbent, 1975). The rationale of this 
encoding activity is to convert a random list into a more manageable hierarchical format 
which can be stored in long-term memory ready to be unpacked whenever the original 
list content needs to be consulted. 
The customary interpretation of such grouping behavior has been that it enables the 
learner to overcome the bottleneck imposed by the limited capacity of working memory. 
Converting a list of 9 or 12 items into three or four chunks effectively reduces the 
immediate memory load by transforming each string into a condensed format. However, 
alleviating immediate memory load is not the only reason. The structural format 
assigned to a list also determines whether or not subsequent lists will be categorized as 
the same or different. That is, the hierarchical structure assigned to a list is tightly 
connected with the individual items and their serial order in determining whether two 
lists will be treated as identical. If we vary a lists’ constituent structure, while leaving its 
elements and their serial order unchanged, this has the effect of creating a new 
e
list through the introduction of double spacing between items at the intended group 
boundaries, it is possible to steer subjects away from their preferred groupings towards 
other patterns chosen by the experimenter. When faced by spatially grouped lists, 
subjects normally adjust their reading to accomodate their extended pauses at the spatial 
break and their recall output is also adjusted to match this reading. Consequently, it is 
possible to observe what structure alters from one trial to the next. Although, on the 
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surface, this is an apparently minor change, the manipulation is quite sufficient to 
impede cumulative learning processes. 
 
Wilkes (1972) arranged for two groups of subjects to learn a list of 15 letters via the 
read and recall procedure. Subjects in the consistent group saw their list spatially 
grouped into threes on all trials. Subjects in the inconsistent group experienced a triplet 
 trial. 
empts 
bjects 
at slavishly grouped their reading in accordance with the changing spatial pattern on 
dition who did manage to learn the list were 
t seems that the subjects who faithfully followed the changing groupings had 
 a major gain in 
ognitive economy, as each newly categorized input can be treated as equivalent to the 
other instances stored under the same description and not as a unique event each time it 
spacing on trial 1 but, thereafter, the spatial grouping altered from trial to trial. Thus 
consistent subjects saw the sequence (LDT CKG BSY FQW ZHV) on each trial. 
Subjects in the iconsistent condition only saw this sequence on their first
Thereafter, the spatial grouping changed (e.g., LDTC KG BSY FQWZ HV) and it 
continued to change from one trial to the next.  
Subjects in the consistent group took on average 8.4 “read and recall” attempts to learn 
their lists whereas subjects in the inconsistent condition took on average 18.5 att
to reach the same learning criterion. Although these group averages seem to imply that 
under the inconsistent condition the learning criterion was eventually met, closer 
inspection revealed that the group measure was highly misleading. In fact, the su
th
each trial never actually learned their list at all. These subjects were stopped after 28 
abortive unsuccessful attempts and it was this score that was entered for averaging. The 
only subjects from the inconsistent con
those who ignored the imposed spatial grouping and substituted a constant version of 
their own; in effect, they transferred themselves into the consistent, experimental 
condition. I
been led to categorize their list afresh on each trial and this was quite sufficient to 
prevent them from deriving any cumulative benefit from the repeated exposures. 
 
The argument, so far, has been that events are encoded in a form that allows us to 
recognise when the same input has been repeated. As a result, we can proceed to impose 
a degree of control on the flux of experience by categorizing together discrete inputs 
that share a common structural description. This strategy leads to
c
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is enco  properties that matched instances have 
 common, we can derive our generic knowledge of the world. 
 
Barsalou (1992) divides the act of categorising an entity into five basic steps (see Fig. 
2.2) where the first step consists, as we’ve just seen, in forming a structural description 
of the entity. 
The second step involves a search in memory for category representations similar to the 
structural description. If the entity is a chair, for example, representations for chair, sofa, 
stool, and table might all receive consideration, given their perceptual similarity.  
Third, a decision procedure selects the category representation best suited for 
classifying the entity, in the case the representation for chair.  
Fourth, relevant inferences about the entity are drawn from category knowledge. 
Because the entity is a chair, for example, the perceiver infers it can be sat upon.  
Finally, information about the categorization is stored in memory to update the category 
representation. Later categorizations may benefit from this memory, and memories of 
enough categorizations may eventually lead to expert classification performance.  
 economics, the topic of categorization has been treated almost exclusively by the 
search on consumer behavior. Categories and categorization processes, indeed, play 
n essential role in consumer settings.   
onsumer researchers have focused the attention on the identification of the basic 
ing consumers that initially do not have familiarity 
untered. Over time, by generalising on the
in
 
In
re
a
C
cognitive structures which shape preferences, attitudes, and in turn consumption 
behavior.  
Through the category-based process
with a new product tend to make inferences by assimilating it to existing categories. 
This involves a relatively intuitive (and often automatic) process of instance-class 
comparison and transfer to the instance itself of some category-based global 
evaluations. Most advertising efforts by firms to communicate specialised positionings 
for their products in the market therefore may be read as attempts to influence 
consumers’ judgements of category membership for those products.  
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Fig. 2.2 The five steps of categorization 
 
Form a structural description of the entity 
Search for category representations 
similar to the structural description 
Select the most similar category representation 
Draw inferences about the entity 
Store information about the categorization 
 
 
A flow chart for processing during categorization 
 
 
 
Shefrin and Thaler (1988) have used psychological explanations based on mental 
categories to comprehend a particular behavioral anomaly observed in relation to 
standard consumption theory.  
They observed as a certain number of families borrowed money for small expenses such 
as buying a car or a washing machine, accepting to pay passive interests higher than 
those received from their bank deposit. This behavior can be attributed to the fact that 
people represent their wealth on the basis of different categories to which a precise role 
is assigned in the domestic economy. For example, money which is deposited on the 
current account has to be distinguished and differently used from that invested in bonds, 
or from that relative to occasional revenues such as pay checks for extraordinary.  
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This form of categorization, known as “mental accounting”, or “mental budgeting”, can 
be a useful shortcu
boundaries are too restrictive, i.e., if there 
t for making consumption or saving decisions, but if budget 
is a reluctance to transfer money from one 
ccount to another, they can prevent the decision making unit from making beneficial 
g 
roblem: 
 received 
e following problem:  
 the lost bill or the lost ticket, 
 $20 poorer than before; either one doesn’t buy the ticket. The difference between the 
r the lost ticket. This way a ticket costs subjectively $20. Thus for the 
ntrary, no relation is perceived between the lost bill 
nd the lost ticket. The loss of $10 is assigned to a different account, thus the ticket has 
 subjective value of only $10. This way, for the majority of this group, the problem 
remains unchanged: V (theatre) > V ($10); the loss of the bill is neglected, and people 
buy the ticket. 
a
trade-offs.  
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) have carried out an experiment with which they provide 
evidence of mental accounting. A first group of subjects received the followin
p
Imagine you have decided to go to the theatre; the ticket costs $10. As you arrive to the 
theatre you realize that you have lost a $10 bill. Would you still pay $10 for the ticket? 
The majority (88%) said yes, they decided to buy the ticket. A second group
th
Imagine you have decided to go to the theatre and you have bought a ticket for $10. As 
you arrive at the theatre you realize that you have lost the ticket. Would you pay $10 for 
a new ticket? 
In this case the majority (54%) said no, decided not to buy the new ticket. 
The result is surprising, because from a pure monetary perspective the two scenarios are 
identical: either one buys a ticket for $10, and, because of
is
two scenarios consists only in the modality of the previous loss, loss of a bill or loss of a 
ticket. If the majority of the subjects buys the ticket in the first version, the same should 
happen in the second version. 
The different preferences are explained by Tversky and Kahneman in the following 
way: in the second case, the £10 expense is assigned to the same mental account as the 
expense fo
majority in this group the problem is as follows: V (theatre)  > V ($10), but V (theatre) 
< V ($20). In the first case, on the co
a
a
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2.2 The cognitive and the psychophysical approaches to 
ategorization 
’t been possible to define GK and SP categories rigorously, although 
.  
died by investigators interested in sensory processes and 
xamples of SP categories include categories of visual (e.g., colors), auditory (speech 
 such as hue and shape.  
c
 
The problem of categorization has been tackled by two main lines of psychological 
research that have been proceeding more or less independently from one another. 
The first line of research is concerned with what Medin and Barsalou call “generic 
knowledge (GK) categories”, and the other with “sensory perception (SP) categories”. 
 
So far it hasn
researchers have discovered various aspects that are characteristic of these two category 
types. Perhaps the best way to define the two category types is operationally
 
GK categories are those categories studied by investigators interested in semantic 
analysis, memory organization, and abstract thought. Work on GK categories is often 
closely tied to cognitive science issues concerning knowledge representation and 
processing. Examples of GK-categories include natural kinds (e.g., birds), artifacts (e.g., 
cars), and events (e.g., going to restaurants) (see Medin and Smith (1984), Mervis and 
Rosch (1981), and Smith and Medin (1981) for reviews).  
 
SP categories are those stu
perception. Work on SP categories is often closely tied to psychophysical issues 
concerning how physical energy relates to perceptual experience.  
E
and non-speech sounds), tactile, gustatory, olfactory, and proprioceptive information 
(stimuli).  
This approach is associated with relativistic judgements of physically continuous 
dimensions
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2.2.1 Generic knowledge (GK) categories 
 
Medin and Barsalou distinguish between two different kinds of GK categories: (1) all-
or-none categories and (2) graded ones.  
There are two sub-types of all-or-none categories: (1a) “in well-defined” categories all 
members share a common set of features and a corresponding rule defines these as 
necessary and sufficient conditions for membership. For example a category can have 
attributes that are jointly sufficient and singly necessary for category membership, that 
is only members of the category possess all these attributes and all members possess 
ach of them. 
t is not a well defined one is a disjunctive 
le, according to which category members must satisfy one of several sufficient 
gs and misses or when the 
e
For instance, being adult, never married, eligible, living, male, and human are jointly 
sufficient and singly necessary for membership in the category bachelors.  
 
(1b) In “defined” (but not well-defined) categories the features need not be shared by all 
members. An example of a defining rule tha
ru
conditions for category membership, but need not satisfy any one in particular. For 
example, a strike in baseball occurs either when a hitter swin
ball is in the strike zone. Many other forms of defining rules for category membership 
are also possible, such as exclusions, conditionals, and biconditionals (see Bourne, 
1970; Bourne et al., 1979).  
The key characteristics of defined categories are that membership is all-or-none and that 
membership can be unambiguously determined by reference to a rule.  
 
Graded, or fuzzy, categories (2) are not defined by all-or-none rules at all, and 
membership is a matter of degree. In contrast to defined categories, a category is fuzzy 
if it is not possible to specify a rule that identifies all of its members and only its 
members.  
Consider Wittgenstein's (1953) example of games. No one has yet found a rule that 
discriminates all games from all non-games. Some attributes seem to be true of all 
games (e.g., occur in time, are an activity), but are so general as to be jointly 
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insufficient. Other characteristic attributes set games apart to some extent from non-
games, but none of these attributes are true of all games; they are therefore not singly 
necessary (e.g., involves competition, goal pursuit, and multiple participants; these 
characteristics are true of many games, but not all). Because no rule appears to 
distinguish games from nongames, and because category membership does not appear 
ry and about the processes that operate on these 
presentations to produce categorizations.  
he central assumption of this approach is that people often determine whether or not an 
to be all or none, games are not a defined category. Instead, the characteristic attributes 
of games are structured such that each game has a strong similarity to a number of other 
games and not much similarity to non-games, what Wittgenstein referred to as a family-
resemblance structure.  
 
Much recent work on graded categories has addressed the search and selection stages 
(Fig. 2.2) of categorization. Theorists have proposed a wide variety of categorization 
models to explain these stages. Each type of model makes different assumptions about 
the representation of categories in memo
re
 
Among the various models of categorization the prototypical one is by and large the 
most widely applied in cognitive psychology  
The assumption of this model is that many GK categories are represented by prototypes. 
Generally speaking, the prototype of a category contains the characteristic attributes of 
it’s category exemplars, namely attributes that are highly probable across category 
members, but that are neither necessary or sufficient for category membership. For 
example, the prototype for bachelor might include attributes true of any bachelors but 
not all (e.g., goes to singles bars, drives a sports car, is heterosexual).  
T
instance belongs to a category on the basis of how similar it is to the category’s 
prototype. Instances above some threshold of similarity to the prototype are classified as 
category members; all others are non-members.  
A further assumption of prototype classification is that ease of classification should vary 
with how similar an entity is to the prototype. The more similar a category member is to 
the prototype, the more easily it should be classified as a category member. In contrast, 
the more similar a non-member is to the prototype, the harder it should be to exclude it.  
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In a series of studies, Rosch and her collegues (e.g.,Rosch, 1973; Rosch and Mervis, 
1975) have demonstrated that when people are timed in the act of assigning instances to 
particular categories, certain cases are processed faster than others. It is as though there 
ere a graded variation in class membership where some class members are treated as 
pical of the class while others are being treated as atypical entries.  
 robin as a bird is shorter than for 
entifying a penguin as a bird (whether the stimulus is the name or the image of the 
as been referred to as “tipicality”, 
rototypes do not contain only the characteristic attributes of their respective categories. 
ften not characteristic of category members. With “things to eat on a 
s central tendency while containing others that represent ideals. 
ilarity to 
assigned to the category having the most similar exemplar or exemplars. With respect to 
w
ty
For example, the reaction time for identifying a
id
bird), a robin is rated as being a better or more typical example of a bird than a penguin 
is, and subjects report that a robin has more of the feature characteristic of a bird than a 
penguin does.  
This differential ease of classification, which h
“exemplar goodness”, and “graded structure”, has been observed extensively and is the 
most robust factor in classification performance we know of (see reviews by Medin and 
Smith, 1984; Mervis and Rosch, 1981). 
 
P
As shown by Barsalou (1985), the prototypes of many GK categories contain ideal 
attributes that are o
diet”, for example, exemplars become better examples of the category as their number 
of calories approaches the ideal value of zero. This reflects the fact that the prototype of 
this category contains the ideal attribute of 0 calories, which clearly is not the 
characteristic value (i.e., central tendency) of the category. Barsalou also demonstrates 
that prototypes of GK categories may simultaneously contain some attributes that reflect 
the category’
 
Another model of categorization is the one referred to as  “classification by exemplars”. 
According to this view, people classify entities on the basis of their sim
memories of previously experienced category members. Instead of testing a stimulus 
against a rule or prototype that has been abstracted from experience with many 
members, they compare it with memories of specific category exemplars, each memory 
representing an encounter with an exemplar at a specific place and time. Stimuli are 
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bachelor, an unidentified man might be compared to memories of previously 
encountered bachelors and would, if sufficiently similar to these exemplars, be assigned 
ation and 
ical intensity of the sensation it causes.  
logically 
s of tones. 
and the listener responded by giving a 
umeral. After the listener had made his response he was told the correct identification 
judge, the best we can expect her to do is to assign them to about six different classes 
without error. Or, stated slightly differently, if we know that there are N alternative 
to the category.   
 
 
2.2.2 Sensory perception (SP) categories 
 
An alternative approach to the problem of categorization is the psychophysical one. 
Psychophysics is concerned with the relationship between physical stimul
sensation, for example, that between the physical intensity of a stimulus and the 
psycholog
The approach is “bottom-up” in the sense of physical-to-psychological. Psychophysics 
is close to the level of neural mechanisms and is often pursued in close collaboration 
with parallel work on sensory psychophysiology, although it is methodo
independent of such work.  
 
An early study that approached the problem of categories in psychophysics was the one 
by Miller (1955).  
He considered for example what happens when we make absolute judgement
Pollak (1952) asked listeners to identify tones by assigning numerals to them. The tones 
were different with respect to frequency and covered the range from 100 to 8000 cps in 
equal logarithmic steps. A tone was sounded 
n
of the tone. 
When only two or three tones were used the listeners never confused them. With four 
different tones confusions were quite rare, but with five or more tones confusions were 
frequent. With fourteen different tones the listeners made many mistakes.  
Miller claims that in general we cannot peak more than six different pitches that the 
listeners will never confuse. No matter how many alternative tones we ask a person to 
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stimuli, than her judgement enables us to narrow down the particular stimulus to one out 
of N/6. 
For example, if you can discriminate five high-pitched tones in a series and five low-
pitched tones in another series, it is reasonable to expect that you could combine all ten 
into a single series and still tell them all apart without error. When you try it, however, 
 been repeated for taste intensities, and visual 
ity.  
here seems to be some limitation built into us either by learning or by the design of our 
ervous systems, a limit that keeps our channel capacities in this general, remarkably 
arrow range. On the basis of the present evidence it seems safe to say that we possess a 
finite and rather small capacity for making such unidimensional judgements and that 
this capacity does not vary a great deal from one sensory attribute to another. 
Considering the wide variety of different variables that have been studied, the mean 
corresponds to 6,5 categories, one standard deviation includes from 4 to 10 categories, 
and the total range is from 3 to 15 categories.”  
 
Many SP theorists assume that people’s knowledge of an SP category specifies 
attributes that its exemplars should ideally have. All exemplars of /b/, for example 
should have the acoustic parameters of stops that are bilabial and voiced15. The status of 
these ideals appears to vary from theory to theory. Some theories assumes that these 
parameters enter into conventional linguistic rules as necessary and sufficient conditions 
for category membership. Many of the accounts along these lines seem to assume that 
                                                          
it does not work. The channel capacity for pitch seems to be about six and that is the 
best you can do.  
In making absolute judgements, the channel capacity is the upper limit on the extent to 
which the observer can match his responses to the stimuli he has been given.  
The same kind of experiments have
stimuli.  
Miller (1955) observes: “considering the wide variety of different variables that have 
been studied, although there is no question that the differences among the variables are 
real and meaningful, the more impressive fact is their considerable similar
T
n
n
15 “Stop” refers to the complete blockage of air through the vocal tract at some point during articulation of 
the sound; “bilabial” refers to the air blockage that results from pressing the upper and lower lips 
together; and “voiced” refers to the vocal chords vibrating at some point during the sound. 
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ideal attributes are used in an all-or-none fashion; namely, either something possesses 
ll of a category’s ideal attributes and is therefore in the category or does not possess all 
al instance of the category; exemplars can vary widely in 
ing this view can be found in Samuel (1982), Repp and Liberman (1987), 
pported the view 
a
the ideal attributes and is not in the category. Category membership is discrete or 
categorical as opposed to being graded. Classification by ideal attributes in SP 
categories is analogous to classification by rules in GK categories. 
Other theoretical views seem to have loosened the requirement that the exemplars of a 
SP category must possess all of its ideal attributes. Instead, a category’s ideal values 
represent only the prototypic
the extent to which they approach the ideal, and the distance from the prototypes 
determines the ease of classification.  
Work reflect
Eimas et al. (1987), Diehl and Kluender (1987), and Massaro (1987). Many 
experimental studies however have rejected this latter view and have su
of categorical perception (CP) which will be treated in the next chapter .  
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2.3 Categorical Perception (CP) 
 
ategorical Perception (CP) was first described by Liberman and his colleagues in 
studies of speech perception (Liberman et al., 1967 and 1957), but it has since been 
found in a variety of domains. It has been demonstrated, for instance, also for musical 
triads, musical intervals, and color perception (e.g., Burns and Ward, 1978; Healy and 
Repp, 1982; Locker and Kellar, 1973; Miller, et al., 1976; Pastore et al., 1977 and 1983 
Zatorre and Halpern, 1979). 
It represents a phenomenon which continues to engage the interest of investigators, even 
though there has been little agreement about what processes might underlie this way of 
erceiving.  
ategorical perception refers to the fact that a range of stimuli from a physical 
ses.  
he stimuli, in other words, are perceived as if they belonged to one or another 
erceptual category in an all-or-none fashion, rather than appearing to vary continuously 
s a function of their physical values.  
ts apart CP and non-
CP continua.  
A consequence of this all-or-none categorization process is that the distance between 
stimuli within the same perceptual category is perceived as being smaller than the 
distance between stimuli belonging to two different categories, even though the actual 
distance is the same.  
 
rceptual recoding of a physical continuum has represented a 
challenge to traditional psychophysical functions that crudely approximate the 
continuous monotonic recoding implied by Fechner’s Law and Steven’s Power Law16.  
                                                          
C
p
C
continuum gives rise to a limited set of discrete perceptual respon
T
p
a
The all-or-none question hinges on whether the identification boundary itself is graded, 
In SP research it is in fact the all-or-none nature of the boundary between categories  
(apart from some psychophysical variance near threshold) that se
This notion of a discrete pe
16 Fechner’s La d Steven’s Law attempt to specify the relationship between sensory or perceptual 
magnitude and physi  stimulus magnitude. Fechner’s Law claims that the relation between the phy cal 
intensity  of the stimulus and the magnitude of the sensation  is logarithmic: 
w an
cal si
)(I )(S
 84 
 
Fig. 2.3 Categorical Perception 
 
 
a b c d e f g h Physical level 
 
 
A continuum of physical stimuli is processed or transduced into a monotonically related sensory 
ntinuum, which is then recoded into a discrete set of perceptual responses. 
d in Fig. 2.3, where a continuum of physical 
                                                                                                                                                                         
co
 
 
 
A conceptual version of CP is summarize
stimuli is processed or transduced into a monotonically related sensory continuum, 
which is then recoded into a discrete set of perceptual responses.  
 
 
IcS log=  
 
where c  is a constant  which depends on the unit of measurement of  the intensity. 
Steven’s Power Law claims that sensation  )(S  is a power function of the physical intensity )(I  of the 
stimulus: 
 
bkIS =  
 
Where k  is a constant that depends on the unit of measurement of the intensity and b  depends on the 
nature of the physical stimulus. 
a’   b’     c’        d’         e’      f’            g’ h’ Sensory level 
(a”, b”, c”, d”)        (e”, f”, g”, h”) Perceptual level 
 85 
 
It is now generally accepted that a psychophysical task contains both sensory and 
decision stages of processing17.  
In the speech-perception literature, the assumption was added that the recoding in the 
decision stage results in loss of subsequent access to the earlier sensory distinctions 
among stimuli; the only stimulus distinctions that can be accessed by the listener are 
those that exist subsequent to the discrete recoding.  
a sound as a particular phoneme 
he experimental paradigm for demonstrating CP is based on the analysis of 
 
In CP as well as in GK categories, classifying a stimulus into an SP category provides 
access to knowledge that can be used for inference. For example, when speakers fail to 
generate all the attributes of a phoneme, the attributes actually produced may be 
sufficient to activate a SP category such that the missing attributes are inferred from its 
representation. It is also obvious that categorizing 
results in predictions of what subsequent phonemes may follow.  
 
T
discrimination and identification performance for a set of stimuli. Usually the stimuli 
vary along a physical continuum and regions of that continuum have been or can be 
assigned labels.  
An example of physical continuum is the color spectrum as it is subdivided into color 
categories, or an acoustic continuum called the “second formant transition” as it is 
subdivided into the (synthetized) stop-consonant18 categories /ba/, /da/, and /ga/.  
 
                                                          
17 Massaro (1975a) proposes to adopt the expression “categorical partitioning” if it is only the output of 
the decision stage that is categorical (as in Fig. 2.3), and the expression “categorical perception” if the 
output of the sensory stage before the decision stage is categorical.  
Precisely how information is transferred betw
contentious issue which, however, is beyond t
een the sensorial and cognitive systems is, to say the least, a 
he purposes of this work. In this work, indeed, we are 
 “Stop” refers to the complete blockage of air through the vocal tract at some point during articulation of 
the sound. 
interested in taking up the account at a relatively late stage in the processing cycle, where stimulus inputs 
have already undergone the decision stage. In the following therefore, we will neglect the distinction 
made by Massaro and refer with term the CP also to the output of the decision stage, as is the custom in 
most of the literature.  
18
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In general, various investigators have defined CP in terms of discrimination 
performance, identification performance, or both.  
Discrimination requires a subject to tell apart stimuli presented in pairs (by indicating 
hether they are the same or different). Identification requires the subject to categorize 
nce predicts discrimination 
the same or 
ifferent. The proportion of right answers for each couple gives then a measure of the 
timuli that straddle the category boundary than for couples of 
ithin-category stimuli. 
The second method is based on the concept of “Difference Limen” (DL) or difference 
reshold. In this case the subjects are repeatedly presented couples of stimuli, 
n performance is then given by the DL which 
onsists in the minimal change in stimulus physical magnitude which is detectable as a 
w
individual stimuli using labels (to say, for example, whether an acoustic stimulus is  
/ba/, /da/ or /ga/).  
Some investigators interpret sharp identification functions at category boundaries as 
evidence of CP (Ehret, 1987). Others (Wilson, 1987; Pastore, 1987) define CP in terms 
of peaks in discrimination performance in correspondence of the category boundaries. A 
third approach requires either that identification performa
performance (Liberman et al., 1957), or at least that local identification and 
discrimination maxima coincide (Macmillan, 1987).  
There is simply no uniform definition of CP. The approaches based on discrimination, 
however seem to be prevalent in the literature on the topic. 
 
Discrimination performance can be measured with two different methods. The first one, 
called “fixed step size”, consists in repeatedly presenting to the subjects couples of 
stimuli - where each couple is characterized by a constant stimulus difference (or fixed 
step size) - and asking them if the two stimuli within each couple are 
d
subject’s discrimination performance. In the case of CP the proportion of right answers 
is higher for couples of s
w
th
characterized by a varying stimulus difference, and are asked if the two stimuli within 
each couple are the same or different. 
A measure of the subject’s discriminatio
c
difference at a specified rate or criterion. A 50% DL will be perceived as a difference 
half of the time. The 50% DL is also known as “Just Noticeable Difference” (JND). 
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In  the case of CP the DL is smaller (i.e. the subjects can discriminate smaller physical 
differences) for pairs of stimuli that straddle the boundary than for pairs that are within 
 would be unable to tell two 
 equivalent stimuli 
idence that one of the provisional criteria 
(and perhaps an artifact of using unnatural stimuli and unnatural testing 
n should be constant for stimuli 
Let’s now consider an example of psychophysical analysis, referred to the sounds of 
speech (which constitute a specific type of category whose physical properties have 
one category or the other.  
 
In the hypothetical case of absolute or perfect CP people would not be able to 
discriminate members of the same category at all (i.e., they
different exemplars of the same category apart). In such a case one would expect to find 
both chance performance in discriminating among the perceptually
drawn from a single perceptual category and a higher degree of discriminability 
between stimuli drawn from separate perceptual categories. 
However, the empirical results are usually indicative of less than absolute 
categorization. Snowdon, 1987) provides ev
for CP – total indiscriminability among members of the same category – was probably 
unrealistic 
conditions). 
Even with the assumption of less than absolute categorization, however, the peak in the 
discrimination function at the category boundary constitutes a phenomenon which 
challenges more traditional psychphyisical theories; it contradicts indeed Weber’s law 
which characterizes many perceptual dimensions to a first approximation.  
 
Weber’s law asserts that the JND of a stimulus is equal to a constant proportion )(k  of 
the stimulus intensity )(I : 
 
kIJND =    
 
From Weber’s law follows in fact that discriminatio
separated by a fixed ratio of physical magnitudes, and decrease monotonically for 
stimuli separated by a fixed difference.  
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received much attention), in which the predictions of the prototypical and of the CP 
model have been tested and compared.  
Given the tremendous variability in acoustic cues, one might think that subjective 
perception of the same phone would vary widely, but do all of the acoustic forms of /d/ 
actually sound different? Perhaps the cognitive system produces the same subjective 
f /b/, the vocal chords begin vibrating before air is 
gorization should show the standard 
experience for all of them, discarding their idiosyncrasies.  
Linguists have been successful at characterizing the properties of speech sounds in 
terms of the motor movements in the vocal tract that produce them.  
To study this issue, researchers use speech synthetizers to construct artificial phones 
that sound much like human language. Imagine that researchers construct different 
versions of the same phone. Upon hearing these different versions, can people tell them 
apart, or do they perceive them as identical? 
Consider the speech sound /b/, which has the properties of being a stop, bilabial, and 
voiced19.  
Different instances of /b/ vary in voice onset time (VOT), which is an acoustic cue that 
specifies voicing. In most instances o
released for the bilabial stop. VOT is simply how much time elapses between the onset 
of vocal chord vibration and air release. /p/ is also a bilabial stop, differing from /b/ only 
in the absence of voicing. For /p/, the vocal chords begin vibrating after air is released 
for the bilabial stop. Whereas the values of VOT are typically negative for /b/, they are 
usually positive for /p/. For example, a /p/ might have a VOT of 100, which means the 
voicing begins 100 msec. after air release.Using a speech synthetizer, researchers can 
construct bilabial stops that vary continuously in VOT, with all other acoustic cues held 
constant. What happens as VOT varies from –150 to 150? How are the stimuli 
perceived?  
The top panel of Fig. 2.4 illustrates two possibilities.   
According to many prototype models phone cate
graded structure effect. To see this, assume that the prototypical VOT for /b/ is –150, 
whereas the prototypical VOT for /p/ is 150. Identification should be best for VOTs 
                                                          
19 “Stop”, as we have already seen in chapter 2.2.2, refers to the complete blockage of air through the 
vocal tract at some point during articulation of the sound; bilabial refers to the air blockage that results 
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near these prototypes. As VOTs move away from a prototype, they become less similar 
to the correct prototype and more similar to the competing prototype. For example, a 
VOT of 50 is less similar to the prototype for /p/ than a VOT of 75, while 
simultaneously being more similar to the prototype for /b/. As a result, the ability to  
identify a VOT of 50 as a /p/ should be worse than the ability to identify a VOT of 75. 
Alternatively, the mechanisms that categorize phones may function categorically, such 
that people identify  a wide variety of acoustic cues equally well as members of the 
same phonetic category. The top panel of Fig. 2.4 illustrates this prediction for 
ly. Whereas people identify nearly all bilabial stops having a 
OT less than 30 as /b/, they identify nearly all bilabial stops having a VOT greater 
 pair in a 
ndom order. The subject than hears a test stimulus, which is the same as either the 
ses 
hould simply reflect guessing (i.e., 50% correct). 
e 
 
categorical perception. As can be seen, people should identify all stimuli with a VOT 
greater than this critical value perfectly as /p/. In other words, they should treat the 
stimuli within a phonetic category as equivalent, regardless of VOT differences between 
them. Many studies have found that /b/ and /p/ exhibit categorical perception when 
VOT varies continuous
V
than 30 as /p/. Numerous studies have also found that many other acoustic cues, besides 
VOT, exhibit categorical perception. 
Still stronger evidence for categorical perception comes from the discrimination tasks. 
Imagine that a researcher selects pairs of bilabial stops whose VOT always differs by 
20. For example, one pair might have VOTs of –100 and –80, and another might have 
VOTs of 20 and 40. On each trial, a subject hears the two members of a
ra
first or second member of the pair. If the pair consists of a –80 VOT stimulus followed 
by a –100 VOT stimulus, the test stimulus might be the –100 VOT stimulus. The 
subject’s task is to say whether the test stimulus is the same as the first or second pair 
member. If subjects can tell the difference between the pair members, they should be 
able to answer correctly, but if the pair members sound the same subjects’ respon
s
Of primary interest is whether subjects can discriminate different phones within a phon
category. Can subjects tell the difference between two /b/s, one with a VOT of -80 and 
one with a VOT of -100? If not, than the processing of these phones is indeed 
                                                                                                                                                                         
from pressing the upper and lower lips together; and voiced refers to the vocal chords vibrating at some 
point during the sound. 
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categorical. Also of interest is whether discrimination is higher for pairs that straddle 
the category boundary. Can subjects tell the difference between a 20-VOT and a 40-
VOT stimulus that straddle the 30-VOT boundary between /b/ and /p/? According to 
categorical perception, subjects should discriminate this pair easily since the two stimuli 
receive different phonetic categorizations, /b/ and /p/. The bottom panel of Fig. 2.4 
summarizes these predictions for categorical perception: whereas subjects should 
exhibit no discrimination for pairs within categories, they should exhibit excellent 
discrimination for pairs between categories. 
In contrast, prototype and exemplar models predict that pairs within categories should 
be discriminable: if subjects identify an 80-VOT /p/ better than a 60-VOT /p/ (as the top 
panel Fig. 2.4 illustrates), than subjects must perceive these stimuli as different. The 
bottom panel of Fig. 2.4 shows these predictions of perfect discrimination for prototype 
and exemplar models.  
 
Across a wide variety of experiments, discrimination data have somewhat supported 
categorical perception. In general, discrimination is much poorer within categories than 
between them, when the distance between a pair of stimuli remains constant. In many 
experiments, however, discrimination is still above chance within categories. People 
generally exhibit some ability to discriminate different instances of the same phone, 
although discrimination remains better between categories than within them.  
 
As of yet, there is no comprehensive theory of categorical perception. Nevertheless it 
seems to be accepted that the cognitive system discards acoustic information early in 
processing, retaining only categorical representations of phonemes. Whatever the nature 
of the mechanisms responsible, they channel information varying on many continuous 
acoustic dimensions into the discrete phonemic categories that later retrieve words.  
 
An important issue that CP researchers have analysed is how categories are acquired.  
In general there appear to be innate biases or natural partitions that influence the 
acquisition of SP categories. People seem to have differential regions of sensitivity 
along perceptual dimensions that are probably biologically determined (Pastore, 1987). 
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Prototype and CP models 
Studies on prelinguistic infants as young as one month, have shown that the latter 
possess highly developed mechanisms for the perception of speech, or at least for 
particular kinds of acoustic signals (Eimas et al., 1987). 
These studies in particular have found poor discriminability for speech stimuli drawn 
from within phonetic categories and relatively enhanced discriminability for stimuli in 
, 
 
 of perception (Eimas et al., 1971; Eimas and 
iller, 1980)  
 
Bornstein (1987) has analysed whether CP effects are universal or language-relative. 
According to the “relativist” hypothesis, language determines how we view reality. The 
location of CP boundary effects is determined by how we partition the world into 
nameable parts. The alternative, “universalist” view is that category boundaries tend to 
occur where nature has put them, either because there are discontinuities in the world or 
because our nervous system innately imposes discontinuities.  
Bornstein examines how the evidence about color categories bears on the two 
hypothesis. On the basis of  color-discrimination performance by animals and infants, as 
well as by adults in different cultures (with different languages and different named 
subdivisions of the color spectrum), together with the data on physiological mechanisms 
of color vision, Bornstein concludes that there is overwhelming support for the 
universalist hypothesis: color categories depend on innate detectors, and language and 
experience probably only influence the fine-tuning or short-term modifications of color 
boundaries. To ascertain whether color CP is somehow unique or special, Bornstein 
goes on to make systematic comparisons between color CP and phoneme CP, finding 
the pattern of data to be very similar in both cases.  
 
Some researchers (Ehret, 1987) have even conducted studies involving animals, and 
their communicative signals. In general they provided evidence that animals exhibit 
behavior consistent with CP for human-speech stimuli and that the boundaries for the 
continua seem to roughly reflect the articulation found for human listeners.  
 
the region of the adult category boundary (Eimas, 1974; Eimas et al., 1971; Jusczyk
1981). The results are suggestive of CP in infants and have been interpreted as evidence
for a biologically based linguistic mode
M
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In spite of our genetic dispositi  for sensitivities underlying SP 
catego  
w  
musical categories  Liberman, 1987 
Rosen and Howell, 1987).  
Although SP categories may have strong innate constraints that contribute to stability, 
adaptation and range effects certainly indica se categories are flexible to some 
extent (Remez, 1987, Bornstein, 19
ons responsible
ries, some researchers have shown that perception may become categorical also
ith experience. This fact has been well-documented, for example, in the case of
 (this work is reviewd by Repp, 1984; Repp and
te that the
87).  
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Section 3 
 
 
imilar to the CP observed in the psychophysical research, takes place even in the 
An experimental study on categorization processes in 
bilateral integrative negotiation
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this section I describe an experimental study aimed at analysing if a phenomenon
s
evaluation of monetary outcomes in bilateral integrative negotiation. 
 
In the first chapter I define the concepts of integrative negotiation, as opposed to 
distributive negotiation, and of logrolling. 
 
In chapter 2 I describe an experiment on bilateral integrative negotiation which I carried 
out with the objective to show that people do not behave as optimizers but rather like 
satisficers who simplify the negotiation problem by categorizing a continuum of 
outcomes into a discrete set containing only two categories (as will be shown, 
satisficing always implies a categorization process), and that the adoption of this 
simplifying procedure can lead to suboptimal outcomes and to what I call the “zone of 
Agreement Bias” (ZAB).  
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3.1 Integrative negotiation 
 
Negotiation has been defined as the process by which two or more parties attempt to 
resolve perceived incompatible goals (Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992).  
Many models derived from game and bargaining theory have treated almost exclusively 
the conflictual and distributive aspect of negotiation. The issues to be negotiated are 
of expanding or redefining the bargaining space.  
nalysis, rather 
an seeing a process that works from fixed points of discord to a common point of 
he different parties are likely to have different 
tors and opportunities for tradeoffs among issues which 
ould be positively exploited. The parties may be differently divided depending on the 
ind of issue to be negotiated. Parties may find that their enemy on one issue is their 
lly on others, so that simple concession-convergence bargaining becomes virtually 
impossible; there is no single dimension along which the parties can converge. A large 
number of parties enhances the possibility to form coalitions which may be used 
strategically by the parties to achieve their goals.  
considered as falling along a single dimension, with opposed positions at each end, and 
the dynamics are supposed to be largely restricted to making initial offers, making 
concessions and retractions, and eventually converging toward agreement or breaking 
off negotiations, without possibilities 
 
The focus of negotiation research has recently been shifted from distributive bargaining 
theory toward the integrative bargaining approach which emphasises the importance of 
joint problem solving. “Many negotiations provide opportunities for integrative 
agreements in which the parties maximise their outcomes, or achieve greater resources, 
without competing with the other party in a direct win-lose fashion [as it happens in 
distributive negotiations]” (Thompson and Hastie, 1990a). Integrative a
th
convergence, stresses the need to create new solutions by manipulating the involved 
subject’s conceptualizations of the problem through a process of inventive and 
cooperative problem solving, so as to reconcile the interests of all parties and reach joint 
benefits, or attain “win-win” goals (Pruitt, 1986; Putnam, 1990; Brett et al., 1990; 
Fisher and Ury, 1991; Brett, 2000). T
interests, priorities, and resources, and these asymmetries frequently produce cross-
cutting cleavages among ac
c
k
a
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A growing branch of mechanisms for identifying 
e best tradeoffs among the parties’ interests, and thereby insure the greatest optimality 
to the outcome (Zartman, 1999). This doesn’t mean that the distributive component of 
bargaining is completely eliminated from the negotiation process, but simply that the 
parties “can cooperate in order to change the pie that they eventually will have to 
divide” (Raiffa, 1982). 
There exist various techniques which are adopted in integrative negotiation: logrolling 
(or issue-aggregation), issue-disaggregation, bridging, circular barter, cost cutting, 
nonspecific compensation (Touval, 1982; Brett, 1990; Hopmann, 1996). In this research 
I focus my attention on logrolling20.  
 
The technique of logrolling consists in redefining the issues to be negotiated by 
aggregating them into interlocking issues. Sub-issues are linked together “to create 
package agreements out of components that would be nonnegotiable if treated 
separately” (Hopmann, 1996). This approach involves identifying interests, prioritising 
them, and creating tradeoffs in which the parties concede on low-priority interests in 
order to receive satisfaction of high-priority interests (Brett et al., 1990). 
 
The idea of logrolling is represented in Fig.3.1, where two parties negotiate on two 
sues. On the vertical axes is represented the utility of the two parties, and on the 
orizontal axes of the left and right graphs are represented respectively the values of 
sue 1 and 2. The horizontal axes represents moreover the line of indifference of the 
ctions of party 1 and the continuous lines the 
tility functions of party 2.  
integrative analysis focuses on precise 
th
is
h
is
two parties, where their utility is zero.  
The dotted lines represent the utility fun
u
 
 
 
                                                          
20 The word logrolling is metaphorically employed in the economic literature to indicate a reciprocal 
exchange of favors. It has assumed  this meaning because of the habit in use among the woodcutters  to 
help each other  when they have to transport logs. The rolling of a log indeed requires the cooperation of 
at least two people.  
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Fig. 3.1 2-issues bilateral negotiation 
 
Issue 1 
U
0 
Issue 2 
Party 1 
U 
0 
Party 2 
 
 
 
The utility curves of party 1 and 2 intersect below the horizontal line of indifference, thus the two parties 
don’t have a zone of agreement on neither issue.  
 
 
In both issues the utility functions of party 1 and 2 intersect below the line of neutrality 
or indifference and therefore the two parties don’t have any zone of agreement, or 
bargaining space. In a situation of distributive bargaining this would create a stalemate 
on both issues; the parties would simply break off the negotiations without finding any 
advantageous agreement. However, in such a situation, it is possible to aggregate the  
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Fig. 3.2 Logrolling 
tronger interest on issue 2 and is more neutral on issue 1, a 
olution can be found in that party 2 agrees to let party 1 win on issue 1, and party 1 
 
U 
0 
Issue 1 Issue 2 
 
By aggregating the two issues (party 1 wins on issue 1 and party 2 wins on issue 2) the two parties can 
both reach a beneficial agreement. 
 
 
issues through the  technique of logrolling, and to find an agreement which can yield a 
positive payoff for both parties (see Fig. 3.2). 
If we consider that party 1 has stronger interests about issue 1 and is more neutral on 
issue 2, and party 2 has s
s
agrees to let party 2 win on issue 2. The parties, for example (see Fig.3.2 ) could agree 
to choose point X on issue 1 and point Y on issue 2. Party 1’s gains on issue 1 (segment 
XP) exceed its losses on issue 2 (YS), and party 2’s gains on issue 2 (YR) exceed its 
losses on issue 1 (XQ), and therefore the overall agreement is beneficial for both parties. 
Party 1 
Party 2 
U
0 
Q S 
X Y 
P R 
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 In order for logrolling to take place, and thus achieve Pareto-optimal outcomes, the 
parties should possess the cognitive capabilities required to represent and analyse the 
whole space of the negotiation problem.  
From the traditional point of view of rational-choice theory, which underlies most 
s be able to 
cognise and take mutually advantage of the integrative potential of negotiations. 
hat negotiators use various 
resumptions or simplifying strategies to interpret the situation and construct a 
response.  
 
Bazerman (1983) suggested that in integrative negotiation tasks, negotiators’ 
representations are subjected to the “fixed-pie bias”. Individuals perceive negotiation as 
a purely distributive or competitive game in which there’s a fixed pie of resources to be 
divided up among the parties, and better outcomes for one can be obtained only at the 
expenses of another. Bazerman (1985) found that in a negotiation task with integrative 
potential, individuals concentrate first on competitive issues and it takes them 
significant experience to overcome the fixed pie bias and recognize the integrative 
potential of the situation. 
 
Hammond et al. (1975) suggest that negotiators frequently have poor and inaccurate 
perceptions of their opponents’ importance weights for multiissue conflicts. “The fixed 
pie assumption actually may derive from the presumption that the other party has the 
same concerns regarding the relative importance of the issues, thus eliminating the 
possibility for mutually-beneficial trades” (Carroll and Payne, 1991). This presumption 
economic models, the problem of understanding the complexity of a problem would not 
subsist since the parties are considered to be able to construct complete and objective 
representations of reality and to choose the tactics most likely to produce an optimal 
realisation of their goals. Under these assumptions the parties would alway
re
 
Research on negotiation, nevertheless, has recently begun to focus attention on the 
study of how individuals actually define and perceive the negotiation game and has 
given solid proofs that negotiators don’t actually behave in such a perfectly rational 
way. Experimental evidence has demonstrated t
p
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is due to a social perception bias known as “false consensus effect”. It refers to the 
ndency of people to overestimate the proportion of other people who have interests 
al., 1977), and in negotiation it might result in distributive, 
ptions of the task (Thompson and Hastie, 1990 b).  
ed pie or zero-sum 
te
similar to their own (Ross et 
win-lose perce
 
Neale and Bazerman (1983) found that negotiators displaying a greater perspective 
taking ability obtained better results in a complex integrative bargaining exercise, 
suggesting that they might have been better at identifying those issues that were most 
valuable to their opponents than those with less perspective taking ability.  
 
Thompson and Hastie (1990) found that individuals enter negotiation situations with 
fixed-pie perspectives, and with the assumption that their interests are diametrically 
opposed to those of the other party. Negotiators who modify their fix
assumption do so immediately at the onset of the interaction; otherwise the fixed-pie 
assumption tends to persist throughout the negotiation.  
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3.2 Experiment  
 
Hypothesis 
nderlies the suboptimality observed in 
tegrative negotiation. As anticipated in the introduction to this chapter, my hypothesis 
a 
ontinuum of monetary outcomes into a discrete set (as will be shown, satisficing 
 
In this experimental study I hypothesise that, besides the fixed pie bias, there might 
exist an alternative explanation which u
in
is that suboptimality might be due to the fact that people do not behave as optimizers 
but rather like satisficers who simplify the decision problem by categorizing 
c
always implies a categorization process), and that the adoption of this simplifying 
procedure can lead to what I call a “zone of agreement bias” (ZAB).  
In order to understand the meaning of this claim, I’ll first explain more in the detail the 
concept of satisfycing and show how it is related to categorization, and then I’ll turn to 
the ZAB and suboptimality in integrative negotiation. 
 
 
Satisficing and categorization 
 
Simon introduced the concept of satisficing, a word that originated in Northumbria (a 
region in England on the Scottish boarder) where it meant “to satisfy”. Satisficing is a 
l variables like profit and market shares. 
strategy for making decisions in the case that one has to choose among various 
alternatives which are encountered sequentially, and which are not known ahead of 
time. In such a situation, there may be no optimal solution for when to stop searching 
for further alternatives. (Simon, 1956a; 1990)  
 
Simon described decision making as a search process guided by aspiration levels. An 
aspiration level is a value of a goal variable that an alternative must reach or surpass in 
order to be considered satisfactory.  In the context of the theory of the firm, one may 
think of goa
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Decision alternatives are not given but found, one after the other, in a search process. In 
e simplest case, the search process goes on until a satisfactory alternative is found that 
aches or surpasses the aspiration levels on the goal variables, and then this alternative 
is taken.  
Aspiration levels are not permanently fixed but are rather dynamically adjusted to the 
situation. They are raised if it is easy to find satisfactory alternatives, and lowered if 
satisfactory alternatives are hard to acquire.  
 
Simon provides two examples of situations in which satisficing might take place, one 
related to the chess game, and one to the case of an individual who is selling a house. 
 
He observed that one route to simplification of a problem involving sequential search 
for alternatives, is to assume that U(s), the utility associated to an outcome of choice, 
necessarily assumes one of two values, (1,0), or of three values, (-1, 0, 1), for all s in S, 
where S is the space of all possible outcomes. Depending on the circumstances these 
values can be interpreted as (a) (satisfactory or unsatisfactory), or (b) (win, draw or 
lose). 
 
As an example of (b), let S represent the possible positions in a chess game at White’s 
th move. Then a (+1) position is one in which White possesses a strategy leading to a 
er Black does. A (0) position is one in which White can enforce a draw, but 
 win. 
s an example of (a) let S represent possible prices for a house an individual is selling. 
he latter may consider $15.000 as an acceptable price, anything over this amount as 
g only two categories: 
atisficing 
th
re
20
win whatev
not a win. A (-1) position is one in which Black can force a
A
T
satisfactory (+1), anything less as unsatisfactory (0). $15.000 therefore would be his 
aspiration level (which in economic theory corresponds to the reservation price).  
By looking at Fig. 3.3, which reproduces the situation described in example (a) it 
becomes clear how at the basis of satisficing lies a categorization process analogous to 
the one described in the psychophysical research; a continuum of monetary outcomes 
(on the horizontal axes) is codified into a discrete set containin
s
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Fig 3.3 Satisficing 
 
 
U(S) 
1 
0
Outcomes (S) 
AL 
Not satisficing Satisficing 
AL (Aspiration Level) = $15.000 
 
 
The outcomes (S) are categorized in “satisficing” (above the aspiration level) or “not satisficing” (beneath 
the aspiration level) and are respectively assigned a utility of  +1 or 0. 
 
 
(above the boundary or aspiration level of $15.000) or not satisficing outcomes (beneath 
the aspiration level). The outcomes within each category are not discriminated from one 
nother (all of them are perceived as equivalent and are associated a utility of 
outcomes the decision problem is reduced to a very simple one. 
 
a
respectively 1 or 0), and the only discrimination which occurs is among between-
category outcomes. Thanks to this discrete recoding of the continuum of monetary 
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Further on with reference to the house example, Simon notes that: “the objection may 
be raised that, although $16.000 and $25.000 are both very satisfactory prices for the 
house, a rational individual would prefer to sell at the higher price, and hence, that the 
irst, the individual may not be confronted simultaneously with a number of buyers 
ffering to purchase the house at different prices, but may receive a sequence of offers, 
ect each one before he receives the next (or, 
ore generally, he may receive a sequence of pairs or triplets or n-tuples of offers, and 
l models of rational choice, all alternatives are evaluated before a 
 an alternative that leads to a forced mate for his opponent, he generally 
dicts the order in which alternatives will be 
satisfactory alternative has precise meaning.”  
 
Simon studied the process of problem solving and satisficing mainly by observing the 
behavior of chess players. Nevertheless, there exists almost no experimental study on 
simple payoff function is an inadequate representation of the choice situation. The 
objection may be answered in several different ways, each answer corresponding to a 
class of situations in which the simple function might be appropriate.. 
F
o
and may have to decide to accept or rej
m
may have to decide whether to accept the highest of an n-tuple before the next n-tuple is 
received). Then, if the elements S correspond to n-tuples offers, [U(s)] would be 1 
whenever the highest offer in the n-tuple exceeded the acceptance price the seller had 
determined upon at that time.  
[….] In most globa
choice is made. In actual human decision making, alternatives are often examined 
sequentially. We may, or may not, know the mechanism that determines the order of 
procedure. When alternatives are examined sequentially, we may regard the first 
satisfactory alternative that is evaluated as such as the one actually selected. If a chess 
player finds
adopts this alternative without worrying about whether another alternative also leads to 
a forced mate. In this case we would find it very hard to predict which alternative would 
be chosen, for we have no theory that pre
examined. But in another case discussed above-the sale of a house- the environment 
presents the seller with alternatives in a definite sequence, and the selection of the first 
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decision making (an exception being Egidi and Narduzzo21, 1996) aimed at testing the 
actual adoption by individuals of the satisficing heuristic and of the related 
 this kind of behavior can 
categorization process.  
The objective of my study is to provide some experimental evidence that people behave 
in a satisficing rather than optimizing way and to show how
lead individuals to a ZAB and to suboptimal agreements in integrative negotiations.   
 
 
The zone of agreement bias (ZAB) 
 
In order to understand the meaning of the ZAB and how the latter is related to the 
concept of satisficing, let’s consider the situations depicted in Fig 3.4. Here are 
represented two different negotiation problems (treatment A and B) that I submitted to 
two different groups of experimental subjects with the aim to compare their behavior in 
the two situations. 
Under treatment A the subjects, coupled in pairs, face a negotiation problem of the same 
kind of the one described in Fig. 3.1 and 3.2; they have to negotiate on two issues and 
eir utility functions are build in such a way that they don’t have any zone of 
 
Under treatment B the negotiation problem is the same as under treatment A, with the 
only difference that the utility functions are build in such a way that the subjects do 
have a zone of agreement on both issues.  
The basic idea is to compare the number of integrative agreements that the subjects are 
able to find under the two treatments. The hypothesis is that, if the subjects behave as 
                                                          
th
agreement but there is still the possibility to find an integrative agreement through
logrolling.  
21 Egidi provides evidence that during problem solving activity the complexity of the problem may 
generate a mental overload. When too many symbolic manipulations are required to explore the available 
strategies to solve a problem, players are unable to create a comprehensive internal model of the actions 
required to act optimally; consequently they explore only a limited part of the space of strategies, and 
learn and memorize suboptimal, satisficing strategies.   
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satisficers rather than optimizers, we will observe a higher number of integrative 
agreements under treatment A than under treatment B.  
Under treatment B indeed the subjects ha ind a positive agreement 
withou
find an agreement within the respective zones of agreement.  
It has to be noted however, that all agreements within the zones of agreement are 
Pareto-dominated by some agreements which can be reached through logrolling and 
which lie outside the zones of agreement (for a more precise description of the space of 
outcomes  and their ordering see Fig 3.6 and 3.7 in the following).  
Let’s suppose that the subjects choose an aspiration level (AL), i.e. a minimum payoff 
they wish to obtain, and categorize all the possible outcomes above the AL as satisficing 
and all those beneath the AL as not sa oreover that the 
spiration level is lower than the maximum payoff that can be obtained through a non-
integrative agreement. Then, once the subjects are able to find a satisficing, non-
 for a 
areto-optimal solution falling outside of it and will remain blocked in the suboptimal 
one (this is what I mean with the expression “zone of agreement bias”).  
 
Negotiators under treatment A, in contrast, are not given the possibility to negotiate the 
two issues separately and to find a satisficing suboptimal solution within the zone of 
                                                          
ve the possibility to f
t aggregating the two issues. They can negotiate on the two issues separately and 
tisficing. Let’s suppose m
a
integrative agreement within the zone of agreement22, they will stop searching
P
22 The empirical and experimental evidence on problem solving gives us a reason to think that the first 
satisficing agreement that the subjects will find will be a suboptimal one, falling within the zone of 
agreement, and not an integrative, optimal, one. A well known approach to problem solving, indeed, 
ggests that individuals often master the overwhelming complexity of a problem by decomposing it into 
independent sub-problems (which in our negotiation problem corresponds to negotiating the two issues 
 
our 
egotiation problem), the combined solutions of the sub-problems that do not take this correlation into 
al decisions  (Weber and Camerer, 
1998)  
su
separately) that are solved one by one. (March and Simon 1958, Simon 1963, Laird, Newell and
Rosembloom 1987, Nilsson 1971, 1980).  
viously, if the sub-problems of the decomposed problem are correlated (as it is the case in Ob
n
account can be inferior to the global solution. In fact, many empirical and experimental studies have 
shown that individuals have difficulties recognizing (often neglect) correlation and simplify multi-goal 
tasks through decomposition even when this strategy leads to suboptim
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                                                     Fig. 3.4  Treatment A and B 
 
Treatment A  
  Issue 1      Issue 2 
Treatment B  
 two paties don’t have a zone of agreement on neither issue. Under treatment B the 
 
 
  Issue 1      Issue 2 
 
 
 
         Party 1   ---------  
         Party 2 
 
 
Under Treatment A the
two parties have a Zone of Agreement (the bold line) on both issues.  
00 
U U
00 
UU 
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agre ent. The only alternatives they have at disposal are either to find an integratiem ve 
greement or to break off the negotiations. For this reason, they might be induced to a
keep on searching in the space of solutions until they find an integrative one.  
 
 
Experimental design 
 
The experiment has been run with 22 European policy makers and then it has been 
replicated with 28 undergraduate students from the faculty of economics at the 
niversity of Trento. Subjects were asked to take part in an experiment aimed at 
ysi vio
hey were randomly paired in couples. Seven couples (5 in the case of policy makers) 
eatment 
.  
representing her incentive in the negotiation about the two issues 
ive 
the 
er the number chosen, the higher was her 
pa r 
“
Denotin er, the 
payoff tables for player one have been obtained as follows: 
u
anal ng negotiation beha r.  
T
were assigned to treatment A and seven couples (6 for the policy makers) to tr
B
Each couple was asked to negotiate on two different issues. Each subject was given a 
sheet with two tables 
(in order to keep the experimental design as simple as possible and to avoid 
comprehension problems on part of the subjects, the latter weren’t shown the graphs 
with their utility functions but just the relative tables). The first column of each table 
contained numbers from 0 to 10, representing the possible agreements on the respect
issue, and the second column contained the points associated to each number. Subjects 
were requested to negotiate with their counterpart on one number from 0 to 10 in 
first table and one number in the second table, in such a way as to maximise their own 
total number of points (for the instructions see appendix A). 
Within each couple a subject assumed the role of player one and the other the role of 
player two. In appendix B are contained the payoff tables of the two players.  
In each treatment, for player one the high
yoff (both for the first and the second issue) so that the best agreement from he
standpoint was (10, 10). However, for player one the first number (i.e. the first issue) is 
more important”  
g by x and y the value of the first and, respectively, the second numb
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[1] P1,A(x) = P1,B( 1,B(y)= – 10 +3 y 
where P1,i(x) and P1,i(y) denote the amount of points under treatment i (for i = A, B) 
metric way: she 
preferred smaller numbers to 
second number is now more im
from: 
 
[2] P2,A(x) = 10 – 3 x  P2,B(x)= 20 – 3 x  P2,A(y)=P2,B(y)= 50 – 10y. 
 
This payoff assignment exactly reproduces the situations described in Fig. 3.4.  
 
In Fig. 3.5 is represented the space of all possible couples of agreements on issues 1 and 
2 under treatment A.  
Along the line I1 we can find all the joint agreements inducing a total payoff of zero for 
player one (i.e. the equation of I1 is P1,A(x) + P1,A(y)= 0; furthermore, the arrow 
indicates the hemiplane containing agreements with a total payoff greater than zero. 
off, and the bold line represents the Pareto frontier of such region.  
anism). In particular with the agreement (10, 0) each player is winning on her most 
portant issue and is losing on the other.  
x)= – 50 + 10 x P1,A(y)= – 20 +3 y P
 
associated with x and, respectively, y. 
 
the two numbers were induced in a symPlayer two preferences over 
larger ones (the best agreement would be (0,0)), but the 
portant. Indeed, player two payoff tables were obtained 
Similarly, I2 is defined by P2,A(x) + P2,A(y)= 0 and the arrow has a similar meaning.  
The region X contains all the possible agreements in which both players obtain a 
positive total pay
As we already know, under treatment A there are no joint agreements in which both 
players obtain a positive payoff on both issues. Region X represents then the bargaining 
space which emerges when the two issues are aggregated (through the logrolling 
mech
im
In Fig. 3.6 is represented the space of all possible agreements on issues one and two 
under treatment B. Lines and arrows have here the same meaning as in Fig. 3.5 but now 
we can also observe a new region (the box denoted by Z) containing those agreements 
in which both players obtain a positive payoff on each issue (and then a 
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Fig. 3.5  Treatment A – Space of agreements 
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1
I 2
Here is represented the space of all possible couples of agreements on issues 1 and 2 under treatment A. 
The region X contains all the possible agreements in which both players obtain a positive total payoff 
through logrolling, and the bold line is its Pareto frontier. 
 
Fig. 3.6  Treatment B – Space of agreements 
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Here is represented the space of all possible agreements on issues one and two under treatment B. The 
region Z contains those agreements in which both players obtain a positive payoff on each issue 
singularly (and then a positive total payoff). Any agreement in the area Y Pareto dominates any other 
reement inside Z. ag
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positive total payoff). It is worth noting that any agreement in the area Y Pareto 
ment inside Z. In particular at the point (10, 0), where each 
layer wins on her most preferred issue and loses on the other, both players are better 
s to reach an agreement on the two numbers. If 
ey didn’t find an agreement on one of the two numbers they got 0 points for that 
umber.  
Before starting th  the only binding 
agreements were those that they communicated to the experimenter at the end of the 
negotiations; in other words any provisory agreement could have been renegotiated 
wit
 
As an incentive the policy ma rs were en an amount of gifts directly proportional to 
the nu r of poin ey ob ed in t experiment. The students instead were paid a 
show-up fee plus an amou eir performanc in the
experim  num
 
 
Theoretical predictions
dominates any other agree
p
off. 
 
The negotiation was carried out face to face and subjects were allowed to speak freely. 
The only restriction was that they could not show their sheet with the tables to their 
counterpart. They had about 10 minute
th
n
e experiment it was made clear to the subjects that
hin the ten minutes. 
ke  giv
mbe ts th tain he 
nt of money dependent on th e  
ent, i.e. directly proportional to the ber of points they obtained.  
 
 
If individuals were perfectly rational, we should expect either that all couples of 
subjects both un  and , wi  find an integrativ that, 
allo som to pl e in (th s o
the payoff tables of their counterpart) some couples won’t find an integrative solution. 
Howev  the propo on of th couples ould e the sa  under treatment A and B. 
 
If we assume that individuals are boundedly rational and are subjected exclusively to 
the fixed pie bias, we should expect that some couples of subjects won’t be able to find 
, der treatment A  B ll  e solution, or 
wing for e inefficiency due  incom et formation e player do not kn w 
er, rti is  sh  b me
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an inte tive agr nt, and that the propo on of e couple ill be  same 
under treatment B and A. 
 
If, as I hypothesise, individuals behave in a satisficing (not optimizing) way, and are 
xperimental Results
gra eeme rti thes s w the
subject to the ZAB, we should expect that some couples of subjects won’t be able to 
reach an integrative agreement, and that the proportion of these couples will be higher 
under treatment B than under treatment A. In particular the prediction is that the 
suboptimal agreements under treatment B will fall within the cartesian product of the 
two zones of agreement of each couple. Namely, we expect to observe a high number of 
agreements inside the region Z of Fig. 3.6.  
 
 
E  
ith letters from H to N the couples subjected to 
eatment B. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the experimental results that we obtained in the 
two subject pools. In order to interpret our results we will use figures 3.7 – 3.10 in 
which the same data sets are reported. 
 
 
Tab. 3.1 Experimental results of the policy makers 
 
 treatment A    treatment B  
 
Hereafter, within each subject pool I will identify with letters from A to G the couples 
subjected to treatment A, and w
tr
Couple 1st N° 2nd N° Time  Couple 1st N° 2nd N° Time 
A 10 0 7  H 6 5 7 
B 9 1 8  I 10 0 8 
C 10 0 7  J 10 2 7 
D 10 0 4  K NO 4 10 
E 8 1 7  L 6 4 6 
     M 6 NO 10 
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 Tab. 3.2 Experimental results of the students 
 
tment B   treatment A    trea
Couple 1st N° 2nd N° Time  Couple 1st N° 2nd N° Time 
A 10 0 2  H 6 4 5 
B 9 1 2  I 6 4 3 
C NO NO 5  J 5 4 3 
D 10 1 7  K 6 4 4 
E 10 0 4  L 10 0 5 
F 8 0 4  M 10 1 5 
G 10 0 2  N 10 0 5 
 
 
 
Let’s consider first the pool of policy maker. As we can observe in Fig. 3.8, under 
treatment B only 2 couples out of 6 were able to find an integrative agreement and to 
reach the Pareto frontier while the other four ended up with an inefficient outcome. In 
 which we previously 
denoted as region Z (couples K and M found an agreement on one issue within the zone 
f agreement and didn’t reach any agreement on the other issue; this means that they 
nes 
of agreement).  
 
Under treatment A (Fig. 3.7), all couples have been able to find an integrative 
agreement; 3 of them have reached the efficient outcome (10, 0), and the other two are 
quite close to the Pareto frontier.  
 
particular four couples remained blocked in the rectangular region
o
negotiated on the two issues separately, trying to find an agreement within their zo
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Fig. 3.7  Experimental results of the policy makers: treatment A 
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Fig. 3.8 Experimental results of the policy makers: treatment B  
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               Fig. 3.9 Experimental results of the students: treatment A 
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            Fig. 3.10 Experimental results of the students: treatment B 
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In the subject pool of students I fo sults. As we can see in Fig. 3.10,  
under treatment B, 4 couples remained blocked inside the bias region Z, and only three 
 find an integrative agreement and reach the Pareto frontier. On the other 
ent A (see Fig. 3.9) 6 couples out of 7 found an integrative 
hitney, 1947). Because 
e test has been executed on the aggregate 
proportion of integrative agreements under 
te that almost all couples that found a suboptimal 
ent under treatment B concluded the negotiations before the 10 minutes deadline. 
its us to exclude the lack of time as explanation for the observed 
und quite similar re
were able to
hand, under treatm
agreement; 5 of them reached an efficient outcome and couple B is quite close to the 
Pareto frontier; only couple C was not able to find any agreement on neither issue. 
  
To test the level of significance of the discrepancy between the results under treatment 
hitney U-test (see Mann and WA and B I carried out a Mann-W
of the limited size of the two subject-pools, th
data of policy makers and students. The 
treatment A has resulted to be significantly higher than under treatment B (asympt. 
significance: p < 0,01). 
 
In Tab. 3.1 and 3.2 has been recorded, besides the final agreements, the negotiation time 
of each couple. It is important to no
agreem
This perm
suboptimality.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The results of the experiments seem to confirm my initial hypothesis. Under treatment 
nder treatment A, in contrast (with the exception of one couple of 
B the subjects found a significantly inferior proportion of integrative agreements than 
under treatment A  Under this condition most of the negotiators (both policy makers and 
students) found an agreement on the two issues separately, and has been subject to the 
ZAB; i.e. they remained blocked in the suboptimal agreements falling within the zone 
of agreement of each issue, without considering the Pareto optimal ones falling outside 
of it. Negotiators u
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students), have all negotiated on the two issues jointly and most of them have been able 
to find a Pareto optimal solution. 
These results confirm the hypothesis that, besides the fixed pie bias, there exists an 
additional factor which can explain the suboptimality observed in integrative 
ey explore only a limited part of the space of the negotiation 
problem and, as soon as they are able to find a satisficing, suboptimal, solution, they 
stop searching for a Pareto optimal one.  
negotiation. That is, negotiators are boundedly rational individuals that simplify the 
negotiation problem by categorizing the possible outcomes in satisficing  and not 
satisficing ones. Th
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Appendix A 
 
You are about to participate in an experimental study in decision-making and 
negotiation. The experiment will la lf an hour. The instructions of the 
experiment are sim ou follow them carefully, n a lot of unique 
gifts a ica cts u  (m or ts) , peak 
with the er pla ntil th xperim starts.
 
Decisions and earnings: 
Each of u wil random atched with another pa ipant. You have about 10 
minutes to gain as many points as you can. The number of gifts (the amount of money) 
you can win will be directly proportional to the total num  of poin  you w ore in 
the experiment. e that e amount of gifts (money) you will receive will be 
Instructions  
st for about ha
ple, and if y  you may wi
nd typ l produ  from o r region oney f  studen . Please do not s
 oth yer u e e ent   
 yo l be ly m rtic
ber ts ill sc
Not th
proportional to your own performance and not to the performance o he couf t ple. At the 
beginning we assign you 50 points.  
 
What to do: 
As you see, you have a sheet with two tables, each made of two columns: in the left 
colum ha le b  0  In ht  you have the 
number of points associated with each numbe  the l column he tab  of the 
other player might be different from yours. Your table and the poi
number of the left column is not known to the other player. Please, keep your tables 
n you ve a sca  of num ers from  to 10.  the rig  column
r of eft . T les
nts you get for each 
secret. 
You have to negotiate with the other player in order to choose a number in the left 
column. You have to negotiate for 1 number in the first tab  (called “first num nd 
1 number in the second table (called “second number”). If you both agree write it in the 
record sheet and call a laboratory assistant. The total points you gain are the sum of the 
le ber”) a
points you get from the agreement in h tabl eac e. If you ot agr  you r
your ini points
do n ee, emain with 
tial . 
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Please, note that you can agree with the other player on the “first number” and not on 
the “second number” and vice versa. In this case you will get the points corresponding 
to the number on which you agreed and you will get 0 points for the number on which 
you didn’t agree. Of course you can agree on both or neither. 
During the negotiations you can speak freely with the other player (if you wish, you can 
even communicate the values in your tables) but you are not allowed to show the tables 
to the other player. 
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 Payoff tables  
Treatment A 
Player one Player two 
Appendix B  
 
1st N° points 2nd N° points 2nd N° points points 1st N° 
0 -50 0 -20 0 10 0 50 
1 -40 1 -17 1 7 1 40 
2 -30 2 -14 2 4 2 30 
3 -20 3 -11 3 1 3 20 
4 -10 4 -8 4 -2 4 10 
5 0 5 -5 5 -5 5 0 
6 10 6 -2 6 -8 6 -10 
7 20 7 1 7 -11 7 -20 
8 30 8 4 8 -14 8 -30 
9 40 9 7 9 -17 9 -40 
10 50 10 10 10 -20 10 -50 
 
Treatment B 
Player one Player two 
1st N° points 2nd N° points 1st N° points 2nd N° points 
0 -50 0 -10 0 20 0 50 
1 -40 1 -7 1 17 1 40 
2 -30 2 -4 2 14 2 30 
3 -20 3 -1 3 11 3 20 
4 -10 4 2 4 8 4 10 
5 0 5 5 5 5 5 0 
6 10 6 8 6 2 6 -10 
7 20 7 11 7 -1 7 -20 
8 30 8 14 8 -4 8 -30 
9 40 9 17 9 -7 9 -40 
10 50 10 20 10 -10 10 -50 
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Section 4  
An experimental study on categorization processes in 
Introduction 
nt 1, and has the aim to compare the effects of majority and unanimity rules on 
e optimality of outcomes. 
 in the level of 
omplexity of the decision problem leads to results different from those obtained in 
xperiments 1 and 2. To this aim I consider a 4-parties-committee that has to make 
ecisions on 4 different issues under majority/unanimity rule. 
committees’ decision making with logrolling 
 
 
 
In this section I present a series of experiments I carried out in order to analyse the 
effects of categorization processes on coalition formation in committees’ decision 
making with logrolling. 
 
In chapter 1 I introduce the Public Choice approach to logrolling in committees’ 
decision making. 
 
Chapter 2 is concerned with an experiment in which I analyse how categorization, 
satisficing, and the ZAB influence the process of coalition formation and the optimality 
of the outcomes within a 3-parties-committee that has to make decisions on 3 different 
issues under majority rule. The results are compared with the standard public choice 
predictions. 
 
The experiment described in chapter 3 is concerned with the same situation of 
experime
th
 
In chapter 4 is reported an experiment in which I test if an increase
c
e
d
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4.1 Logrolling in the
 
In the public choice lit ogrolling re  to the exchange of votes within decision 
making committees and in particular w  legislatures. A logrolling situation is 
normally defined in the fo wing way (Stra n, 1997): 
 
let (x,y) and (z,w) be pairs of mutually exclusive issues. If voters preferences in relation 
. 
 in principle be eliminated by vote trading. 
dividuals exchange votes on issues they are not strongly  interested in for votes on 
grolling allows to express 
 public choice  
erature l fers
ithin
llo tma
to each pair are separable and each voter votes sincerely, a logrolling situation exists if 
 
xPy and zPw, but ywPxz, 
 
where P represents the social preference as determined by the voting rule employed (in 
many theorems concerning logrolling it’s enough if xRy and zRw, i.e., x does not lose 
to y and z does not lose to w). 
In a pairwise vote x defeats y and z defeats w. But, if all issues are voted together, the 
pair yw can defeat, through a vote-trading agreement (logrolling), the pair xz
 
Logrolling agreements can manifest themselves in two ways. First, y and w can be 
joined in a single bill and be voted on as a package. Such omnibus bills often appear in 
the US Congress in areas where logrolling is alleged to take place (e.g., public works, 
tariffs). Alternatively, the issue pairs can be voted upon separately. 
 
Decisions taken with simple majority rule elicit a simple yes or no vote on a given issue 
but not the intensity with which a voter favors or opposes an issue, that is, they reveal 
ordinal preferences but not cardinal preferences. Majority rule, therefore does not allow 
to express differences in the degree of preferences among voters.  
 
This disadvantage of majority rule can
In
issues they are strongly  interested in. Buchanan and Tullock (1962) were the first to 
notice the normative significance of logrolling: that lo
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different intensities of preferences and that collective choice with vote trading may 
bring society closer to the provision of a socially optimal level of public goods.  
 
All democratic countries forbid the buying and selling of votes by individual citizens. 
Although buying and selling votes is officially prohibited also in parliamentary bodies, 
the more informal process involving the exchange of votes is difficult to keep under 
control.  Such exchanges have occurred in the U.S. congress for as long as it has been in 
existence.  
 
Early studies by political scientists often report vote trading in their descriptions of 
gislative behavior. Mayhew (1966) has studied the House of Representatives in the 
nited States from 1948 to 1962. He considered votes concerning farm, city, labor, and 
estern issues. In that period of time, most representatives from the Democratic party 
showed a tendency s. Examining the 
onstituency benefiting from various types of legislation, Mayhew argued that 
legislation passed if every 
legislator er  ob ts resenting various 
special interests supported r on fou t types ssue. Stratmann (1992) 
identifies logrolling statistically among ag  interes n endments to the 
1985 farm ong the  are that tives fr  to co stricts traded 
otes with legislators representing other agricultural commodity interests, specifically 
ugar and peanut farmers. Further evidence of logrolling taking place within legislatures 
 provided by Froman (1967), Jackson (1974), Kau and Rubin (1979), Stratmann 
tratmann illustrates logrolling with the example reported in Tab. 4.1.  
 
le
U
w
to vote in ways benefiting special interest
c
 benefiting farm, labor, and western interests could not have 
had voted sinc ely. Mayhew served that Democra  rep
each othe r differen  of i
ricultural ts o  am
 bill. Am findings representa om bac  di
v
s
is
(1995). 
 
 
S
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Tab. 4.1 Example of logrolling 
 
 Issues 
Voters A B 
1 5 -1 
2 -1 5 
3 -1 -1 
 
 
 
In this example voters 1, 2, and 3 vote separately with majority rule for the passage of 
each issue A and B. The numbers in the cells represent the payoff of each voter for the 
passage of each issue. The table represents the payoffs for each voter on each issue. If 
everyone voted sincerely (i.e. stated honestly his preference - pass or not pass - for each 
single issue), neither issue A nor issue B would pass. However voters 1 and 2 have an 
incentive to make an agreement in which voter 1 accepts to vote for B in exchange for 
voter 2 voting for A. In the presence of this votes-trade, which implies a 
misrepresentation of preferences, both issues pass. In this particular example, the total 
utility is increased by 3 units for each issue, and society is better off overall. 
oters 1 and 2 to trade votes, but in this case society is worse off 
verall by –1 for each issue. Logrolling indeed, can produce externalities with utility 
-trading can 
In the example reported in Tab. 4.1 we saw that through logrolling the society is better 
off overall. Nevertheless, we have to note that, by replacing the –1’s by –3’s, there is 
still an incentive for v
o
losses on nontraders, and, depending on the entity of these losses, the community as a 
whole can be better or worse off. In the first case logrolling can be interpreted as a 
positive sum game; in the second as a negative sum game. The fact that vote
be on net welfare enhancing as well as welfare reducing, has raised a controversy 
surrounding the optimality of logrolling. Early discussions on the topic go back at least 
to Bentley (1907), and the whole century has seen authors and arguments in favour of as 
well as against logrolling (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Coleman, 1966; Mueller, 1967 
and 1973; Wilson, 1969; Koford, 1982). 
 
Gordon Tullock (1959) sustains that majority rule with trading can lead to too much 
governement spending and reports the following example. 
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Let A, B, and C be three farmers; X be a road used only by farmer B, and Y a road used 
 both the construction of roads with 
ross benefits of 5 and costs of 6, and the redistribution of wealth from A to B and C; 
e latter can be enough to approve the bills.  
 
 
 
Tab. 4.2 Logrolling and government spending 
 
                                                                                     Utilities 
only by C. If the gross gains to a farmer from the access road are 7 and the cost is 6, 
which is equally shared among the three farmers, we have the values of Tab. 4.2. With 
these costs and benefits, total welfare is improved by logrolling. But a bill promising a 
gross gain of 5 at a cost of 6, equally shared, also passes. Such a bill lowers community 
welfare by excessively constructing new roads, roads whose total benefits are less than 
their total costs. The problem arises because majority rule can imply allocation and 
redistribution at the same time. The two bills involve
g
th
Winning pair Losing pair Trading voters A B C 
X, Y ~X, ~Y B and C -4 3 3 
X, ~Y X, Y A and B -2 5 -2 
~X, ~Y X, ~Y A and C 0 0 0 
 
 
 
However, logrolling can lead to a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources when side 
payments are allowed (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) in that the redistribution of income 
associated to allocative efficiency outcomes is eliminated.  
 
James Coleman (1966) is one of the most influential supporters of vote trading’s 
potential. He describes the members of the committee or legislature as entering into 
logrolling agreements on all public goods issues. Each voter gains  more control on his 
high-priority events (issues) in exchange for a loss of control over his low-priority 
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issues. A form of ex ante Pareto optimum is reached in which no voter can increase his 
xpected utility by agreeing to exchange another vote. 
his view, however, is criticized by Mueller (1967):  
ation of preferences. When vote trades are parts of only informal 
g is not a problem, cheating may be. When issues are taken up 
hange market (Mueller, 1967; Park, 1967) and cyclical majorities.  
ans that issue A and B 
spectively do not pass. Let’s suppose that voters 1 and 2 make an agreement to let the 
sue pair (A,B) pass. Now voter 3 has an incentive to propose an agreement to voter 1 
r the passage of the issue pair (A, ~B). This combination makes both voters 1 and 3 
 2 has an incentive to propose an agreement to voter 3 in 
rder to let none of the issues pass (~A,~B). From here the cycle starts all over again 
ith the issue pair (A,B).  
e
Coleman therefore characterizes vote trading as a means to select socially optimal 
quantities of public goods.  
 
T
“Whatever potential a vote trading process has for revealing relative intensities of 
preference, and thereby improving the allocation of public goods, may go unrealized 
because the trading process may not produce stable coalitions, nor be free from strategic 
misrepresent
agreements and take place in sequence, voters are motivated both to misstate their 
preferences at the time an agreement is formed, and to violate the agreement after it is 
made. A voter who would benefit from X might pretend to oppose it and secure support 
for some other issues he favors “in exchange” for his positive vote for X. If successful, 
he wins on both X and the other issue. But the other trader might be bluffing too, and 
the end results of trading become indeterminate . 
Even when bluffin
seriatim, there is an obvious and strong incentive for the second trader to renege on his 
part of the bargain”.  
 
It has been shown that some of the negative impacts of vote-trading stem from the fact 
that vote trading outcomes may not be stable, implying a lack of equilibrium in the 
vote-exc
Using the example in Tab. 4.1 it is possible to illustrate how logrolling is linked to 
cyclical majorities. In Tab. 4.1 there exist four possible combinations of issue pairs: 
(A,B), (~A,B), (A,~B), (~A,~B), where ~A and ~B me
re
is
fo
better off. At this point voter
o
w
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 Bernholz (1973) has demonstrated 1) that the existence of a logrolling situation implies 
intransitive social preferences, and 2) that the existence of a transitive social preference 
ordering implies the absence of a logrolling situation. The only situation in which 
logrolling is certain not to create the potential for a cycle is when a unanimity rule is 
employed. The possibility of cycling through logrolling may have severe implications 
for the stability of the political system. If coalitions are inherently unstable the outcome 
of the political process might indeed be suboptimal. 
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4.2 Experiment 1 
e purpose of this experimental study is to analyse committees’ decision making with 
rolling. In particular I analyse how categorization, satisficing  and the ZAB affect the 
cess of coalition formation and the level of efficiency of the agreements. 
e topic I’m dealing with lies in the intersect of the disciplinary areas of negotiation 
earch and public choice theory. Logrolling, indeed, has been treated in both areas, 
t with different approaches and methodologies, which in my opini
 
Th
log
pro
 
Th
res
bu on can be 
tegrated.  
on
ob
ne
far
co
op
Pu
negotiations, coalition formation, and voting rules, but is mainly of a purely theoretical 
nature and is built on the assumption of negotiators’ perfect rationality. It assumes that 
even in very complex situations the negotiators are always able to recognise the optimal 
voting strategy and to form the best coalition which allows them to maximize their 
gains.  
My objective in this experiment is to simultaneously draw from and integrate both 
perspectives, and to provide empirical data on cognitive aspects that affect the process 
of coalition formation and the efficiency of the agreements.  
 
 
 
 
 
in
The negotiation research on logrolling (which I’ve already discussed in Chapter 3.1) , 
 the one hand, is more empirically based, in that it makes a wider use of direct 
servation and of experimentation, and stresses the importance of taking into account 
gotiators’ cognitive processes. Most of the work, however, which has been done so 
 exclusively deals with bilateral integrative negotiation. How coalition formation in 
mmittees’ multilateral negotiations under different voting rules works has been left 
en to question.  
blic choice research, on the other hand, treats the topic of committees’ multilateral 
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Hypothesis 
 
The aim of the experiment is to analyse to what extent negotiators are actually able to 
form an optimal coalition and reach an optimal agreement in a situation of three-issues 
and three-parties negotiation with a potential for logrolling. The focus lies on testing the 
hypothesis that in certain situations the ZAB might induce negotiators to form 
suboptimal coalitions which lead to Pareto-dominated agreements, and that the cycling 
problem predicted by the public choice theory might in fact not take place. 
 
Consider the situation described in Fig. 4.1. Three negotiators, A, B, and C negotiate on 
three issues 1, 2, and 3 and make decisions employing a simple majority rule. In each 
graph the horizontal axis represents the value of the issue to be negotiated and the 
vertical axis represents the utility values of the involved negotiators. The three curves 
represent the utility functions of the three negotiators.  
The utility functions have been constructed in such a way that on issue 1 (2, 3) 
negotiators A and B (C and A, B and C, respectively) share a Zone of Agreement, and 
negotiator C (B, A), which has the highest interest on issue 1 (2, 3), doesn’t share any 
zone of agreement with the other two negotiators. In this situation there are three types 
of possible solutions to the negotiation problem:  
 
1) Non-integrative suboptimal solution: if the three issues were negotiated separately, 
negotiators A and B would form a coalition and find an agreement within their Zone 
of Agreement on issue 1, and the same would happen for negotiators A and C on 
issue 2, and for B an C on issue 3. This way each negotiator would win on his two 
low-priority issues and lose on his high priority issue (if the players of our example 
choose this solution and make an equitable agreement, each of them wins about 9 
points). There is also the possibility that the negotiators don’t find any agreement on 
one or more issues; in this case the negotiators get 0 points for each issue on which 
they disagree, and the solution would be non-integrative and suboptimal as well. 
 
 131 
 
2) Integrative Pareto optimal solution: the negotiation of the three issues together 
could lead negotiators to a Pareto-dominant (in comparison to solution 1) outcome. 
The three parties indeed have different interest intensities on the three issues, and 
they could engage in a logroll in which each party accepts to lose on his two low-
priority issues in exchange for a win on his high-priority issue (in our example, the 
parties might decide to let C win on issue 1, B on issue 2, and A on issue 3). The 
utility curves have been constructed in such a way that, if the negotiators choose this 
solution and make an equitable agreement, the payoff for each negotiator would be 
between three and four times greater than with solution 1 (i.e. 32 points). 
lly optimal solution: two negotiators could form a coalition 
and exclude the third negotiator. The two members of the coalition could make an 
4 points). This solution would be optimal for the two coalition 
 
3) Integrative individua
integrative agreement in which each one wins on his own high priority issue and on 
the high priority issue of the third negotiator (if the two coalition members make an 
equitable agreement, they get about 51 points each while the excluded negotiator 
loses about 3
members, but surely would not be Pareto-optimal. This solution, moreover, would 
imply a cycling problem because all coalitions A-B, B-C, and C-A would be equally 
likely. 
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 excluded from the 
reement is the one 
ighest interest on the 
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My hypothesis is that the existence of a Zone of Agreement for two parties on each 
issue might induce negotiators to behave in a satisficing, and not optimizing, way; i.e. 
egotiators look for a solution within the Zone of Agreement, and as soon as they find it 
e 3). In this case no cycle should be observed. 
n
they stop their search for a better agreement, and do not explore the space of Pareto-
dominant solutions falling outside the Zone of Agreement. This way the parties would 
choose the non-integrative suboptimal solution (solution 1); they would negotiate on 
each issue separately and form suboptimal winning coalitions (A and B on issue 1, A 
and C on issue 2, B and C on issu
 
 
Experimental design 
 
The experiment has been run with 39 undergraduate students from the Faculty of 
Economics of the University of Trento, Italy. Subjects were asked to take part in an 
xperiment aimed at analysing negotiation behavior. They were randomly divided in 
roups of three.  
p was asked to negotiate on three different issues. Each subject was given a 
heet with three Tables (for the Tables see Appendix B) representing her incentive in 
he experimental 
sign as simple as possible and to avoid comprehension problems on part of the 
he first column of each Table contained numbers from 0 to 28, representing the 
ponded to the utility functions of Fig. 
.1, with the only difference that the abscissa values of the second issue have been 
zing that they had the same utility functions on the three issues 
spectively).  
ubjects were requested to negotiate with their counterpart on one number from 0 to 28 
 the first Table, one number in the second Table, and one in the third Table in such a 
e
g
Each grou
s
the negotiation about the three issues respectively (in order to keep t
de
subjects, the latter weren’t shown the graphs with their utility functions but just the 
relative tables).  
T
possible agreements on an issue, and the second column contained the points associated 
to each agreement (the values in the Tables corres
4
inverted, i.e. from 28 to 0, instead of 0 to 28; this was done in order to prevent the 
subjects from reali
re
S
in
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way as to max of points (for the precise instructions see 
Appendix A).  
The decision on each issue was to be taken with a m o ou  
Each player, inc e excl
points corresponding to the number chosen by the coalition me ers. 
Nego tion was carri  out face to face  subjects were allowed to speak freely23. 
The only restriction was that they could not show their sheet with the tables to their 
counterparts. They had a maximum of 1 inutes to reach an agreement on the three 
numb . If they didn ind an agreement on one of the three numbers they got 0 points 
for that number.  
Before starting the experiment it was ma clear to the subjects that the only binding 
agre nts were tho at they communicated to the exper nter at the end of the 
negotiation period; in other words any provisory agree
renegotiated within the fifteen minutes. 
As an incentive the subjects were paid a show-up fee plus an amount of money 
dependent on their performance in the experiment, i.e. directly proportional to the 
number of points they obtained. At the beginning subjects were automatically assigned 
15 points. 
 
 
Theoretical predictions
imize their own total number 
ajority rule of tw t of three.
luding the on uded from the winning coalition, was assigned the 
mb
tia ed  and
5 m
ers ’t f
de 
eme se th ime
ment could have been 
 
 
According to public choice theory and to the assumption of perfect rationality of 
individuals, the prediction for this experiment is that negotiators will choose solution 3, 
i.e. two negotiators will form a coalition so that each coalition member wins on his own 
high-priority issue and on the high priority issue of the third negotiator who gets 
excluded from the coalition (i.e. each group should choose the number 28 on two issues, 
and a number within the interval 1-14, which corresponds to the Zone of Agreement, on 
                                                          
23 In some experiments the fact that the players interact face to face and are allowed to speak freely with 
one another might influence the results in that it introduces a problem of fairness.  This fact however, is 
irrelevant for the purposes of this experiment,  because an eventual concern of the players for fairness 
could cause, at most, a shift of choices from solution 3 to solution 2 (which are both optimal), but not 
from solution 2 or 3 to solution 1.   
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the third issue). Since all coalitions A-B, A-C, and B-C are equally likely a cycling 
 
If negotiators are perfectly rational but also have a concern for equity, the theoretical 
prediction is that they will choose the Pareto-optimal solution (solution 2), i.e. they will 
form an extended coalition of three, in which each negotiator wins only on his own 
high-priority issue (i.e. each group should choose the number 28 on each issue). In this 
case no cycling problem arises.  
 
In contrast, my theoretical prediction, based on the assumption of bounded rationality of 
individuals, is that the ZAB will induce part of the negotiators to choose solution 1, 
even though it is Pareto-dominated by solution 2. Negotiators A and B, B and C, and A 
and C in this case would form a coalition on issue 1, 2, and 3, respectively (i. e. each 
agreement would fall within the interval 1-14), and no cycle should be observed. 
 
 
Results
problem should arise. 
 
 
The results of the experiment are represented in Table 4.3 and Fig. 4.2. 
  
roups 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13 (69%) have made agreements on the three issues, 
ts on the three issues outside the Zone of 
greement, in particular at point 28 (solution 2).  
ade an agreement at point 28 on two issues, and at point 5 on one 
).  
G
which fall within the Zone of Agreement, i.e. the interval 1-14 (solution 1). 
 
Groups 2, 5, 11 (23%) have made agreemen
A
 
Group 3 (8%) has m
issue (solution 3
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Tab 4.3 Results experiment 1 
 
Group Agreement on 
th
Agreement on Agreement on Time 
e  1st issue the 2nd issue the 3rd issue 
1 4 3 2 9 
2 28 28 28 15 
3 5 28 28 3 
4 5 5 5 12 
5 28 28 28 12 
6 1 3 4 4 
7 5 5 5 13 
8 3 4 8 10 
9 7 3 5 8 
10 4 4 2 3 
11 28 28 28 15 
12 5 4 5 8 
13 2 2 3 4 
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  Fig. 4.2 
onclusions
Results exp.
 
The diagram represents all the agreements (the black points) that the groups made on the three issues. 
Each group is identified by a number which appears on the side of each agreement point. For each group 
three agreements on the three issues are depicted respectively. The bold line from 1 to 14 on the abscissa 
represents the Zone of Agreement of the three issues.  
 
 
C  
he results of the experiment have confirmed my initial hypothesis in that a great 
 
T
majority of the subjects (69%) behaved in a way which is inconsistent with the public 
choice predictions, but consistent with the ZAB prediction. 69% of the subjects indeed, 
 1
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adopted a satisficing behaviour; as soon as two negotiators out of three were able to find 
a suboptimal agreement within their Zone of Agreement on each issue separately 
olution 1), the search process for an optimal solution (outside the Zone of Agreement) 
as interrupted.  
ave been able to find an optimal agreement (23 % chose 
solution 2, and 8 % solution 3) by exploring the space of solutions falling outside the 
24
ely before the 15 minutes deadline. This permits us to 
e as explanation for the observed suboptimality.  
(92%) who chose solution 1 and 2 there arose no cycling 
n each issue a stable coalition agreement was made 
he two subjects who shared a Zone of Agreement. In the case of solution 2, a 
table coalition agreement of all three group members was made. 
                                                        
(s
w
Only 31% of the subjects h
Zone of Agreement .  
In Tab.4.3 has been recorded, besides the final agreements, the negotiation time of each 
group. It is important noting that almost all groups that found a suboptimal agreement 
concluded the negotiations larg
exclude the lack of tim
Moreover, for all the groups 
problem; in the case of solution 1, o
between t
s
 
 
  
 It could be argued that most subjects found a suboptimal agreement within their Zone of Agreement 
ecause they have been subject to a sort of median position salience bias (the zone of agreement occupied 
central position in the values’ interval of each issue) and not to the ZAB. We think, nevertheless that 
is was not the case: the most salient values of each player (were she could win the maximum number of 
oints) were located at the extremes of the values’ scale for 2 issues out of 3; it was only through the 
negotiation process that players were induced by their counterparts to take into consideration the values 
within the Zone of Agreement.    
24
b
a 
th
p
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4.3 Experi
 
The a of exper xamin at diff les can ve on 
the ZAB and on the optimality of the agree nts.  
I consider the same ne otiation problem ent 1 and observe what happens 
when a unanimity rule, instead of a majority rule, is employed.
 
 
ypothesis
ment 2  
im imen is to et 2 e the ect th eff erent ing ruvot ha
me
g of experim
  
H  
The hypothesis is that, in a situation like the one described in Fig. 4.1, the adoption of a 
unanimity rule instead of a majority rule might eliminate the effect of the ZAB. With a 
unanimity rule, indeed, the parties don’t have the possibility to negotiate the three issues 
separately, because on each issue there would be the veto of at least one party. This way 
negotiators might be induced to explore the space of solutions falling outside the Zone 
of Agreement, and eventually to find an optimal agreement. 
It is worthy noting that, under unanimity rule, solution 1 is an integrative solution, 
because each negotiator must accept to lose on one issue in order to win on the 
remaining two. Nevertheless it remains a suboptimal solution (it is Pareto-dominated by 
solution 2) because each negotiator loses on his high-priority issue and wins on his two 
low-priority issues. Under unanimity rule the only case of non-integrative suboptimal 
solution is that in which the negotiators try to negotiate on each issue separately, and 
don’t come to any agreement because on each issue there’s the veto of one player. 
Solution 2, moreover is the only (Pareto) optimal solution, because solution 3 is not 
viable under unanimity rule. 
 
 
xperimental design
 
E  
he design was exactly the same as in 
 
The experiment has been carried out with 21 undergraduate students of the Faculty of 
Economics of the University of Trento. T
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experiment 1, with the exception that decisions had to be made with the unanimity, 
stead of majority, rule. in
 
 
Theoretical predictions 
 
My theoretical prediction is that, in comparison to experiment 1 where a majority rule 
(in correspondence of number 28) should be 
esults
was employed, under unanimity rule the effect of the ZAB should be reduced, and a 
greater number of optimal agreements 
observed.   
 
 
R  
ade agreements on the three issues, which fall within the Zone of 
Group 3 (14%) didn’t find any agreement at all. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results of the experiment have been represented in Tab.4.4 and Fig.4.3. 
 
Groups 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 (72%) have made agreements on the three issues outside the Zone of 
Agreement, in particular at point 28 (solution 2).  
 
Group 2 (14%) has m
Agreement, i.e. within the interval 1-14 (solution 1). 
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Tab 4.4 Results experiment 2 
Group Agreement on 
the 1st issue 
Agreement on 
the 2nd issue 
Agreement on 
the 3rd issue 
Time 
1 28 28 28 9 
2 3 3 3 14 
3 / / / 6 
4 28 28 28 13 
5 28 28 28 14 
6 28 28 28 9 
7 28 28 28 15 
 
Fig. 4.3 
 
The diagram represents all the agreements (the black points) that the groups made on the three issues. 
Each group is identified by a number which appears on the side of each agreement point. For each group 
three agreements on the three issues are depicted, respectively. The bold line from 1 to 14 on the abscissa 
represents the Zone of Agreement of the three issues.  
Results exp. 2
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Conclusions 
 
The results of experiment 2 have confirmed my initial hypothesis; under unanimity rule 
the effect of the ZAB has been considerably reduced. The subjects have been induced to 
explore the space of solutions falling outside the Zone of Agreement, and 72% of them 
le has been tested with a Mann-Whitney U-test and resulted to be highly 
nanimity rule most of 
e subjects are able to find an optimal solution to the same negotiation problem. 
sults of experiments 1 and 2, and a comparison between the 
(in contrast to only 31% under majority rule) has been able to find the optimal solution 
in correspondence of the number 28.  
Only 28% of the subjects (69% under majority rule) found a suboptimal solution (14%) 
or didn’t find any solution at all (14%).  
The difference in the proportion of optimal agreements found under majority and 
unanimity ru
significant (asympt. significance: p<0,01). 
 
The results of this experiment have a relevance also for the interpretation of the results 
in experiment 1. It might be argued indeed that most of the subjects in Experiment 1 
found a suboptimal solution not because of the satisficing heuristic, but simply because 
the negotiation problem was too complex to be solved. The results of experiment 2 
nevertheless permit us to reject this argumentation, in that under u
th
 
For a synthesis of the re
effects of the majority and the unanimity rule, see Fig.4.4. 
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Fig. 4.4 
 
The (Pareto) optimal solution refers to both solutions 2 and 3, while the suboptimal solution refers to 
solution 1. 
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4.4 Experiment 3 
tiators to find (Pareto) optimal 
re dependent on the number of parties 
nd issues involved in the negotiation. An increase in the number of parties and issues, 
 majority rule, even if yielding suboptimal agreements, would be 
referable.  
et’s consider the situation depicted in Fig. 4.5. Here we have four parties that negotiate 
ith majority rule. Each party has one high-priority issue and three low-
curves have been constructed in such a way that the 
 
In the previous experiment we have shown that the unanimity rule, in comparison to the 
majority rule, induced a larger number of nego
agreements.  
It is interesting now to test whether these results a
a
indeed, could result in a higher level of complexity of the negotiation problem and, 
under the unanimity rule, the negotiators might not be able to find any agreement at all. 
In this case therefore a
p
L
on four issues w
priority issues. On each issue three out of four negotiators share a Zone of Agreement. 
The negotiator excluded from the Zone of Agreement is always the one with the highest 
interest on that issue. The utility 
solutions to this negotiation problem under the majority and the unanimity rule, 
respectively, are conceptually the same as in experiments 1 and 2. 
 
 
Experimental design 
 
The experiment has been carried out with 48 undergraduate students of the Faculty of 
Economics of the University of Trento. 24 subjects were assigned to the treatment with 
the majority rule, and 24 to the treatment with the unanimity rule. In each treatment 
ubjects were randomly divided in groups of four and asked to negotiate on four issues. 
 28) and that, under majority rule, decisions had to be taken with a 
ajority of 3 out of 4 negotiators. 
s
The experimental design was exactly the same as for experiments 1 and 2, with the only 
difference that the values in the tables corresponded to the utility functions of Fig. 4.5 
(the abscissa values of the second and fourth issues have been inverted, i.e. from 28 to 0 
instead of 0 to
m
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Results 
 
Under h m  Tab .6), , 
(83%) have m reements on the four is all wi e of 
greement, i.e. within the interval 4-18 (solution 1). 
nly group 7%) has made agreements on the four issues outside the Zone of 
greement, in particular at point 28 (solution 2).  
nder the treatment with unanimity rule (see Tab. 4.6 and Fig. 4.7), all groups (100%) 
 the Zone of Agreement, in particular at 
point 28 (solution 2). 
 
 
Conclusions
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ajority rule (see . 4.5 and Fig. 4
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A
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U
h aave m de agreements on the four issues outside
 
 
The results of experiment 3 basically reflect the results of experiments 1 and 2. Under 
majority rule the great majority of the subjects has been subject to the ZAB and chose a 
suboptimal solution (solution 1).  
Under the unanimity rule, notwithstanding the increased level of complexity of the 
negotiation problem (in comparison to experiment 2), the subjects have been induced to 
search for a solution outside the Zone of Agreement, and all of them have been able to 
find the Pareto-optimal solution (solution 2).  
 
The difference in the proportion of optimal agreements found under majority and 
unanimity rule has been tested with a Mann-Whitney U-test and resulted to be highly 
significant (asympt. significance: p<0,01). 
 
Even in this case it is important to note that almost all groups under majority rule that 
found a suboptimal agreement concluded the negotiations largely before the 15 minutes 
eadline. This permits us to exclude the lack of time as explanation for the observed d
suboptimality. 
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Tab. 4.5 Results experiment 3 with majority rule 
 
up Agreement on AgreemeGro
st issue 
nt on 
the 2nd issue 
Agreement on 
the 3rd issue 
Agreement on 
the 4th issue 
Time 
the  1
1 8 7 9 10 7 
2 6 10 10 7 6 
3 8 16 11 7 6  
4 7 11 7 9 7 
5 28 28 28 28 15 
6 15 10 14 10 13 
 
  
 Fig 4.6 
 
The diagram represents all the agreements (the black points) that the groups made on the four issues. 
Each group is identified by a number which appears on the side of each agreement point. For each group 
four agreements on the four issues are depicted, respectively. The bold line from 4 to 18 on the abscissa 
represents the Zone of Agreement of the four issues.  
Results exp. 3 - Majority rule
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Values of issues 1, 2, 3, 4
0 1 2
1111
222
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3333
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Tab. 4.6 Results experiment 3 with
 
Group Agreement on 
the  1st issu
Agreement on Agreement on Agreement on 
th issue 
Time
 unanimity rule 
e the 2nd issue the 3rd issue the 4
1 28 28 28 28 2  
2 28 28 28 28 3 
3 28 28 28 28 2  
4 6  28 28 28 28 
5 28 28 28 28 3  
6 28 28 28 28 4 
 
  
 Fig. 4.7 
Results exp. 3 - Unanim ity rule
 
The diagram represents all the agreements that the groups made on the four issues. Each group is 
identified by a number which appears on the side of each agreement point. For each group four 
agreements on the four issues are depicted, respectively. The bold line from 4 to 18 on the abscissa 
represents the Zone of Agreement of the four issues.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
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For a synthesis of the results of experiment 3, and a comparison between the majority 
and the unanimity rule, see Fig.4.8 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.8 
 
 
The (Pareto) optimal solution refers to both solutions 2 and 3, while the suboptimal solution refers to 
solution 1. 
17%
83%
100%
0%
0%
80%
0%10
90%
50%
60%
70%
10%
20%
30%
40%
(Pareto) optimal
solution
Suboptimal solution (Pareto) optimal
solution
Suboptimal solution
        Majority rule                                           Unanimity rule
Synthesis results exp. 3
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Appendix A 
 
In   
an hour. The instructions of the 
You will be randomly matched with 2 other participants, and your scope is to win as 
many points as you can. The amount of money you will be paid will be directly 
proportional to the total number of points you score in the experiment. For each point 
you will get 0,25 €. At the beginning you are assigned 15 points.  
 
What to do? 
 
Each participant will choose an envelope (A, B, or C) containing a record sheet and a 
sheet with 3 tables. Please, write your name on the record sheet. 
Each of the three tables is made of two columns: in the left column you have a scale of 
numbers from 0 to 28. In the right column you have the number of points associated to 
each number in the left column. The tables of the other players are different from yours. 
Your tables and the points you get for each number of the left column is not known to 
the other player. Please, keep your tables secret. 
You have to negotiate with the other players in order to choose a number in the left 
column of each table, so as to maximize your own total number of points. For a number 
to be chosen it suffices that a majority of two players out of three agree on the number. 
Each player (the one excluded from the majority as well) will be assigned the points 
corresponding to the number chosen in each table. In case of disagreement each player 
structions of experiment 1 (2 and 3)*
 
 
Introduction 
 
You are about to participate in an experimental study on decision-making and 
negotiation. The experiment will last about half 
experiment are simple, and if you follow them carefully, you may win an amount of 
money directly proportional to your performance in the experiment plus a show-up fee 
of 3 €.  
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will get 0 points The total number of points you will gain will be the sum of the points 
you get from the agreement in ea  tabl
You can negotiate following the order you pref
the any table, and you don’t have to conclude the negotiation on one table before 
switching to the next one. It is only important that you and the two other players 
negotiate on the same tables at th  sam  time (for instance, you can all start negotiating 
on the second table)  
During the negotiations you can speak freely with the other players (if you want, you 
can communicate information about your poin  but you can no how th  your 
tables
You have about 15 minutes to comple he nego tions on the three es. 
 
* In experiment 2 the instructions were the sa  as in experimen , with  only 
difference that it was required tha tors agreed on one num in orde r that 
number to be chosen. 
In experiment 3 the instructions f r the majority and unanimity rule tments were the 
same as in experiment 1 and 2 respectively, with the only difference that the groups 
were m e of fo egotiators and that decisions under the majority rule had to be taken 
with a jority ree out of four negotiators.  
 
 
ch e.  
er, i.e. you can start the negotiation with 
e e
ts) t s em
. 
te t tia  tabl
me t 1 the
t all negotia ber r fo
o trea
ad ur n
 ma of th
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Appendix B 
 
Tables used in experiments 1 and 2 
umbers of the second issue have been inverted for each player, 
 
The tables correspond to the utility curves depicted in Fig.4.1.1. Each player received 
the same three tables, but in a different order so that for player A issue 1 corresponded 
to Table 1, issue 2 to Table 2, and issue 3 to Table 3; for player B Table 2 corresponded 
to issue 1, Table 3 to issue 2, and Table 1 to issue 3; for player C Table 3 corresponded 
to issue 1, Table 1 to issue 2, and Table 2 to issue 3. 
In the experiment the n
i.e. from 28 to 0 instead of 0 to 28; this was done in order to prevent the subjects from 
realizing that they had the same utility functions. 
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TABLE 1 TABLE 2 TAB LE 3 
Numb nt   r Num iner Poi s Numbe Points ber Po ts 
0 4  0 1 0 -4 -16 
1 13   0 1 -15 1
2 12  4 2 -15 2 
3 11  8 3 -14 3 
4 10  4 -13 4 12 
5 9  16 5 -12 5 
6 8  12 6 -12 6 
7 7  9 7 -11 7  
8 6  8 8 -10 8  
9 5  6 9 -9 9  
10 4   6 10 -9 10  
11 3   5 11 -8 11  
12 2   4 12 -7 12  
13 1   3 13 -6 13  
14 0  4 2 14 -6 1  
15 -1  5 2 15 -5 1
16 -2  6 1 16 -4 1
17 -3  7 1 17 -3 1
18 -4  8 0 18 -3 1
19 -5  9 - 19 -2 1 1 
20 -6  0 - 20 -1 2 3 
21 -7  1 - 21 -1 2 5 
22 -8  2 - 22 0 2 6 
23 -9  3 - 23 3 2 7 
24 -9  4 - 24 8 2 8 
25 -10  5 -8 25 13  2
26 -10   -9 26 20  26
27 -11  -9 27 34 27 
28 -11   -9 28 52  28
Disagree 0  Disagree 0 D agre 0   is e
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Appendix C 
 
 
 
The tables correspond to the utility curves epicted in Fig.7.1.1. Each player received 
the same four tables but in a different order, o that for player A issue 1 corresponded to 
Table 1, issue 2 to Table 2, issue 3 to Table 3, and issue 4 to Table 4; for player B Table 
2 corresponded to issue 1, Table 3 to issue 3, and Table 1 to issue 4; 
and fourth issue have been inverted, i.e. 
 28 to 0 instead of 0 to 28; this was done in order to prevent the subjects from 
 
Tables used in experiment 3  
 d
 s
 to issue 2, Table 4 
for player C Table 3 corresponded to issue 1, Table 4 to issue 2, Table 1 to issue 3, and 
Table 2 to issue 4. 
In the experiment the numbers of the second 
from
realizing that they had the same utility functions. 
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TABLE 1  TABLE 2  TABLE 3  TABLE 4 
Number Points  Number Points  Number Points  Number Points 
0 32  0 -4  0 -16  0 -20 
1 26  1 1  1 -11  1 -20 
2 20  2 5  2 -7  2 -20 
3 16  3 8  3 -3  3 -20 
4 13  4 9  4 0  4 -20 
5 12  5 11  5 3  5 -19 
6 11  6 11  6 6  6 -19 
7 9  7 12  7 8  7 -19 
8 8  8 11  8 10  8 -19 
9 7  9 11  9 12  9 -19 
10 6  10 10  10 13  10 -18 
11 6  11 9  11 13  11 -18 
12 5  12 8  12 14  12 -18 
13 4  13 7  13 13  13 -18 
14 3  14 7  14 12  14 -17 
15 3  15 6  15 10  15 -17 
16 2  16 5  16 8  16 -17 
17 1  17 4  17 7  17 -17 
18 0  18 3  18 5  18 -16 
19 -1  19 1  19 3  19 -16 
20 -1  20 0  20 0  20 -16 
21 -2  21 -1  21 -2  21 -8 
22 -2  22 -1  22 -4  22 0 
23 -2  23 -2  23 -6  23 9 
24 -3  24 -3  24 -8  24 18 
25 -3  25 -4  25 -8  25 27 
26 -3  26 -4  26 -9  26 36 
27 -4  27 -5  27 -10  27 45 
28 -4  28 -5  28 -11  28 53 
Disagree 0  Disagree 0  Disagree 0  Disagree 0 
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Section 5 
An experimental study on categorization processes in 
decisions under risk 
g many alternatives people do not 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This section is concerned with an experimental study on decision making under risk, 
and in particular on the process of categorization as a strategy to symplify problems 
involving the computation of probabilities.  
 
In chapter 1 I review previous empirical research indicating that people systematically 
violate the principles of rational decision-making when judging probabilities, making 
predictions or otherwise attempting to cope with probabilistic tasks. Instead of applying 
the correct rules for estimating probabilities, individuals adopt intuitive heuristics, 
which allow to reduce difficult mental tasks to simpler ones.  
 
In chapter 2 I report an experiment in which I advance the hypothesis that in the field of 
decision making under risk one simplifying strategy that people might use is that of 
categorization. I suppose that in a choice task involvin
adopt a rational optimizing algorithm to come to a decision, but rather simplify the 
decision problem through a process of categorization which allows to reduce the 
effective number of alternatives available to choice. 
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5.1 Bounded rationality and probabilistic decision making 
 
As we saw in chapter 1.1, the field of economic decision making under risk and 
uncertainty has been dominated, throughout the late 1940s and through the 1950s, 
960s and part of the 1970s, by Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEUT).  
this theory derives from the extreme simplicity of 
utility of each action by adding the expected utilities of the 
lative outcomes; 
 action with highest expected utility.    
SEUT  a  thinking by most economists and applied to 
numero co en with enormous success. It enjoyed a virtually 
contested reign until increasing numbers of economists accumulated sufficient 
 evidence to cast doubt over its general and universal applicability in 
conomics.  
Experim ecision-making have a long and distinguished history; 
more than in any other area of economics, experiments have had a profound influence 
n the development of theory. Indeed, one could argue that the development of 
sburg paradox25.  
                                                          
1
SEUT became firmly established in economics as an immediate consequence of the 
classic book by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior. The strength of 
the logic at its basis, which can be described in the following way: 
 
1) for every decision consider all the possible actions that can be executed; 
2) for each action consider all the possible outcomes; 
3) for each outcome determine the relative utility and probability of occurrence  
4) compute the expected utility of each outcome by multiplying its utility times the 
probability of occurrence; 
5) compute the expected 
re
6) choose the
 
was ccepted almost without
us e nomic problems, oft
un
experimental
e
ents into probabilistic d
o
Subjective Expected Utility Theory was a direct response to the experimental evidence 
concerning the famous St. Peter
 
25 The St Petersburg paradox is explained in chapter 1.1. 
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The St. Petersburg paradox constituted the first in a series of monetary gambles such as 
the Allais paradox and the Ellsberg paradox (both paradoxes will be explained in the 
llowing) in the 20th century that led to changes, or at least to proposed changes, in the 
The topic of decision ma ng under risk and uncertainty, and of probabilistic reasoning 
 general, has been widely investigated not only in the laboratory, but also in real-
s. Slovic presents both evidence from the psychological laboratory 
mework for understanding adjustments to hazards. The picture that 
erges from his work illustrates some rather startling limitations in the ability of the 
ker to think in probabilistic terms and to bring relevant information to bear 
n his or her judgements. He analysed, for example the problem of probabilistic 
reasoning in relation to managers that have to deal with floods: “A major limitation to 
human ability to use improved flood hazard information is a basic reliance on 
xperience. Men on flood plains appear very much to be prisoners of their experience 
ear to set an upward bound to the size of loss with 
anagers believe they ought to be concerned”. 
Our knowledge of the psychological processes involved in risk-taking decisions has 
increased g rs. However, we still have only a rudimentary 
rationality manifests itself. We know 
is literature, several empirical generalizations have been established.  
The experimental results indicate that people systematically violate the principles of 
tional decision-making when judging probabilities, making predictions or otherwise 
attempting to cope with probabilistic tasks. Indeed, the distortions of subjective 
fo
theory of rationality.  
 
ki
in
world situations. Slovic (2000), for example, focuses on cognitive elements of decision-
making under risk, that are important for understanding adjustment to natural hazards in 
a modern technological society. Efficient adjustment to natural hazards indeed demands 
an understanding of the probabilistic character of natural events and an ability to think 
in probabilistic term
and data from field observations to document the usefulness of the notion of bounded 
rationality as a fra
em
decision-ma
o
e
[…] Recently experienced floods app
which m
reatly in recent yea
understanding of the ways in which bounded 
much about certain types of deficiencies and biases, but we do not know the full extent 
of their generality across tasks and across individuals of varying expertise.  
Although no systematic theory about the psychology of uncertainty has emerged from 
th
ra
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probabilities are often large, consistent and difficult to eliminate. Instead of applying the 
correct rules for estimating probabilities, people replace the laws of chance by intuitive 
heuristics, which are employed to reduce difficult mental tasks to simpler ones. These 
sometimes produce good estimates, but all too often yield large systematic biases.  
 
In expected utility theory, the utilities of outcomes are weighted by their probabilities. 
 the following I describe a series of choice problems in which people’s preferences 
original in that it refers to 
oderate rather than to extremely large gains. The subjects were requested to choose 
A:  (2.500, .33; 2.400, .66) 
C: (2.500, .33) 
he data showed that 82% of the subjects chose B in Problem 1, and 83% of the 
nces violates expected utility theory. The preferences in the first 
problem indeed imply (with ): 
In
systematically violate this principle.  
People, for example, overweight outcomes that are considered certain, relative to 
outcomes that are merely probable a phenomenon known as the “certainty effect”. 
The French economist Maurice Allais (1953), one of the earliest experimentalists, 
provided the best known counter-example to expected utility theory which exploits the 
certainty effect. The following experiment carried out by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) is a variation of Allais’ example, and differs from the 
m
between option A and B: 
  
Problem 1:  
 
B:  2.400 with certainty 
  
Problem 2:  
 
D:  (2.400, .34) 
 
T
subjects chose C in Problem 2 
This pattern of prefere
0)0( =u
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)400.2(66.)500.2(33.)400.2(u > uu +  or 
ality: 
uu >  
 2 is obtained from problem 1 by eliminating a .66 chance of winning 
change produces a 
rospect from a sure 
e original and the reduced prospects are 
)500.2(33.)400.2(34. uu >  
 
While the preferences in the second problem imply the reverse inequ
 
)2400(34.)500.2(33.
 
Note that problem
2.400 from both prospects under consideration. Evidently, this 
greater reduction in desirability when it alters the character of the p
gain to a probable one, than when both th
uncertain. 
Here follows a further demonstration of the same phenomenon This example is also 
based on Allais: 
 
Problem 3: 
 
A: (4.000, .80)  
B: (3.000)   
 
Problem 4:  
 
C: (4.000, .20) 
D: (3.000, .25)   
 
In this experiment 80% of the subjects chose B in problem 3, and 65% of the subjects 
chose C in problem 4. In this pair of problems as well as in the previous one, the pattern 
of preferences violated expected utility theory. The choice of B indeed implies: 
 
5
4
)000.4(
)000.3( >
u
u   
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 whereas the choice of C implies the reverse inequality. Note that the prospect C (4.000, 
.20) can be expressed as (A, .25), while the prospect D (3.000, .25) can be rewritten as 
(B, .25). The substitution axiom of utility theory asserts that if B is preferred to A then 
any (probability) mixture (B, p) must be preferred to the mixture (A, p). The subjects 
evidently did not obey this axiom. Apparently, reducing the probability of winning from 
 vary the apparent certainty with which they prevent harm. 
set of problems.  
ct subjective expected utility maximizers is the 
 that Bayesian26  probability assessments are not 
lways descriptive of observed behavior.  
ctive probabilistic 
ssessments, or that the way probabilities enter their preferences depends on the nature 
 problem where a person is told of the following two urns: 
1.0 to .25 has a greater effect than the reduction from .8 to .2.  
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1982) noted that mental representations of protective actions 
can be manipulated so as to
For example, an insurance policy that covers fire but not flood can be presented either 
as full protection against the specific risk of fire or as a reduction in the overall 
probability of property loss. The authors predicts that the policy will appear more 
attractive in the former perspective, labelled pseudocertainty, in which it offers 
unconditional protection against a restricted 
 
An important experiment that established another way in which individuals may 
systematically deviate from being perfe
one from Ellsberg (1961), who showed
a
 
The author demonstrated that people either don’t form coherent subje
a
of the uncertainty from which those probabilities are derived.  
Consider a choice
 
Urn1: 100 balls, red or black (the proportions are unknown) 
Urn 2: 100 balls, 50 red, 50 black 
 
                                                          
26 For a description of Bayes’ Theorem, see, for example, Cicchiteli (1998) 
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Now suppose people have to choose between option A and B in each of the two 
following problems:  
 
Problem 1: 
 
A: extract ball from urn 1, and win $100 if it is red, $0 if it is black 
B: extract ball from urn 2, and win $100 if it is red, $0 if it is black 
 
Problem 2: 
 
A: extract ball from urn 1, and win $100 if it is black, $0 if it is red 
B: extract ball from urn 2, and win $100 if it is black, $0 if it is red 
 
Experimental evidence indicates that many people prefer B over A in both problems. 
Such revealed preferences (if assumed not to reflect pure indifference, which 
experimental variants have ruled out) are inconsistent with subjective expected utility 
ample, people preferred the options B based on urn 2, with its 
theory, even if we generalize expected utility theory to allow for non-linear preferences. 
This is because the choice of B over A in problem 1 means that a person is choosing as 
if she believed that the percentage of red balls in urn 1 is less than .5. But the choice of 
B over A in problem 2 is as if the person believes that the percentage of black balls in 
urn 1 is less than .5. 
From this and other evidence Ellsberg  has concluded that people are often uncertainty-
averse or ambiguity-averse. People’s dislike of known or objective uncertainties (risk) 
is less severe than their dislike of unknown, ambiguous, or subjective uncertainties 
(uncertainty). In this ex
known 50/50 distribution of red and black balls, to the options A based on urn 1, with 
its unknown distribution of ball colors. 
Formal models have been developed where people treat risk and uncertainty differently. 
Some of these models capture uncertainty aversion by assuming a type of pessimism, 
i.e. people act as if, whatever they choose, uncertainty (but not risk) is likely to be 
resolved in a way that makes them worse off. In the previous example, it is as if people 
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thought that if they picked urn 1 when betting on a red ball they would likely draw a 
black ball, whereas if they bet on a black ball, they would more likely draw a red ball.  
t  of decision-making. Although people are 
ometimes free to choose their response mode, more often some external source defines 
 as one of judgement (evaluating individual options) or as one of 
 two or more options).  
ited with a judgment task rather than a choice 
sk should be equivalent (procedural invariance) (see chapters 1.1 and 1.3.2). SEUT 
owever, the descriptive validity of this assumption is now in question. Much recent 
onstrated that the information-processing strategies used prior to 
ent from the strategies employed in judgment. As a 
ive judgements of the same options differ, sometimes 
ramatically (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981).  
they made a simple choice, A or B. Later, they were asked to assume that they owned a 
ticket to play each bet, and they were to state the lowest price for which they would sell 
this ticket.  
 
Further experimental evidence has shown that elicitation procedures are major forces in 
shaping the preferences of people. The way in which an individual has to respond to a 
decision problem is an important aspec
s
the problem either
choice (selecting one from
According to SEUT the preferences elic
ta
assumes that each option X has a value v(X) that determines its attractiveness in both 
contexts (eg, Luce, 1977).  
H
research has dem
making choices are often quite differ
result, choices and evaluat
d
An example of the strong differences between evaluation and choice comes from an 
experiment (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; 1973) which was conducted on the floor of 
the Four Queens Casino in Las Vegas.  
Consider the following pair of gables:  
 
Bet A: 11/12 chance to win 12 chips, and 1/12 chance to lose 24 chips  
Bet B: 2/12 chance to win 79 chips, and 10/12 chance to lose 5 chips 
 
Notice that bet A has a much better chance of winning and that bet B offers a higher 
winning payoff.  
Subjects indicated, in two ways, the attractiveness of each bet in many such pairs. First, 
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Presumably, both these selling prices and choices were governed by the same 
underlying factor, the attractiveness of each gamble. Therefore, subjects should have 
osen about equally 
us 
ariations designed to show that the observed inconsistencies were artifactual. 
this type of 
e than dimensions that are unique to a particular option. They 
comparison between two students along the same dimension should be cognitively 
easier than a comparison between two students along different dimensions. The data 
stated higher selling prices for the gambles that they preferred in the choice situation. In 
fact, subjects often chose one gamble yet stated a higher selling price for the other. For 
the particular pair of gambles just mentioned, Bets A and B were ch
often. However, bet B received a higher selling price about 88% of the time. Of the 
subjects who chose bet A, 87% gave a higher selling price to bet B, thus exhibiting an 
inconsistent preference pattern.  
Grether and Plott (1979), two sceptical economists, replicated this study with numero
v
Nevertheless they obtained essentially the same results as Lichtenstein and Slovic.  
Another way of looking at these results is in terms of the notion of compatibility. 
Because a selling price is expressed in terms of monetary units, subjects apparently 
found it easier to use the monetary aspects of the gamble to produce 
response. Compatibility made the amount to win more salient, which caused that aspect 
to dominate the response. Such bias did not exist with the choices, because each 
attribute of one gamble could be compared directly with the same attribute of the other. 
With no reason to use payoffs as a starting point, subjects were free to use either rules to 
determine (or to justify) their choices. 
A compatibility hypothesis was tested directly in a study by Slovic and MacPhillamy 
(1974). They predicted that dimensions common to each option in a choice situation 
have greater influenc
asked subjects to compare pairs of students and to predict, on the basis of scores on two 
cue dimensions (tests), which student would get the higher college grade average. One 
dimension was common to both students, while the other was unique. For example, 
student A might be described in terms of scores on tests of English skill and quantitative 
ability, whereas student B might be described by scores on tests of English skill and 
need for achievement. 
In this example, the compatibility hypothesis implies that English skill will be weighted 
particularly heavily, because it is common to both students. The rationale is that a 
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strongly confirmed this hypothesis. The dimensions were weighted more heavily when 
common than when unique. After the experiment, most subjects indicated that they had 
o common dimension when students are judged one at a time; 
a judgement task. Evidence for this was also found. For example, consider 
udent A a higher rating (that is, judgement) 
an student B, who had the following scores: 
not wanted to give more weight to the common dimension and they were unaware of 
having done so. 
There is, of course, n
hence, one would expect a dimension that was common in choice to be given less 
weight in 
student A, who had the following scores: 
 
English skill: 470 
Quantitative ability: 674  
Need-for-achievement:  no information 
 
The large majority of the subjects gave st
th
 
English test: 566  
Quantitative ability: no information 
Need-for-achievement: 474 
 
However, when choosing between students A and B, almost  half of the subjects who 
had given a higher rating to student A chose B but almost nobody reversed in the other 
direction. Many other such differences between judgement and choice can be found in 
Slovic and Macphillamy’s (1974) data.  
 
Another line of experimental research is concerned with the update of probabilities. In 
many experiments carried out to see if individuals estimate probabilities ex post in the 
way predicted by the Bayesian theorem27, there has been observed a phenomenon called 
“conservatorism” by Edwards and Phillips (1964). This term refers to a certain way to 
update prior probabilities on part of the subjects, where the relevant aspect consists in 
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an extreme prudence. It is characterised by an ex post probabilities estimation which 
tends to be closer to the correspondent prior probabilities rather than to the values 
pdated with the Bayes formula.  
subjects 
 
u
The results of the experiments seem to highlight that subjects do not use all the 
information available in order to update the initial hypothesis; rather the final judgement 
seems to vitiated by what Evans (1989) calls “confirmation bias”28.  
The evidence relative to the update of probabilities seems to indicate that 
elaborate information in a completely different way than in Baysian models (Slovic and 
Lichtenstein, 1971); in evaluating information, individuals are evidently not only 
Bayesian conservators; they are not Bayesian at all (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972).   
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1973) have carried out a series of studies where it has been 
observed that individuals, when evaluating the occurrence of events or estimating 
probabilities, use a heuristic characterized by availability, i.e. the ease with which 
certain events, associated with what has to be evaluated, come to memory.  
So, if a person has to judge the risk of heart attack among individuals of certain age, he 
might base the judgment on the fact that he can recollect cases of this nature which 
happened to his friends or relatives. Or the fact that people have the tendency to insure 
against heart attack more after this event has happened, and to insure progressively less 
the worse they can recollect the event (Lichtenstein et al. 1978). Many people, for 
example, consider as more dangerous travelling by plane than by car, because, due to 
the publicity made to airplane accidents, these events can be more vividly remembered 
than car accidents.     
The mentioned cases are likely to correspond to a distortion in the use of the availability
heuristic, because not necessarily the examples that most easily come to mind and on 
which the judgment is based correspond to a wide class of cases. Nevertheless, the 
immediate availability in memory of facts or events constitutes a good cue to estimate 
their frequency, because the cases which most frequently happen are easier to remember 
or image in comparison to the less frequent ones.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
27 Bayes’ Theorem provides a formula for the update of prior probabilities, as a function of newly 
acquired information. For a description of Bayes’ Theorem, see, for example, Cicchiteli (1998) 
2. 28 See chapter 1.3.
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It must be considered anyway that the availability of cases or events is affected also by 
other factors in addition to the frequency or effective probability of occurrence. For this 
reason the use of this strategy to make judgments can lead to predictable and systematic 
biases.  
In an experiment by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) the subjects were presented the 
following problem: 
Consider the letter R. 
Is it more probable that it appears (in English words) in the first position or in the third 
position? 
Two thirds of the sample thought that the first position was more probable than the 
for words that have the same letter in third position, many 
(1972) have provided experimental evidence on the 
obability that an event A is caused by fact B on the basis of the 
egree to which A is representative of B or, in other words, on the basis of the similarity 
s been extracted; 2) reflects 
of representativeness, nevertheless, can be vitiated by a distorted 
onception of the concept of casualty. By playing at the roulette, for example, many 
third. 
The letter R is in fact more frequent in the third than in the first position. How to 
explain this systematic error? Since it is easier to search in memory for words that begin 
with a certain letter than 
people judge the words that begin with one consonant as more numerous than those that 
have that consonant in third position.  
 
Kahneman and Tversky 
representativeness bias. Often we make inferences on the appartenence of an object A to 
the class B, or on the pr
d
between A and B. The process underlying these inferences is called representativeness 
heuristic. A person that uses this heuristic estimates the probability of an uncertain 
event or a sample on the basis of the degree to which that event or sample: 1) is similar 
in its essential properties to the population from which it ha
the salient characteristics of the process that has generated it (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1972).  
The heuristic 
c
people expect that, after a certain number of times in a row that a color or a certain 
number has been extracted, a new color or number should be extracted. This is the so 
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called gambler’s fallacy (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). This is a cognitive bias of 
players who think that the outcomes of a bet, as at the roulette, need necessarily to be in 
lready described, Kahneman and Tversky (1974) have identified 
ther systematic errors related to the use of the representativeness heuristic. Among 
tion, the probability that it belonged to an 
f likelihoods should combine 
cifically, it can be shown by applying Bayes’ rule that the ratio of these 
dds should be (.7/.3) or 5.44, for each description. In a sharp violation of Bayes’ rule, 
hich this profile was representative of 
e two stereotypes, with little or no regard for the prior probabilities of the categories. 
 register the 
70) corresponding to the population base rates. Rather, subjects apparently don’t 
a sequence which corresponds to their idea of casualty. And this distortion has also been 
observed with people possessing a sophisticated statistical knowledge.  
 
In addition to those a
o
these there’s the insensibility of individuals to base rate probabilities. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) illustrate this bias using the following example. 
Subjects were shown brief personality descriptions of several individuals, allegedly 
sampled at random from a group of 100 professionals, engineers and lawyers. The 
subjects were told to assess, for each descrip
engineer rather than to a lawyer. In one experimental condition, subjects were told that 
the group from which the descriptions had been drawn consisted of 70 engineers and 30 
lawyers. In another condition, subjects were told that the group consisted of 30 
engineers and 70 lawyers. The odds that any particular description belongs to an 
engineer rather than to a lawyer should be higher in the first condition, were there is a 
majority of engineers, than in the second condition, were there is a majority of lawyers.  
Bayes’ Law tells us that our assessment o
representativeness with base rates (the percentage of the population falling into various 
groups). Spe
o
the subjects in the two conditions produced essentially the same probability judgments. 
Apparently, subjects evaluated the likelihood that a particular profile belonged to an 
engineer rather than to a lawyer by the degree to w
th
The population proportion had a statistically significant effect, but this effect was 
minimal in comparison to the magnitude demanded by Bayes’ law. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1973) show that the problem is not per se that subjects do not
population proportions; when given no description at all of an individual chosen 
randomly from the population, subjects choose the obvious probabilities (70-30 or 30-
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attribute as much importance to base rates as to representativeness for assessing 
probabilities. 
A more dramatic illustration of how little weight people put on base-rate probabilities is 
given by the effects of irrelevant information. Kahneman and Tversky (1973) report that 
when provided with a description of a man that is seemingly uninformative as to 
whether he is an engineer or a lawyer, people guessed that the probability that the man 
was an engineer was approximately 50% irrespective of whether the population was 
composed of 70% or 30% engineers. 
ase rates.  
w of big numbers.  
 a day, 
 has recorded the days in which more 
f 60% of the born children were males. Which of the two hospitals has recorded more 
By assessing the odds at 50%, subjects clearly found the description uninformative 
about whether the person was a lawyer or an engineer; but once they got the description, 
they ignored the population b
 
Another systematic error related to the under-use of base rates is the law of small 
numbers (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971): people exaggerate to which extent a small 
group will closely resemble the parent population or underlying probability distribution 
that generates the group.  
If a sample on which we have to express a judgment is extracted from a population in a 
perfectly casual way, then the larger the sample, the better its characteristics tend to 
reflect the parameters of the population. This fundamental statistical principle is known 
as the la
The tendency not to consider the dimension of the sample has been demonstrated with 
the following problem: 
 
In a city there are two hospitals. In the bigger hospital are born about 45 children
and in the smaller one 15 children a day. It is known that about 50% of the children are 
males. Nevertheless the exact percentage varies from day to day. Sometimes it can be 
higher and sometimes it can be lower than 50%. 
In the period of one year, each of the two hospitals
o
of such days? 
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Most of the subjects thought that the number of these particular days were the same for 
both hospitals. From a pure statistical point of view, it is more probable that the small 
his distortion depends exactly from the use of the representativeness heuristic; the 
k
hes somebody who falls into 
th g subjects with the following 
escription: 
inda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As 
hospital has recorded more of such days: in small samples the fluctuations around the 
mean are necessarily bigger.      
T
indifference between the two hospitals is presumably due to the fact that these events 
are described by the same statistic and thus are both equally representative of the 
general population.   
 
A fundamental theorem of probabilities theory sustains that the probability of composed 
events cannot be greater than the probability of the simple component events. In other 
words, if we have two sets of individuals A (pipe smokers) and B (cigarettes smokers), 
the probability to find a pipe and cigarettes smo er cannot be greater than the 
probability to find a pipe (cigarette) smoker. 
Many researches have shown that people often violate this principle (Slovic et al., 1976; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1983; Yates and Carlson, 1986; Agnoli and Krantz, 1989; 
Thuring and Jungermann, 1990; for a recent review see Hertwig and Gigerenzer, 1999). 
Tversky and Kahneman (1982a; 1983), for example, demonstrate that, when a 
description is representative of a person in category A but not of a person in category B, 
people often judge it more likely that the description matc
both categories A and B than into category B alone.   
Tversky and Kahneman illustrate is effect by providin
d
 
L
a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and 
also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. 
 
Subjects were then asked to rate the relative likelihood that eight different statements 
about Linda were true. Two of the eight statements on the list were “Linda is a bank 
teller” and “Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement”. 
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The experiment was conducted with three different groups of subjects: one without, one 
with basic, and one with advanced statistical competence. The results for all groups are 
that the conjunction “Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement” was 
always judged as more probable than its constituent “Linda is a bank teller”.  
The phenomenon can find an explanation in terms of the heuristic of representativeness. 
This heuristic, as we have seen, consists in an estimation of the extent to which a 
sample corresponds to the population. It can be hypothesised that, if a certain event 
(even a composed one) is considered very representative of the prototype, individuals 
don’t have any difficulty to judge it as highly probable, even though this violates the 
w of probability of events.  
choose the tickets of a lottery, in 
omparison to the case in which the tickets were distributed by the organizers of the 
e subjects that had bought the 
ttery ticket were ready to sell it to someone else. The main result was that those who 
ad chosen the ticket established an average selling price that was four times higher 
an that established by the subjects who had received a ticket chosen by others. 
 is evident from the point of view of probability theory that all tickets are equivalent. 
evertheless the subjects who made the choice of the ticket think to be able to exercise 
some form of control on the results, in opposition to the others, which think instead that 
the results are determined exclusively by chance.  
 
lo
The description of Linda made her seem like a feminist, so that being a bank teller and a 
feminist seemed a more natural description, and thus more representative of Linda, than 
simply being a bank teller.  
 
Langer and Roth (1975) have investigated a phenomenon known as “illusion of control. 
It is a systematic tendency usually related to the emission of a judgment, on the basis of 
which individuals have an expectation (or subjective probability) of personal success in 
a certain task, which is superior to what the objective circumstances allow.  
Langner (1975), for example, observed in an experiment the effects that derived from 
giving to the subjects the possibility to personally 
c
lottery. 
The dependent variable consisted in the price for which th
lo
h
th
It
N
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The reasoning modality that brings subjects to judge uncertain events whose outcome is 
known at the moment of judgment, by making an ex-post judgment of facts previously 
occurred is known as hindsight (Fischhof, 1975). 
Two are the characteristics of this cognitive process. Once the outcome of the uncertain 
event is known, individuals tend to consider that outcome as inevitable.  
In other words, when making ex-post judgments individuals tend to exaggerate what 
could have been anticipated in an ex-ante prediction task.  
 
Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory (1979), originally developed as a model of 
choice under uncertainty, constitutes the first organic proposal of an alternative theory 
to SEUT, which can account for many of the anomalies described in this chapter and in 
chapter 1.3.2. 
In Prospect Theory the overall value of a prospect (x, p; y,q), where an individual can 
obtain x with probability p and y with probability q or maintain the status quo with 
probability (1-p-q) is expressed in terms of two scales, π  and v. The first scale, π , 
associates with each probability p a decision weight π (p), which reflects the impact of 
p on the overall value of the prospect. However, π  is not a probability measure, and it 
ill be shown later that π (p)+πw (1-p) is typically less than unity. The second scale, v, 
ssigns to each outcome x a number v(x), which reflects the subjective value (or utility) 
f that outcome. As mentioned in chapter 1.2, the outcomes are defined relative to a 
a
o
reference point, which could be the status quo, or an aspiration level, or an expectation, 
and which serves as the zero point of the value scale. Hence, v measures the value of 
deviations from the reference point, i.e., gains and losses.  
Analogously to the utility models, the prospect theory gives a fundamental equation 
which describes the way in which π  is combined with v: 
 
V(x, p; y,q) = π (p)v(x)+ π (q)v(y)   
 
The value function describes the value for the individual of some change in asset; in 
other words, v measures the value of the positive or negative deviations produced by the 
outcomes of the prospect with respect to a neutral reference point which constitutes the 
 173 
 
point zero. Kahneman and Tversky (1979a) stress that the salience of changes from 
reference points is a basic aspect of human nature: “An essential feature of the present 
he evaluation of changes or differences rather 
an to the evaluation of absolute magnitudes. When we respond to attributes such as 
nt context of experience defines 
reference point, and stimuli are perceived in relation to this 
ference point. Thus, an object at a given temperature may be experienced as hot or 
mply abject poverty for one person and great 
ches for another-depending on their current assets.”  
resents two fundamental characteristics (see Fig. 5.1). The first one 
 related to the fact that in the domain of gains, i.e., at the right the reference point, the 
te 
ifferent subjective values to relative welfare changes, as a function of the distance from 
ahnemen and Tversky (1979a) argue that diminishing sensitivity reflects a more 
 
theory is that the carriers of value are changes in wealth or welfare, rather than final 
states. This assumption is compatible with basic principles of perception and judgment. 
Our perceptual apparatus is attuned to t
th
brightness, loudness, or temperature, the past and prese
an adaptation level, or 
re
cold to the touch depending on the temperature to which one has adapted. The same 
principle applies to non-sensory attributes such as health, prestige, and wealth. The 
same level of wealth, for example, may i
ri
 
The value function p
is
function is concave, while in the losses domain, i.e. at the left of the reference point, the 
function is convex. This pattern of the curve is due to the fact that people attribu
d
the reference point. People are more sensible to changes located near the reference 
point, than to changes located further away. 
People indeed, seem to appreciate more the possibility to win or lose the difference 
between $100 and $200 than the possibility to win or lose the difference between 
$1.100 and $1.200 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984)  
 
K
fundamental feature of human cognition and motivation: 
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Fig. 5.1 The value function 
 
Value 
 
The value function is concave for gains and convex for losses. It changes abruptly slope in proximity of 
the reference point. 
Losses Gains 
 
 
 
“Many sensory and perceptual dimensions share the property that the psychological 
response is a concave function of the magnitude of physical change.  
For example, it is easier to discriminate between a change of 3 nd a change of 6 in 
room temperature, th
a
an it is to discriminate between a change of 13 and a change of 16. 
e propose that this principle applies in particular to the evaluation of monetary 
hanges. Thus, the difference between a gain of 100 and a gain of 200 appears to be 
greater than the difference between a gain of 1.100 and a gain of 1.200. Similarly, the 
difference between a loss of 100 and a loss of 200 appears greater than the difference 
between a loss of 1.100 and a loss of 1.200, unless the larger loss is intolerable. Thus, 
we hypothesize that the value function for changes of wealth is normally concave above 
W
c
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the reference point […] and often convex below it […] That is, the marginal value of 
oth gains and losses generally decreases with their magnitude.”  
The shape of the curve, concave for gains and convex for losses, implies that people are 
risk averse in the domain of gains and risk loving in the domain of losses. If subjects are 
given the possibility to choose between: 
 
-win $1.000 with probability 50%, or winning nothing; 
-winning for sure $500 
 
they tend to choose the certain option showing to be risk averse. If, instead, subjects are 
given the possibility to choose between a couple of options with the same expected 
value, but which imply losses, such as: 
 
-lose $1.000 with 50% probabilities, or losing nothing; 
-lose for sure $500 
 
ey tend to prefer the risky option, showing a behavior opposite to the precedent, i.e. 
he second characteristic of the function concerns “loss aversion”. The value curve 
creases less rapidly in the gains domain than it diminishes in the losses domain. This 
: “They do not obey the probability axioms and they should 
ot be interpreted as measures of degree of belief. Consider a gamble in which one can 
win 1.000 or nothing, depending on the toss of a fair coin. For any reasonable person, 
b
th
they are risk seeking (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).  
 
T
in
is due to the fact that the pleasure intensity that individuals experience when they win a 
certain amount of money is smaller than the displeasure intensity they experience when 
they lose the same amount of money (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). So, for example, 
most people find symmetric bets of the form (x, .50; -x, .50) distinctly unattractive.  
 
In prospect theory, the value of each outcome is multiplied by a decision weight. 
Kahneman and Tversky stress the fact that decision weights should not be confused 
with subjective probabilities
n
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the probability of winning is .50 in this situation. This can be verified in a variety of 
ways, e.g., by showing that the subject is indifferent between betting on heads or tails, 
or by his verbal report that he considers the two events equiprobable. As will be shown 
below, however, the decision weight π (.50) which is derived from choices is likely to 
be smaller than .50. Decision weights measure the impact of events on the desirability 
of prospects, and not merely the perceived likelihood of these events.” The authors 
describe the weighting function π  as an increasing function of p, with 0)0( =π  and 
1)1( =π . 
The decision weights moreover are characterised by “subcertainty”, a phenomenon 
which captures an essential element of people’s attitudes to uncertain events, namely 
that the sum of the weights associated with complementary events is typically less than 
the weight associated with certain event. 
Kahneman and Tversky hypothesize a curve like the one reported in Fig. 5.2 in which 
obabilities, while for high probabilities there is an 
nderestimation. 
eir ability to comprehend and evaluate 
and, the gap existing between high probabilities and 
ertainty tends to be neglected or to be amplified. Consequently, 
the decision weights don’t increase linearly with the increase of probabilities, even 
though they are regressive in relation to the latter. 
The decision weights are always lower than the correspondent values of objective 
probabilities, with the exception of those in proximity of the end points. In these points 
there’s an overestimation of low pr
u
This curious pattern of the curve is determined by the evaluation of extreme 
probabilities. Because people are limited in th
extreme probabilities, they tend to assign negligeable importance to very improbable 
events or, on the contrary, estimate their probabilities to be much higher than they 
actually are. On the other h
π  is not well-behaved c
near the endpoints.  
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 Fig. 5.2 Weighting function 
 
.5 
1.0 Decision 
weight: )( pπ  
.5 1.0 0 
Probability: p 
 
The decision weights are always lower than the correspondent values of objective probabilities, with the 
exception of those in proximity of the end points. In these po
probabilities, while for high probabilities there is an underestim
ints there’s an overestimation of low 
ation. 
an 
arly phase of editing and a subsequent phase of evaluation. The editing phase consists 
here the latter are organized and re-
mulated so as to yield a simpler representation of the choice problem. In the second 
re evaluated and the prospect of highest value is chosen. 
 outcomes and 
robabilities associated with the offered prospects. The major operations of the editing 
 
 
In the Prospect Theory the choice process is supposed to be divided in two phases: 
e
in a preliminary analysis of the offered prospects, w
fo
phase, the edited prospects a
Editing consists in the application of several operations that transform the
p
phase are described below.  
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Coding: as already mentioned, people normally perceive outcomes as gains and losses, 
rather than as final states of wealth or welfare. Gains and losses, of course, are defined 
ions of the decision maker. 
n operation which allows to isolate the non-risk components of 
ecisions from those implying risk. For example, the prospect (300, .80; 200, .20) is 
oice between (200, .20; 100, .50; -50, .30) and (200, .20; 
50, .50; -100, .30) can be reduced by cancellation to a choice between (100, .50; -50, 
 a prospect (201, .49)  would 
e simplified in (200, .50) 
nated without further considerations.  
relative to some neutral reference point. The reference point usually corresponds to the 
current asset position, in which case gains and losses coincide with the actual amounts 
that are received or paid. However, the location of the reference point, and the 
consequent coding of outcomes as gains or losses, can be affected by the formulation of 
the offered prospects, and by the expectat
 
Combination: Through combination equivalent outcomes are grouped together. 
Prospects, for example, can sometimes be simplified by combining the probabilities 
associated with identical outcomes. For example, the prospect (200, .25; 200, .25) will 
be reformulated as (200, .50) and evaluated in this form.  
 
Segregation: this is a
d
naturally decomposed into a sure gain of 200 and the risky prospect (100, .80). 
Similarly, the prospect (-400, .40; -100, .60) is readily seen to consist of a sure loss of 
100 and of the prospect (-300, .40). 
 
Cancellation: The components which are shared by the offered prospects can be 
eliminated through the cancellation operation.  
For example, the choice the ch
1
.30) and (150, .50; -100, .30). 
 
Simplification: this operation yields as a result the approximation of the probabilities or 
of the alternatives nominal values or of both. For example,
b
Dominance consists in determining which prospects are dominated by others, and the 
first are elimi
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From the editing of prospects depend many of the anomalies of preference. For 
example, some intransitivities of choice are explained by a simplification that eliminates 
small differences between prospects. More generally, the preference order between 
rospects could vary across contexts, because the same offered prospect could be edited 
ple of context-dependence, where 
probably their most famous experiment, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) 
roposed to two different groups of subjects a choice between two alternative programs 
unusual Asian disease expected to kill 600 people in the U.S.  
ernative programs to combat an unusual Asian disease expected to kill 
h on e do you choose? 
s with 1/3 probabilities, save 0 lives with 2/3 probabilities 
he second group received the following problem: 
, showing a clear preference for 
acceptable the sure death of 400 in comparison to the probable death of all 600 people, 
p
in different ways depending on the context in which it appears. Tversky and Kahneman 
(1982) called this phenomenon “framing” and in a series of experiments demonstrated  
how normatively inconsequential changes in the formulation of choice problems 
significantly affect preferences. These effects are noteworthy because they are sizable 
(sometimes complete reversals of preference), and because they violate important tenets 
of rationality.  
Framing can be considered an extreme exam
preference reversal occurs simply by modifying the description of (otherwise identical) 
sets of alternatives. 
In what is 
p
to combat an 
The first group received the following problem: 
There are two alt
600 people in the U.S. Whic
 
1st program: save 200 lives for sure (72% preferences) 
2nd program: save 600 live
 
T
 
1st program: 400 die for sure 
2nd program: 600 die with 2/3 probabilities, 0 die with 1/3 probabilities    
 
In the first group, 72% of the subjects chose option A
the option with the certain outcome. 
In the second group, 78% of the subjects chose option D in that they considered less 
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even though the probability of the bad outcome was very high. In this case the 
individuals displayed a clear preference for the risky option. 
ved lives, and induces the construction of a 
rame characterised by gains; the second, instead is formulated in negative terms, and 
induces a frame characterised by losses. 
What this experiment shows is that, by structuring the problem in different ways, the 
reference point can be very easily manipulated, with dramatic effects on preference and 
choice. Individuals perceive alternatives in the lives saved version as gains with respect 
to a reference point represented by the death of 600 people if nothing is done. On the 
contrary, in the lives lost version, the two programs are encoded in terms of the losses 
they yield with respect to a reference point represented by the current situation in which 
nobody has yet died. 
 
Another example of inconsistency related to the editing of problems is the one referred 
to as “isolation effect”. In order to simplify the choice between alternatives, people 
often disregard components that the alternatives share, and focus on the components 
that distinguish them. This approach to choice problems may produce inconsistent 
preferences, because a pair of prospects can be decomposed into common and 
distinctive components in more than one way, and different decompositions sometimes 
lead to different preferences.  
 
For example, let’s consider the following game which takes place in two stages: 
 
1st stage: there are 75% probabilities that the game is concluded without winning 
anything and 25% probabilities to get to the second stage; 
 
2nd stage: if this stage is reached you can choose between a sure gain of 3.000 and 
(4.000, .80). 
 
The two problems are in fact substantially identical; nevertheless they have induced 
different preferences because of the different formulation. The first problem is 
formulated in positive terms, referring to sa
f
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Note that in this game, one has a choice between .25 x.80 = .20 chance to win 4.000, 
nd a .25 x 1.0 = .25 chance to win 3.000. Thus, in terms of final outcomes and 
 was formulated in two stages, and second option when the problem was 
ects. The subjects 
 
erences conform to the assumption of risk aversion for positive prospects and risk 
when viewed in terms of final states, the 
roblems are identical. Specifically, 
 12 is obtained from problem 11 by adding 1.000 to the initial bonus, 
 all outcomes. Evidently, the subjects did not integrate the 
a
probabilities one faces a choice between (4.000, .20) and (3.000, .25).  
 
The interesting fact is that the great majority of the subject chose the first option when 
the problem
formulated in one stage. The subjects seem to act as if they ignored the first stage, 
probably, because it describes a characteristic common to both prosp
indeed were also asked to choose between: (4.000, .80) and a sure gain of 3.000 and the 
pattern of responses has been the same as in the two stages game, with the great 
majority of the subjects choosing the first option. 
The following two problems which were presented to two different groups of subjects 
give a further proof of how choices may be altered by varying the representation of 
outcomes. 
 
Problem 11: 
In addition to whatever you own, you have been given 1.000. You are now asked to 
choose between 
A(1.000, .50) and B: (500)  
 
Problem 12: In addition to whatever you own, you have been given 2.000. You are now 
asked to choose between 
C: (-1.000), .50), and D: (-500)  
 
The majority of subjects chose B in the first problem and C in the second. These
pref
seeking for negative ones. Note, however, that 
two choice p
A = (2.000, .50; 1.000, .50) = C, and B = (1.500) = D 
In fact, problem
and subtracting 1.000 from
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bonus with the prospects. T  the comparison of prospects 
ecause it was common to both options in each problem. 
The apparent neglect of a bonus that was common to both options in problems 11 and 
12 implies that the carriers of value or utility are changes of wealth, rather than final 
asset positions that include current wealth.  
 
he bonus did not enter into
b
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5.2 Experiment  
 
 
The aim of this experiment is to test the hypothesis that one strategy people may adopt 
in order to simplify the process of decision making under risk is constituted by the 
categorization of the alternatives available to choice. 
 
To begin with I’ll give an example of a concrete situation where the general kind of 
problem I’m going to address could find an application. 
Imagine a person who is driving a car and has to decide how fast she wants to drive. On 
the road there’s a speed limit and she gets a ticket if the police catches her violating it. 
Her payoff, in the case that she doesn’t get any ticket, is assumed to be directly 
proportional to her speed (1 Km/h = 1 payoff unit), so that for her the faster the better. 
The situation described is depicted in Figure 5.3 (please note that the values in the 
figure, do not pretend to be representative of reality; as mentioned above, this is just an 
example of the class of situations to which the general problem I’m addressing could be 
applied). 
m speed of 85 Km/h. The dotted line represents 
er speed (and payoff) in the case that she decides to observe the speed limit. If she 
ecides to violate the speed limit, i.e. she chooses one point above the dotted line, she 
d line, or above it, and in this latter case how far above.  
On the abscissa are represented all the possible speed limits and on the ordinate how 
fast the person actually chooses to drive. It is assumed that, because of technological 
limitations, her car can reach a maximu
h
d
has 10% probabilities to be caught by the police, and in this case she gets a ticket of 15 
payoff-units for every 5 Km/h above the speed limit.  
The decision she has to make in correspondence of each speed limit is whether to 
choose a point on the dotte
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Fig. 5.3 The speed problem 
 
 
On the abscissa are represented all the
actually chooses to drive. It is assume
 possible speed limits and on the ordinate how fast the person 
d that, because of technological limitations, her car can reach a 
aximum speed of 85 Km/h. The dotted line represents the speed (and payoff) in the case that the person 
decides to observe the speed limit. 
 
 can also be interpreted as a situation in which a person has to pay 
 certain amount of taxes and she has to decide how much she actually wants to pay and 
how much she wants to evade. In the case she decides to evade and she gets caught she 
ets a fine proportional to the amount evaded. Her payoff, in the case that she doesn’t 
85 
m
 
This kind of problem
a
g
get caught, is assumed to be directly proportional to the taxes she actually pays (-1 tax 
unit = -1 payoff unit), so that for her the more she pays the worse it is. This situation is 
described in Fig. 5.4.  
 
 
Speed limit 
Speed 
0 
75 
75 0 
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Fig. 5.4 The taxes problem 
he dotted line represents 
ow much she should pay (i.e. her payoff) in the case that she decides to comply.  
0 
-10 
-85 
Amount 
ayed p
-10 -85 
Taxes to be payed 
 
 On the abscissa is represented the amount of taxes the person is supposed to pay, and on the ordinate the 
amount of taxes she actually decides to pay. The dotted line represents how much she should pay (i.e. her 
payoff in the case that she decides to comply).  
 
 
This problem is conceptually identical to the “speed problem”, it is only framed in 
negative terms, i.e. the only difference is that here we deal with negative numbers 
(losses) (even in this case holds the remark that the values used do not pretend to be 
representative of reality).  
On the abscissa is represented the amount of taxes the person is supposed to pay, and on 
the ordinate the amount of taxes she actually decides to pay. T
h
If she decides to evade i.e. she chooses one point above the dotted line, she has 10% 
probabilities to be caught, and in this case she gets a fine of 15 payoff-units for every 5 
taxes-units she evaded.  
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The decision she has to make, in correspondence of each amount of taxes she is 
supposed to pay, is whether to choose a point on the dotted line, or above it, and in this 
latter case how far above.  
 
Formally the two problems can be represented in the following way: 
 
x :  actual speed (actual amount of taxes payed) 
 speed limit (amount of taxes to be payed) b :
p : probability to be fined  
a :  fine coefficient for speeding (evading taxes) 
:  
:  
:  ected 
 
The expected payoff of the person is comp d a o s
 
y
baxpxy
bxxy
xy
s
g
⋅+⋅=
−+⋅=
−=
=
)1(
))((1(
)
 
 
The expected utility is given by: 
sy payoff when fined 
payoff when not fined gy
y exp payoff 
ute s f llow  : 
bapxap−
xp− )
a− (
−⋅
 
)()1())1(()(
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from which follows: 
 
)
x
EU =∂
∂
 
( gy) U1()s(y)a1( pUp ′⋅−+′⋅−⋅  
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 The m na uti tie d al s it  (a
higher utility); the fine therefor u be fe e ly e the firs rm  
the equ n tive). 
 
If a = 4 d = 0  (  in our xam
 
y 06,0=  
argi l li s of s  any  gy  are way  pos ive  higher payoff always yields a 
e co ld  ef ctiv  on  wh n a 1 (> t te  of
atio  is nega
 an p ,1 as  e ple): 
bx + 4,
)(9,0)(3,0
)(9,0)(1,)(
gs
gs
yUyU
x
EU
yUyEU
′⋅+′⋅−=∂
⋅
 
oses, in the case that she doesn’t observe the 
e 
hoose f coincides with her actual speed, i.e. 25 
(firs a 
sp e 
police (10% probabilities) and then her final n 
co on ing to s t
0= yU⋅ +
∂
 
The marginal expected utility is positive only when the marginal utility of the payoff 
when fined ( sy ) is at most three times as high as the marginal utility of the payoff when 
not fined ( gy ). Therefore, if the person is risk loving or risk neutral, she should always 
drive as fast as possible (evade as much as possible). If the person is risk averse, her 
behavior cannot be predicted without knowing her utility function. 
 
In Tab. 5.1 are summarized the payoffs for every speed limit both in the case that the 
person gets caught by the police and that she doesn’t get caught. The fat numbers on the 
diagonal represent the speed limits. The fat numbers in the first column represent the 
actual speed she chooses to drive. If she decides to observe the speed limit, or if she 
decides not to observe it and she doesn’t get caught by the police, her actual speed 
coincides also with her payoff. The numbers above each speed limit represent her 
payoff for every speed she actually cho
corresponding speed limit and she gets caught by the police. So, for example, let’s 
suppose she is on a road where the speed limit is 25 Km/h (on the diagonal). If sh
c s to observe the speed limit her payof
t column). If she chooses not to observe the speed limit and drive for example at 
eed of 75 Km/h (first column), there are 2 possibilities: 1) she gets caught by th
payoff (inclusive of ticket) is –125 (colum
rresp d  a peed limi  of 25 Km/h and row corresponding to an actual speed of 
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75 Km/h); 2) she doesn’t get caught by the police (90% probabilities); then her final 
pa r actu e i.
 
Table 5.2 represents her expected payoff  s  in 
correspondence of every speed limit. As in table one, t a al 
rep its and the fat numbers in the f nt 
her actua speed (and expected payoff if she decides to observ the p
nu rs bove t  sp d limits in this case represent the expected payoffs. So, for 
xample, if the speed limit is 25 Km/h and she decides to observe it, her expected 
ayoff is also 25. If she decides not to observe it and to drive, for instance 75Km/h, then 
er exp
 
 
 
Tab. 5.1 Payoffs in the speed problem 
 
85 25 5 -15 -35 -55
yoff coincides with he al sp ed, e. 75 (first column).  
for the peed she actually chooses 
he f t numbers on the diagon
resent all the possible speed lim  irst column represe
l e  s eed limit). The 
mbe a he ee
e
p
h ected payoff is 55. 
45 -75 -95 -115 -135 -155 -175 -195 -215 -235 -255
80 40 -20 -40 -6060 20 0 -80 -100 -120 -140 -160 -180 -200 -220 -240
75 75 55  -5 -25 -45 -6535 15 -85 -105 -125 -145 -165 -185 -205 -225
70 70 -10 -30 -50 -7050 30 10 -90 -110 -130 -150 -170 -190 -210
65   25 5 -15 -35 -55 -7565 45 -95 -115 -135 -155 -175 -195
60    40 20 0 -20 -40 -60 -8060 -100 -120 -140 -160 -180
55    55 35 15 -5 -25 -45 -65 -85 -105 -125 -145 -165
50    50 30 10 -10 -30 -50 -70 -90 -110 -130 -150
45    45 25 5 -15 -35 -5 -7 -95 5 5 -115 -135
40    40 20 0 -20 -40 -60 -80 -100 -120
35    35 15 -5 -25 -45 -65 -85 -105
30    30 10 -10 -30 -50 -70 -90
25    25 5 -15 -35 -55 -75
20    20 0 -20 -40 -60
15     15 -5 -25 -45
10      10 -10 -30
5       5 -15
0       0
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Tab. 5.2 Expected payoffs in the speed problem 
 
85 81 79 77 75 73 71 69 67 65 63 61 59 57 55 53 51 
80 78 76 74 72 70 68 66 64 62 60 58 56 54 52 50 48 
75 75 73 71 69 67 65 63 61 59 57 55 53 51 49 47 45 
70  70 68 66 64 62 60 58 56 54 52 50 48 46 44 42 
65   65 63 61 59 57 55 53 51 49 47 45 43 41 39 
60    60 58 56 54 52 50 48 46 44 42 40 38 36 
55    55 53 51 49 47 45 43 41 39 37 35 33 
50     50 48 46 44 42 40 38 36 34 32 30 
45      45 40 41 39 37 35 27 24 29 27 
40      40 38 36 34 32 30 28 26 24 
35      35 33 31 29 27 25 23 21 
30      30 28 26 24 22 20 18 
25      25 23 21 19 17 15 
20      20 18 16 14 12 
15      15 13 11 9 
10      10 8 6 
5       5 3 
0        0 
 
 
In Tab. 5.3 are summarized her payoffs for every amount of taxes for both cases that she 
is and that she is not fined. The fat numbers on the diagonal represent the taxes due. The 
fat numbers in the first column represent the actual amount of taxes she chooses to pay. 
 she decides to comply, or if she decides to evade and she is not fined, the amount she 
xes-units (-60 on the diagonal). If she chooses to comply her payoff coincides with the 
mount she actually paid, i.e. -60 (first column). If she chooses to evade, and actually 
ays for example only -10 taxes-units (-10 in the first column), there are 2 possibilities: 
) she is fined (10% probabilities) and then her final payoff (inclusive of fine) is –210 
(column corre esponding to -10 actually paid); 
) she isn’t fined (90% probabilities) and then her final payoff coincides with the actual 
amount she paid, i.e. -10 (first column).  
Tab. 5.4 represents her expected payoff for the taxes she actually chooses to pay in 
correspondence of every amount due. As in Tab. 5.3, the fat numbers on the diagonal  
If
actually decided to pay coincides also with her payoff. The numbers above each amount 
of taxes due represent her payoff for every amount she actually chooses to pay, in the 
case that she evades and she is fined. So, for example, let’s suppose she has to pay -60 
ta
a
p
1
sponding to –60 taxes due, and row corr
2
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Tab. 5.3 Payoffs in the taxes problem 
 
0 -40 -60 -80 -100 -120 -140 -160 -180 -200 -220 -240 -260 -280 -300 -320 -340
-5 -25 -45 -65 -85 -105 -125 -145 -165 -185 -205 -225 -245 -265 -285 -305 -325
-10 -10 -30 -50 -70 -90 -110 -130 -150 -170 -190 -210 -230 -250 -270 -290 -310
-15  -15 -35 -55 -75 -95 -115 -135 -155 -175 -195 -215 -235 -255 -275 -295
-20  -20 -40 -60 -80 -100 -120 -140 -160 -180 -200 -220 -240 -260 -280
-25   -25 -45 -65 -85 -105 -125 -145 -165 -185 -205 -225 -245 -265
-30    -30 -50 -70 -90 -110 -130 -150 -170 -190 -210 -230 -250
-35    -35 -55 -75 -95 -115 -135 -155 -175 -195 -215 -235
-40    -40 -60 -80 -100 -120 -140 -160 -180 -200 -220
-45    -45 -65 -85 -105 -125 -145 -165 -185 -205
-50    -50 -70 -90 -110 -130 -150 -170 -190
-55    -55 -75 -95 -115 -135 -155 -175
-60    -60 -80 -100 -120 -140 -160
-65    -65 -85 -105 -125 -145
-70     -70 -90 -110 -130
-75      -75 -95 -115
-80       -80 -100
-85       -85
 
 
Tab. 5.4 Expected payoffs in the taxes problem 
 
0 -4 -6 -8 -10 -12 -14 -16 -18 -20 -22 -24 -26 -28 -30 -32 -34
-5 -7 -9 -11 -13 -15 -17 -19 -21 -23 -25 -27 -29 -31 -33 -35 -37
-10 -10 -12 -14 -16 -18 -20 -22 -24 -26 -28 -30 -32 -34 -36 -38 -40
-15  -15 -17 -19 -21 -23 -25 -27 -29 -31 -33 -35 -37 -39 -41 -43
-20  -20 -22 -24 -26 -28 -30 -32 -34 -36 -78 -42 -44 -46 -48
-25   -25 -27 -29 -31 -33 -35 -37 -39 -41 -43 -45 -47 -49
-30    -30 -32 -34 -36 -38 -40 -42 -44 -46 -48 -50 -52
-35    -35 -37 -39 -41 -43 -45 -47 -49 -51 -53 -55
-40    -40 -42 -44 -46 -48 -50 -52 -54 -56 -58
-45    -45 -47 -49 -51 -53 -55 -57 -59 -61
-50    -50 -52 -54 -56 -58 -60 -62 -64
-55    -55 -57 -59 -61 -63 -65 -67
-60    -60 -62 -64 -66 -68 -70
-65    -65 -67 -69 -71 -73
-70     -70 -72 -74 -76
-75      -75 -77 -79
-80       -80 -82
-85       -85
 
represent all the possible amounts of taxes due and the fat numbers in the first column 
represent the amount she actually pays (and expected payoff if she decides to comply). 
he numbers above the amounts due represent the expected payoffs. So, for example, if T
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she is supposed to pa ply, her expected payoff 
 also -60. If she decides to evade, and to pay, for instance, only –10 taxes-units, then 
her expected payoff is -30. 
 
 
Hypothesis 
y –60 taxes-units and she decides to com
is
 
 
My hypothesis is that a phenomenon similar to the CP demonstrated for physical stimuli 
(see chapter 2.3) might take place also in the field of decision making under risk. Let’s 
consider just the “speed problem“ since for the “taxes problem” holds exactly the same 
reasoning (I chose to carry out the experiments with both a positive and a negative 
frame for an additional purpose which will be explained later in more detail; concerning 
the main hypothesis of the experiment, the distinction between positive and negative 
frame is irrelevant, so that I will neglect it for the rest of the chapter).  
For simplicity I reproduce in Fig. 5.5 the decision problem corresponding to only one 
(25 Km/h) of the speed limits (for all others holds exactly the same reasoning) 
represented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. 
The last number on the bottom represents the speed limit. The numbers in the left 
column represent the speed the person actually chooses (and her payoff in the case that 
she observes the speed limit or that she doesn’t get caught when speeding (90% 
probabilities)), and the numbers in the right column represent her payoff in the case that 
he gets caught when speeding (10%probabilities). Her task is to choose which speed 
lls in the left column. 
s
she actually wants to drive, i.e. one of the ce
 
The hypothesis I want to test is that people, when facing such a problem, don’t actually 
use the optimizing alghorithm previously described, with which they compute and 
compare the expected utilities of each option and than choose the option yielding the      
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Fig. 5.5 Example for a speed limit of 25 
mit. 
 
90% 10% 
85 -155
80 -140
75 -125
70 -110
65 -95
60 -80
40 -20
5 25
55 -65
50 -50
45 -35
   
Here is reproduced, as an example, the decision problem for the 25 km/h speed li
 
35 -5
30 10
2
 
highest expected utility; rather they simplify the choice problem by categorizing the set 
of options available into two subsets: risk options / no risk options (with this second 
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subset containing only the sure option), and then make their decisions on the basis of 
these two categories (see Fig. 5.6).  
 
Fig. 5.6 Categorization of the options 
 
85 -
65 -95
5
-2
-
1
155
80 -140
75 -125
70 -110
60 -80
55 -65
50 -50
 
All available options are categorized in risk/no risk. 
 
By saying that people categorize the set of options available, it is meant that people 
perceive the options within a category as identical, or at least as much more similar and 
closer to one another than they really are, and the options belonging to different 
categories as more di ey actually are. If this fferent and distant from one another than th
45 -3
40 0
35 5
30 0
25 25
Risk 
No risk 
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is the case, i.e. the options within the category “risk” are treated as equivalent to one 
another, then the choice problem described in Fig. 5.5 reduces to a simpler choice 
 
xperimental design
problem with only two available alternatives: risk / no risk.  
 
E  
 
ination task. The subjects were requested to discriminate among physical stimuli 
ile at the boundary 
 
iminate between stimuli within the same category but could discriminate between 
ance as well. Neverth
s o
th
in
t describe the structure of the experiment, and subsequently explain in more 
e round , 
 
As we have seen in chapter 2.3, the research in psychophysics has demonstrated the
phenomenon of CP for physical stimuli mainly through experiments involving a 
discrim
drawn from a continuum, and it was shown that within some regions of the continuum 
the discrimination performance was very bad (near to chance), wh
between these regions the discrimination performance displayed a peak; people couldn’t
discr
stimuli belonging to two different categories, although the physical distance between 
the stimuli was the same. The continuum, in other words was perceived in a discrete 
(categorical) way.  
In order to demonstrate the phenomenon of categorical perception in the domain of 
decision making under risk, I based my experiments on the analysis of a discrimination 
perform eless, because of the different nature of the stimuli I’m 
dealing with, it has been necessary to develop a new experimental method in order to 
infer the ability of subject  to discriminate am ng risky options. 
 
The basic idea of the me od I developed has been to infer the subjects’ ability to 
discrim ate among risky options by comparing their decisions in two different rounds. 
I’ll firs
detail the logic that underlies it.  
The experiment was structured in thre s. In the first round each subject was 
presented, for each of the possible speed limits, a table like the one depicted in Fig. 5.5. 
For each table he had to choose one of the cells in the left column.  
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It is important to note that, in order to prevent the results of the experiments from being 
contaminated by uncontrollable psychological effects, and to keep the validity of the 
results as general as possible, the subjects weren’t told any cover story, i.e. they weren’t 
told anything about driving, speed limits, or taxes. The only information they received 
as that the numbers in each table corresponded to money they could win (or lose), and 
abilities), then they would win exactly the number they had chosen; if the ticket 
ve the experimenter 
prob
c  different sheet had been 
repared, based on the answers given in the first round.  
5, and in the first round the subject has chosen to drive 75. For 
 
 
 
w
that they had to chose one number in the left column; then a lottery would have been 
made for each table: a ticket would have been extracted from an urn containing 9 tickets 
with a circle and one with a cross. If one ticket with the circle was extracted (90% 
prob
with the cross was extracted (10% probabilities), then they would win the corresponding 
number in the right column. 
 
In the second round of the experiment the subjects were given a 20 minutes distraction 
task (some questions taken from an intelligence test), in order to move their attention 
away from the decisions they had made in the first round, and to gi
the necessary time to fill in the question sheet for the third round. 
 
In the third round the subjects were presented a sheet containing various binary choice 
lems that were logically equivalent to the choice problems of the first round; only 
the presentation format was different. For each subje t a
p
In order to understand how the choice problems of the third round were structured, let’s 
consider the example depicted in Fig. 5.7.  
The speed limit is 2
simplicity the cells have been numerated in such a way that the bottom one always 
corresponds to step 0 and the others, in succession, to steps 1, 2, 3, 4, …, n. Following 
this numeration the subject in our example has chosen step 10 in the first round.  
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Fig. 5.7 Binary choices in the third session 
 
 
If the subject has chosen step 10 in the first round, in the third round he has to make three binary choices 
between: step 10 and step 9;  step 10 and step 1;  step 10 and step 0. 
 
 
 
 the third round the subject has to face the following three binary choices (the subject 
as requested to choose between option A and B):  
 
 
S12
S11
S10
S9
S8
S7
S6
S5
S4
S3
S2
S1
S0
85 -155
80 -140
75 -125
70 -110
65 -95
60 -80
55 -65
50 -50
45 -35
40 -20
35 -5
30 10
25 25
0,i
1,i
1, −ii
In
w
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 1) A) 75 (90%),  -125 (10%)         B) 70 (90%), -110 (10%) 
2) A) 75 (90%), -125 (10%)          B) 30 (90%), 10 (10%) 
) A) 75 (90%), -125 (10%)          B) 25 (100%) 
nd step 1;  the third one is 
 the step chosen by the subject in the first round. For those tables 
3
 
The first binary choice is equivalent to a choice between step 10 and step 9 in Fig. 5.7; 
the second one is equivalent to a choice between step 10 a
equivalent to a choice  between step 10 and step 0. 
Generalising from our example to all tables relative to the other speed limits, be step i , 
with ni ,...2,1,0=
where 3≥i  the subject has to face in the third round the following three binary 
choices: 1) between step i  and step 1−i ; 2) between step i and step 1; 3) between 
step i  and step 0.  
For the tab  2=i the subject has to face only the following two binary les where
choices: 1) between step i  and step 1; 2) between step i  and step 0. For the tables 
where 1,0=i  the subject has to face only the following binary choice: between step 
1 and step 0. 
In general, the binary choices between step i and step 1−i  (which, for simplicity, 
from now on will be designated as choices 1, −ii , and between step i  and step 1 
rom now on choices ), represent choices among options within the category risk, 
e. the subject always has to choose betwee o risky o The fat lines in Fig. 5.7 
, the binary choices 
etween step  and step 0, and between step 1 and step 0 represent between-category 
1,i(f
i. n tw ptions. 
correspond to choices within the category risk. On the contrary
ib
choices (from now on choices 0,i ), i.e. the subject always has to make a choice 
between a risky and a sure option. In Fig. 5.7 the thin line represents a between-category 
choice. 
 
If the subjects were perfectly rational and made their decisions on the basis of an 
optimizing algorithm, then the decisions made in the third round should always confirm 
those made in the first one, i.e. in our example the subject should always choose option 
A. 
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Let’s suppose, on the contrary, that the subjects, in order to simplify the decision 
problem, in the first round categorize the available options in risk/no risk options. Such 
a categorization would imply that the subjects treat all risky options as (almost) 
equivalent, and therefore are not able to discriminate among them. This in turn would 
uld expect to observe a confirmation rate 
imply that, in the case the subject has opted for the category risk, his choice, within this 
category, would be made (almost) at random. 
If this were the case, in the third round we sho
of the choices made in the first round of nearly 50% (signifying a random 
discrimination performance) for within-category choices (i.e. choices 1, −ii  and 
choices 1,i ), and a higher confirmation rate (signifying a peak in the discrimination 
erform nce) for between-category choices (i.e. choices ). 
students from the faculty of economics at 
fee plus an amount of money directly 
mance in the experiment. In order to avoid the problem of 
losses (in
ount of money to which the actual gains and 
losses have been respectively added or subtracted. Each subject
Euros.  
 
 
Results
a 0,ip
 
The experiment has been carried out with 32 
the University of Trento. A half of them was assigned to the positive frame and a half to 
the negative frame.  
The subjects have been paid a show-up 
proportional to their perfor
 which case it wasn't possible to force the subjects to pay money), the subjects 
have been endowed with an initial am
 could win up to 25 
 
 
In appendix B are repo d e o es  b each subject in the first and third round.  
 
 
 
 
rte  th  ch ic  made y 
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    Fig 5.8 Results 
mation rate for choices (between-category) than for choices  and 
(within-category) confirms that most of the subjects categorize the options in risk/no risk 
of subjects that has 
 
 
 
The higher confir
Si
Si-1
S1
0S
47%
 
 
74%
45% 
 0,i 1, −ii
1,i
 
 
In order to analyse the results, I first computed the proportion 
displayed a higher confirmation rate for choices 0,i (between-category choices) than 
for choices 1, −ii and 1,i (choices within the category “risk”). 
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The great majority of the subjects (72%) has displayed such a choice pattern, which is 
an indication that these subjects did in fact categorize the options available in risk/no 
sk. ri
In order to appreciate the entity of the categorization process within this group of  
subjects (see Fig. 5.8), I calculated the average confirmation rate for choices 1, −ii , 
for choices 1,i , and for choices 0,i . The rates resulted to be respectively: 45%, 47%, 
and 74%.  
The results indicate that the categorization effect has been strong even though we 
cannot speak of absolute categorization (in these latter case the average confirmation 
rates for the three types of choices should have been respectively 50%, 50% and 100%). 
This result, however is compatible with the research on psychophysics (chapter 2.3) 
which has shown that categorical perception is usually less than absolute. 
 
 
Further considerations in relation to the Prospect Theory 
 
The experiment has been carried out with a positive and a negative frame with the aim 
to collect  experimental evidence (in addition to that already existing in the literature) in 
relation to the tenets of the prospect theory. The latter, indeed, constitutes a theme of 
interest for this work in that at its basis we can find, again, a categorization process. The 
prospect theory states that people perceive losses and gains not in absolute terms, but 
rather in relation to a reference point. All the values above the reference point are 
categorized as the positive domain, i.e. the domain of gains, and all the values below the 
reference point are categorized as the negative domain, i.e. the domain of losses. The 
behavior of individuals changes as a function of this categorization; people are risk-
averse in the positive domain, and are risk-seeking in the negative domain and their 
value function changes abruptly slope in correspondence of the category boundary 
(reference point). 
The distinction made in the experiment between a positive and a negative frame, had in 
fact the purpose to compare the risk posture (in the aggregate) of the two groups of 
subjects in the positive and negative domain.  
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Of interest to this aim is the data collected in the 
third round cannot be useful to this urpose since every subject received a 
“per
 
In Tab. 5.5 is reported the numb e sure option, that each subject 
hose for each table in the positive frame.  
ect 
Tab. 5.5 Number of steps above the sure option (positive frame) 
only the first round of the experiment (
p
sonalized” task and therefore the results for the two groups are not comparable).  
er of steps above th
c
In Tab. 5.6 is reported the number of steps above the sure option, that each subj
chose for each table in the negative  frame. 
 
 
 
 Subject 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Table         
1  0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 0 0 2 
2  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 2 1 0 0 3 
3  0 4 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 2 0 0 4 4 
4  2 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 2 4 2 4 0 5 
5  0 0 6 0 3 0 0 3 4 0 6 3 3 1 4 6 
6  7 0 7 0 3 2 0 0 4 0 2 3 5 2 2 7 
7  8 1 8 0 3 3 3 0 8 8 0 0 3 1 3 8 
8  9 0 9 9 2 4 3 2 4 9 6 2 4 3 3 9 
9  8 3 10 0 2 1 0 10 5 3 0 7 6 2 2 10 
10  8 2 0 0 2 11 2 11 2 11 1 5 3 4 2 11 
11  10 0 12 3 1 0 6 12 1 12 1 5 5 2 0 12 
12  8 0 0 2 1 13 3 13 1 13 4 1 5 0 1 13 
13  11 1 0 4 0 1 1 14 2 14 7 1 7 0 1 14 
14  12 0 0 6 0 0 5 15 0 15 1 4 4 2 4 15 
15  13 0 0 3 0 16 5 16 0 16 2 7 6 1 6 16 
16  11 0 0 4 0 0 4 17 3 17 8 17 4 2 1 17 
 
 
frame have chosen 6,3 steps above the sure 
ption, which is a number significantly higher than in the positive frame, where the 
nce: p<0,01). 
 
 
In the average the subjects in the negative 
o
subjects chose in the average 3,8 steps above the sure option (Mann-Whitney U-test, 
asympt. significa
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Tab. 5.6 Number of steps above the sure option (negative frame) 
 
 Subject 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Table                  
1  2 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 
2  3 0 0 0 3 0 3 1 2 3 3 1 0 0 0 1 
3  4 0 0 0 4 3 4 2 0 4 3 1 0 3 0 1 
4  5 2 0 0 5 2 5 1 2 1 3 1 0 1 5 1 
5  6 0 2 6 6 5 6 2 5 6 1 2 0 3 6 2 
6  7 2 3 3 7 4 7 3 2 7 6 1 0 3 7 4 
7  8 4 4 0 8 8 8 2 7 8 5 3 0 3 8 3 
8  9 6 1 0 9 9 9 3 5 8 5 3 0 5 9 1 
9  10 7 5 8 10 9 10 4 5 8 6 7 0 5 10 3 
10  11 7 6 10 11 11 11 3 10 7 10 5 11 9 11 2 
11  12 7 6 12 12 7 12 4 10 9 7 3 12 7 12 11
12  13 6 6 9 13 0 13 4 9 8 8 11 13 9 13 1 
13  14 6 8 12 14 9 14 8 14 8 9 4 14 11 14 3 
14  15 6 3 0 9 14 15 7 13 10 9 11 15 11 15 4 
15  16 10 7 12 16 12 16 8 13 12 8 7 16 13 16 7 
16  17 9 7 1 17 14 17 8 15 11 9 10 17 15 17 17
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The results of the experiment seem to confirm the initial hypothesis that people try to 
simplify the decision task by categorizing the options available to choice into the two 
categories risk/no risk. The higher confirmation rate for choices 0,i (between-
category) than for choices 1, −ii  and 1,i (within-category) confirms that most of the 
ubjects cannot discriminate among the options within the category risk (i.e they treat 
thin this category as almost equivalent), and that the only relevant 
he choices made by the subjects in the first round of the experiment, moreover, have 
confirmed the tenets of the Prospect Theory. In the average the subjects have displayed 
a significantly higher propensity to risk when they had to deal with choices in the 
negative domain rather than in the positive domain. 
s
the options wi
decision they make is whether to take a risk or not.  
 
T
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Appendix A - Instructions 
 
Instructions for the ex making under risk 29 
You are taking part in an experiment aimed at analysing decision making under risk. 
For your participation you will be paid an amount of money directly proportional to the 
umber of points you will gain in the experiment. 
The experiment is divide ee last ou . 
 
First session
In the first session you will be assign 5 Euros our aim s to win many points as 
possible since every point will be converted in m
You’ve been given a sheet tainin rious t s each de of two columns. In the 
left column there re alway umbers from 0 to  In the t colu here are values 
that change from table to table. Your task is to choose, for each table, a number from the 
left column. If you choose the last number at  botto ou wil n a number of 
points corresponding to the number y hose. I stead y ecide oose a number 
above the last one ipat  a lotte a ticket l be ex ted from an urn 
containing 9 tickets with a circle and one ticket with a cross. If t extracted ticket 
presents a circle you will win a number of points corresponding to the number you 
chose in the left column; if  ticket ents the ross, you will win a number of points 
corresponding to e numb  the ri ber you chose. 
The extractions for each table will all be made at the end of the exper nt.   
 
Third session 
 
In this session you have to choose option A or B for each of the problems you have 
been submitted. 
                                                          
periment on decision 
(positive frame) 
 
n
d in thr  sessions and will  ab t 35 minutes
 
ed . Y  i  as 
oney. 
 con g va able  ma
 a s n  85.  righ mn t
 the m y l wi
ou c f in ou d to ch
, you will partic e in ry:  wil trac
he 
 the pres  c
th er in ght column next to the num
ime
29 The instructions of the second session have been omitted since the second session was irrelevant for the 
purposes of the experiment; it just served the aim to distract the subjects between the first and the thirs 
session.  
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Instructions for the experiment on decision making under risk 
(negative frame) 
 
You are taking part in an experiment aimed at analysing decision making under risk. 
For your participation you will be paid an amount of money directly proportional to the 
number of points you will gain in the experiment. 
The experiment is divided in three sessions and will last about 35 minutes. 
 
First session 
In the first session you will be assigned 30 Euros. Your aim is to loose as few points as 
possible since every point will be converted in money. 
You’ve been given a sheet containing various tables each made of two columns. In the 
left column there are always numbers from 0 to –85. In the right column there are 
values that change from table to table. Your task is to choose, for each table, a number 
from the left column. If you choose the last number at the b ttom you will lose anumber 
of points corresponding to the number you chose. If instead you decide to choose a 
number above the last one, you will participate in a lottery: a ticket will be extracted 
from an urn containing 9 tickets with a circle and one ticket with a cross. If the extracted 
ticket presents a circle you will lose a number of points corresponding to the number 
you chose in the left column; if the ticket presents the cross, you will lose a number of 
points corresponding to the number in the right column next to the number you chose. 
The extractions for each table will all be made at the end of the experiment.   
 
Third session 
 
In this session you have to choose option A or B for each of the problems you have 
been submitted 
 
o
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Appendix B 
 
Experimental results 
 
For each subject are reported the choice made in the first session in correspondence of 
each sure option (i.e. speed limit or amount of taxes to be paid), and the choices , 
 and  of the second session. 
 
 
 Sure 
option 
Choices in 
1st sess. 
Choices
1, −ii
1,i 0,i
1, −ii  
Choices Choices
1,i  0,i  
      
Subject 1 75 75   75 
 70 70   70 
 65 65   65 
 60 70  70 60 
 55 55   55 
 50 85 80 85 85 
 45 85 80 85 85 
 40 85 80 85 85 
 35 75 70 75 75 
 30 70 65 70 70 
 25 75 70 75 75 
 20 60 55 60 60 
 15 70 65 70 70 
 10 70 70 70 70 
 5 70 70 70 70 
 0 55 50 55 55 
      
Subject 2 75 75   80 
 70 70   70 
 65 85 80 70 85 
 60 60   60 
 55 55   60 
 50 50   50 
 45 50   50 
 40 40   45 
 35 50 45 40 50 
 30 40  35 30 
 25 25   30 
 20 20   20 
 15 20   15 
 10 10   10 
 5 5   10 
 0 0   0 
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Subject 3 75 85  80 85 
 70 70   75 
 65 85 85 85 65 
 60 60   60 
 55 85  60 55 
 50 85 80 55 85 
 45 85 85 50 45 
 40 85 85 45 85 
 35 85 80 85 85 
 30 30   35 
 25 85 80 85 85 
 20 20   20 
 15 15   15 
 10 10   10 
 5 5   10 
 0 0   5 
      
Subject 4 75 75   80 
 70 70   75 
 65 70   70 
 60 60   60 
 55 55   60 
 50 50   50 
 45 45   50 
 40 85 80 45 85 
 35 35   40 
 30 30   35 
 25 40 35 30 25 
 20 30  25 30 
 15 35 30 20 15 
 10 40 35 40 10 
 5 20 15 10 20 
 0 20 15 5 20 
      
Subject 5 75 75   75 
 70 70   70 
 65 65   70 
 60 80 75 65 60 
 55 70 70 60 55 
 50 65 60 55 50 
 45 60 55 50 45 
 40 50  45 40 
 35 45  40 45 
 30 40  35 30 
 25 30   25 
 20 25   20 
 15 15   15 
 10 10   15 
 5 5   5 
 0 0   0 
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Subject 6 75 75   75 
 70 70   70 
 65 65   65 
 60 60   60 
 55 55   55 
 50 60  55 50 
 45 60 55 50 45 
 40 60 55 45 60 
 35 40   35 
 30 85 80 35 85 
 25 25   25 
 20 85 85 25 85 
 15 20   15 
 10 10   10 
 5 85 80 10 85 
 0 0   5 
      
Subject 7 75 75   75 
 70 70   70 
 65 65   65 
 60 60   60 
 55 55   55 
 50 50   50 
 45 60 55 50 45 
 40 55 50 45 40 
 35 35   35 
 30 40  40 30 
 25 55 50 30 25 
 20 35 30 25 20 
 15 20   20 
 10 35 30 15 10 
 5 30 25 10 5 
 0 20 15 5 20 
      
Subject 8 75 75   75 
 70 70   70 
 65 65   65 
 60 80 75 80 60 
 55 70 65 60 55 
 50 50   50 
 45 45   45 
 40 50  45 50 
 35 85 85 40 85 
 30 85 85 85 85 
 25 85 85 85 85 
 20 85 80 85 85 
 15 85 85 85 85 
 10 85 85 85 85 
 5 85 80 85 85 
 0 85 85 85 85 
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Subject 9 75 75   75 
 70 70   70 
 65 65   65 
 60 60   60 
 55 75 70 75 55 
 50 70 65 55 50 
 45 85 80 50 85 
 40 60  55 40 
 35 60 55 40 60 
 30 40  35 30 
 25 30   25 
 20 25   20 
 15 25  20 15 
 10 10   10 
 5 5   5 
 0 15 15 5 15 
      
Subject 10 75 85  80 75 
 70 85 85 85 70 
 65 85 80 70 65 
 60 60   60 
 55 55   60 
 50 50   50 
 45 85 80 85 85 
 40 85 85 45 40 
 35 50 50 40 35 
 30 85 85 85 85 
 25 85 85 85 25 
 20 85 85 25 85 
 15 85 85 20 85 
 10 85 85 85 85 
 5 85 80 10 85 
 0 85 85 85 85 
      
Subject 11 75 85  80 85 
 70 85 80 75 85 
 65 70   70 
 60 70  65 60 
 55 85 80 60 85 
 50 60  55 50 
 45 45   45 
 40 70 65 45 40 
 35 35   40 
 30 35   30 
 25 30   30 
 20 40 40 25 20 
 15 50 45 20 15 
 10 15   15 
 5 15 10  15 
 0 40 40 5 40 
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Subject 12 75 75   80 
 70 80  80 80 
 65 75  75 75 
 60 80 80 80 80 
 55 70 70 70 70 
 50 65 65 65 65 
 45 45   50 
 40 50  50 50 
 35 70 65 40 70 
 30 60 60 60 30 
 25 50 50 30 25 
 20 25   25 
 15 20   15 
 10 30 30 15 10 
 5 40 35 10 5 
 0 85 80 85 0 
      
Subject 13 75 85  80 85 
 70 75   75 
 65 65   65 
 60 70  70 70 
 55 70 65 70 70 
 50 75 75 75 50 
 45 60 55 50 45 
 40 60 60 45 40 
 35 65 60 40 65 
 30 45 40 45 45 
 25 55 50 55 25 
 20 45 40 25 45 
 15 50 45 50 15 
 10 30 25 30 30 
 5 35 30 10 35 
 0 20 15 5 20 
      
Subject 14 75 75   75 
 70 70   70 
 65 65   65 
 60 80 75 80 60 
 55 60   55 
 50 60  55 60 
 45 50   45 
 40 55 50 45 40 
 35 45  40 45 
 30 50 45 35 30 
 25 35  30 35 
 20 20   20 
 15 15   15 
 10 20  15 10 
 5 10   5 
 0 10  5 0 
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Subject 15 75 75   75 
 70 70   70 
 65 85 85 70 65 
 60 60   60 
 55 75 70 60 55 
 50 60  55 50 
 45 60 55 50 60 
 40 55 50 55 40 
 35 45  40 45 
 30 40  35 30 
 25 25   25 
 20 25   20 
 15 20   15 
 10 30 25 15 10 
 5 35 30 10 5 
 0 5   0 
      
Subject 16 75 85  85 85 
 70 85 85 85 85 
 65 85 85 85 85 
 60 85 85 85 85 
 55 85 85 85 85 
 50 85 85 85 85 
 45 85 85 85 85 
 40 85 85 85 85 
 35 85 85 85 85 
 30 85 85 85 85 
 25 85 85 85 85 
 20 85 85 85 85 
 15 85 85 85 85 
 10 85 85 85 85 
 5 85 85 85 85 
 0 85 85 85 85 
      
Subject 17      
 -10 0  0 0 
 -15 0 0 0 0 
 -20 0 0 0 0 
 -25 0 0 0 0 
 -30 0 0 0 0 
 -35 0 0 0 0 
 -40 0 0 0 0 
 -45 0 0 0 0 
 -50 0 0 0 0 
 -55 0 0 0 0 
 -60 0 0 0 0 
 -65 0 0 0 0 
 -70 0 0 0 0 
 -75 0 0 0 0 
 -80 0 0 0 0 
 -85 0 0 0 0 
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Subject 18 -10 -10   -5 
 -15 -15   -10 
 -20 -20   -15 
 -25 -15  -15 -15 
 -30 -30   -25 
 -35 -25   -25 
 -40 -20 -20 -20 -20 
 -45 -15 -15 -15 -15 
 -50 -15 -15 -15 -15 
 -55 -20 -20 -20 -20 
 -60 -25 -25 -25 -25 
 -65 -35 -35 -35 -35 
 -70 -40 -40 -40 -40 
 -75 -45 -45 -45 -45 
 -80 -30 -30 -30 -30 
 -85 -40 -40  -40 
      
Subject 19 -10 -10   -5 
 -15 -15   -10 
 -20 -20   -15 
 -25 -25   -25 
 -30 -20  -25 -30 
 -35 -20 -25 -30 -20 
 -40 -20 -25 -35 -40 
 -45 -40   -40 
 -50 -25 -30 -45 -50 
 -55 -25 -25 -50 -55 
 -60 -30 -35 -55 -60 
 -65 -35 -35 -60 -65 
 -70 -30 -35 -65 -70 
 -75 -60 -65 -70 -60 
 -80 -45 -45 -75 -45 
 -85 -50 -50 -80 -85 
      
Subject 20 -10 -10   -5 
 -15 -15   -10 
 -20 -20   -15 
 -25 -25   -25 
 -30 0 0 0 0 
 -35 -20 -20 -20 -35 
 -40 -40   -35 
 -45 -45   -40 
 -50 -10 -10 -10 -10 
 -55 -5 -5 -50 -5 
 -60 0 -5 0 0 
 -65 -20 -20 -20 -20 
 -70 -10 -10 -10 -10 
 -75 -75   -75 
 -80 -20 -20 -20 -20 
 -85 -80   -80 
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Subject 21 -10 0  -5 -10 
 -15 0 0 -10 0 
 -20 0 -5 0 0 
 -25 0 0 0 0 
 -30 0 -5 0 0 
 -35 0 -5 0 0 
 -40 0 -5 0 0 
 -45 0 -5 0 0 
 -50 0 0 0 0 
 -55 0 0 0 0 
 -60 0 0 0 0 
 -65 0 -5 0 0 
 -70 0 0 0 0 
 -75 -30 -35 -30 -30 
 -80 0 0 0 0 
 -85 0 -5 0 0 
      
Subject 22 -10 0  0 0 
 -15 -15   -15 
 -20 -5 -5 -5 -20 
 -25 -15 -15  -25 
 -30 -5 -5 -25 -5 
 -35 -15 -15 -30 -15 
 -40 0 0 -35 0 
 -45 0 0 -40 0 
 -50 -5 -10 -45 -5 
 -55 0 0 0 -55 
 -60 -25 -25 -55 -25 
 -65 -65   -65 
 -70 -25 -30 -65 -25 
 -75 -5 -5 -5 -5 
 -80 -20 -20 -75 -80 
 -85 -15 -15 -15 -85 
      
Subject 23 -10 -5   -5 
 -15 0 0 0 0 
 -20 0 0 0 0 
 -25 0 0 0 0 
 -30 0 0 0 0 
 -35 0 0 0 0 
 -40 0 0 0 0 
 -45 0 0 0 0 
 -50 0 0 0 0 
 -55 0 0 0 0 
 -60 0 0 0 0 
 -65 0 0 0 0 
 -70 0 0 0 0 
 -75 0 0 0 0 
 -80 0 0 0 0 
 -85 0 0 0 0 
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Subject 24 -10 -10   -10 
 -15 -10   -10 
 -20 -10  -10 -20 
 -25 -20   -20 
 -30 -20  -20 -20 
 -35 -20 -25 -30 -20 
 -40 -30  -30 -30 
 -45 -30 -30 -40 -30 
 -50 -30 -30 -30 -30 
 -55 -40 -40 -40 -40 
 -60 -40 -40 -40 -40 
 -65 -45 -45 -45 -45 
 -70 -30 -30 -65 -30 
 -75 -40 -40 -40 -40 
 -80 -40 -40 -40 -40 
 -85 -45 -45 -45 -45 
      
Subject 25 -10 0  0 0 
 -15 -5  -5 -5 
 -20 -20   -20 
 -25 -15   -25 
 -30 -5 -5 -5 -30 
 -35 -25  -25 -35 
 -40 -5 -5 -35 -40 
 -45 -15 -15 -15 -45 
 -50 -25 -25 -45 -25 
 -55 -5 -5 -5 -5 
 -60 -10 -10 -55 -10 
 -65 -20 -20 -20 -20 
 -70 0 0 0 0 
 -75 -10 -10 -10 -10 
 -80 -15 -15 -15 -15 
 -85 -10 -10 -10 -10 
      
Subject 26 -10 0   0 
 -15 0 0 0 0 
 -20 0 0  0 
 -25 -20   -20 
 -30 0 0 0 0 
 -35 0 0 0 0 
 -40 0 0 0 0 
 -45 -5 -5 -5 -5 
 -50 -10 -10 -10 -10 
 -55 -20  -20 -20 
 -60 -15   -15 
 -65 -25 -25 -25 -25 
 -70 -30 -30 -30 -30 
 -75 -25 -25 -25 -25 
 -80 -20 -25 -20 -20 
 -85 -30 -30 -30 -30 
 214 
 
      
Subject 27 -10 0  0 0 
 -15 0 0 0 -15 
 -20 -5 -10 -5 -5 
 -25 -10 -10 -20 -10 
 -30 -25   -25 
 -35 -5 -10 -5 -35 
 -40 -15 -20 -35 -15 
 -45 -15 -20 -15 -15 
 -50 -20 -25 -20 -20 
 -55 -5 -5 -5 -5 
 -60 -25 -30 -25 -25 
 -65 -25 -30 -25 -25 
 -70 -25 -25 -25 -25 
 -75 -30 -35 -30 -30 
 -80 -40 -45 -40 -40 
 -85 -40 -45 -40 -40 
      
Subject 28 -10 -5   -5 
 -15 -10   -15 
 -20 -15   -20 
 -25 -20   -25 
 -30 -20  -25 -30 
 -35 -30   -35 
 -40 -25 -25 -25 -40 
 -45 -30 -30 -30 -30 
 -50 -15 -20 -45 -15 
 -55 -30 -35 -30 -55 
 -60 -45 -45 -55 -45 
 -65 -10 -10 -60 -10 
 -70 -50 -55 -65 -50 
 -75 -20 -20 -20 -20 
 -80 -45 -45 -45 -45 
 -85 -35 -35 -35 -35 
      
Subject 29 -10 -10   -10 
 -15 -15   -15 
 -20 -20   -20 
 -25 -25   -25 
 -30 -30   -30 
 -35 -35   -35 
 -40 -40   -40 
 -45 -45   -45 
 -50 -50   -50 
 -55 0 -5 -50 -55 
 -60 0 -5 -55 -60 
 -65 0 -5 -60 0 
 -70 0 0 0 0 
 -75 0 -5 0 0 
 -80 0 -5 0 0 
 -85 0 -5 0 0 
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Subject 30 -10 -10   -5 
 -15 -15   -15 
 -20 -5 -5 -15 -5 
 -25 -20   -25 
 -30 -15 -15 -15 -15 
 -35 -20 -25 -20 -20 
 -40 -25 -25 -25 -25 
 -45 -20 -25 -40 -20 
 -50 -25 -25 -25 -25 
 -55 -10 -15 -50 -10 
 -60 -25 -30 -25 -25 
 -65 -20 -20 -20 -20 
 -70 -15 -15 -65 -15 
 -75 -20 -20 -20 -20 
 -80 -15 -15 -15 -15 
 -85 -10 -15 -10 -10 
      
Subject 31 -10 -10   -10 
 -15 -15   -15 
 -20 -20   -20 
 -25 0 0 0 0 
 -30 0 0 0 0 
 -35 0 0 0 0 
 -40 0 0 0 0 
 -45 0 0 0 0 
 -50 0 0 0 0 
 -55 0 0 0 0 
 -60 0 0 0 0 
 -65 0 0 0 0 
 -70 0 0 0 0 
 -75 0 0 0 0 
 -80 0 0 0 0 
 -85 0 0 0 0 
      
Subject 32 -10 -10   -5 
 -15 -10   -10 
 -20 -15   -15 
 -25 -20   -20 
 -30 -20  -25 -30 
 -35 -15 -20 -30 -35 
 -40 -25 -25 -25 -25 
 -45 -40   -40 
 -50 -35 -40 -45 -35 
 -55 -45 -25  -45 
 -60 -5 -10 -5 -5 
 -65 -60   -60 
 -70 -55 -60 -65 -70 
 -75 -55 -60 -55 -55 
 -80 -45 -50 -75 -45 
 -85 0 0 0 0 
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Conclusions 
 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the objective of this work has been to get a more 
realistic understanding of economic decision making processes by adopting an 
interdisciplinary approach which takes into consideration at the same time economic 
and psychological issues. The research in particular has been focused on the 
psychological concept of categorization, which in the standard economic theory has 
received until now no attention, and on its implications for decision making. 
The three experimental studies conducted in this work provide empirical evidence that 
individuals don not behave according to the perfect rationality and maximization 
assumptions which underly the SEUT, but rather as bounded rational satisfiers who try 
to simplify the decision problems they face through the process of categorization.  
 
The results of the first experimental study, on bilateral integrative negotiation, show that 
most of the people categorize a continuum of outcomes in two categories (satisfying/not 
satisfying), and treat all the options within each category as equivalent. This process of 
categorization leads the negotiators to make suboptimal agreements and to what I call 
the “Zone of Agreement Bias” (ZAB). 
 
The experimental study on committees’ decision making with logrolling provides 
evidence of how the categorization of outcomes in satisfying/not satisfying can affect 
the process of coalition formation in multi-issue decisions.  
In the first experiment, involving 3-issues and 3-parties decisions under majority rule, 
the categorization of outcomes leads most of the individuals to form suboptimal 
coalitions and make Pareto-dominated agreements.  
The second experiment, aimed at comparing the suboptimizing effect of categorization 
under majority and unanimity rule, shows that the unanimity rule can lead to a much 
higher rate of optimal agreements than the majority rule. 
The third experiment, involving 4-issues and 4-parties decisions provides evidence that 
the results of experiments 1 and 2 hold even when the level of complexity of the 
decision problem increases. 
 217 
 
 The third experimental study, on decision making under risk, has given proof that most 
of the people do not adopt an optimizing algorithm in order to evaluate the options 
available to choice; rather they categorize the set of options in two categories (risk/no 
risk) and the relevant decision is made only between these two categories. Once the 
subjects have opted for the first category, the decision on the effective entity of the risk 
to be taken plays but a secondary role, and is made almost at chance.  
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